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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I have attempted to deal with various 
aspects of Talaq (divorce) in Hindus and Muslims. 
Now-a-days divorce has become so fre^juent in our society 
that in almost all the courts of law in India there are a 
large number of cases of divorce rather than the 
performances of marriage in the court. Hence, the laws of 
divorce in both the communities are sometimes required to 
be amended as per requirements of the circumstances. 
So far as Hindu Shastras are concerned, no 
provisions for divorce are found. It was only in 1955 that 
the government has passed an act in this regard so that 
the spouses involved may not come across any situation 
which make complicate their existence. This act has 
further been amended according to the circumstances and 
condition prevailing in the society. 
In the first chapter of this work various aspects 
and effects of divorce in religious books of both the 
relegion has been given .Condition prevailing in pre and 
post independent India is also surveyed in this chapter. 
Hindu Shastric Law, as I have been pointed out here, 
attached great sanctity to the concept of marriage by 
declaring it as a sacrament and holding it as an 
indissoluble bond between the spouses which is supposed to 
subsist not only during the life times but also in next 
existence in heaven. From the religions and spiritual 
point of view even the death of one of the marriage 
partner does not mean dissoulution of the marriage. That 
is why a Hindu widow was not allowed to remarry, although 
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there are some Shastric laws which are capable of being 
construed either as outhorising a woman to take a second 
husband in some cases, e.g. when her husband is impotent, 
lost, died, or becomes a relegious ascetic, or as 
countenancing customs permitting remarriage provided 
those conditions obtained such an other analogus texts may 
'»J terna ti veJy be interpreted in part as cases of 
presumtion of death actual death or civil death and would 
conceivably be seen by the orthodox as venial breaches of 
the Shastric pattern of the indissolubility of marriage. 
Apastamba says, "He who has unjustly forsaken his 
wife shall put on an ass's skin with the hair turned 
outside and beg in seven houses saying, 'Give alms to him 
who forsook his wife'. That shall be his livelihood for 
six months." Manu, Narada and Vasisbtha also provide 
(2) 
sanctions against the unjust abandonment of a wife. 
This shows that even abandonment; which is comparable to 
judicial separation in English law and Islamic Law, was 
not recognised at Hindu Shastric Law. In fact the 
prevailing sentiment of Hindu society has always been 
repugnant to the idea of divorce and remarriage of females, 
excepting the regions where divorce is practised by (3) 
custom. 
(1) Apastamba 1.10.28, 19-20, S.B.E., II. 
(2) Manu IX, 30, S.B.E., 25; Narada XII, 95, S.B.E., 33; 
Vasishtha XXVIII, 2-3, S.B.E., 14/ these texts are 
discussed earlier at chapter I. 
(3) See also J.D.M. Derrell, Religion, Law and the State 
in India, London, 1968, pp. 356-358. 
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The existence of rigid orthodox Shastric rules 
against permitting divorce inevitably had given rise to 
various problems to the couple as well as the society and 
created cases of real hardship which necessitated 
legislative measure, e.g., Baroda Hindu Nibandha, 1937; 
Bombay Hindu divorce act, 19^7; Madras Hindu (Bigamy 
Prevention and divorce) Act, 1949; Saurashtra Hindu 
Divorce act, 1952 and finally the Hindu Marriag Act, 1955. 
The Marriage Laws (Ammendment) Act, 1976 (No 68 of 1976) 
was passed by the Parliament. This act has further amended 
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage act, 
J954 (Received the assent of the president on 27th May, 
1976) provided a uniform system of marriage or divorce for 
all Hindus in India. 
I have also discussed in details in this chapter 
(Unit-D) about divorce in the light of Islamic Law, Talaq 
(divorce) is strongly condemned in Islam and it should not 
be resorted unless it becomes impossible for the spouses to 
live together in peace and harmony. But once it is 
pronounced by the husband it will upheld and valid 
although there may be no appropriate cause for i t . It is 
described in a precept of the Holy Prophet (PBUH.) as the 
worth of all the things that law permits. f Islam takes a 
realistic and sympathetic view of human affairs and 
therefore it attaches great importance to the happiness of 
both the spouses. In Islam marriage in the ordinary course 
is to last till one of the spouses dies. But if a husband 
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and wife can not live happily together so that the very 
objects of marriage are defeated and it becomes a mere 
farce, then its continuance is no longer considered 
desirable. Under such circumstances, divorce and 
dissolution of marriage are allowed under Islamic law. 
A Muslim marriage, unlike marriage in certain other 
religions, is not a sacrament. It has been stated by some 
writers and also held in some cases that it is a civil 
contract. But this view is equally incorrect and a Muslim 
marriage is not a mere civil contract. Great importance 
has been given to marriage by Islam andt al-Durr-ul-Mukhter 
and Ashbah wan Nazair and other books have called it an 
act of devotion. The Holy Prophet (P. B .U .H.) has said, 
"Marriage is my Sunnah." But in spite of the above it is 
not to be considered as sacred and indissoluble tie. A 
sacrament cannot be violated but Muslim Law unquestionably 
allows divorce. The Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) has said, "of 
all the permitted things divorce is the most abominable 
with Allah." Even when a man is not satisfied with his 
wife, the Holy Qur'an enjoins forbearance. It says,"And 
retain them (the wives) kindly. Then if you hate them, it 
may be that you dislike a thing while'^- 'Allah has put 
(5) I-
abundant good in it." T^6^2> 
If it is established that a husband and wi'fe cannot live 
together in peace and harmony, they are given the option 
(i) 5unan-E~Abu Dawud, I,-296. (5) Qur'an, IV:19. 
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to separate. Divorce is also permitted when the wife's 
conduct is undesirable as when she does injury to her 
husband or is not chaste. This rule is based on a Our'anic 
text wherein the husbands has been enjoined "to keep the 
wives with kindness". Thus it is laid down in the 
Qur'an, "And if you fear a breach between the two (husband 
and wife), then appoint an arbiter from his (husband's) 
people and an arbiter from her (wife's) people. If they 
desire agreement, Allah will effect harmony between 
(7) them". Judicial separation in which the aggrieved 
spouse is allowed to live separate from the other without 
the marriage being dissolved is an institution not 
recognized by the Islamic Law. The reason for this is that 
the objects of marriage are not restored by the judicial 
separation, while it may be result in immorality which in 
Islam is an evil far greater than divorce. The Islamic 
law, while it permits divorce, insists that there shall be 
some guarantee that the husband or the wife is not acting 
from caprice or frivolity or on the impulse of a momentary 
provocation. For this purpose certain restriction are 
imposed by the law upon the spouses right to dissolve 
their marriage. 
In the second chapter grounds of divorce in both 
the religions is discussed at length (in details). It is 
under this chapter that the grounds for divorce have been 
(6) Qur'an, 11:231. (7) Qur'an, IV:35. 
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discussed and compared with Islamic law. Hindu Law of 
divorce is by no means identical with Islamic law which is 
resorted to for the sake of clari fication of legal terms. 
In interpreting the concept of desertion, cruelty and 
other matrimonial faults Indian courts frequently look at 
the English case-law in order to find out how English 
judges have construed the same words. Consequently Eglish 
decisions seem to have a strong persuasive authority in 
this respect. Where there are no judicial precedents, not 
only English decisions but also Indian decisions under 
different statutes, e.g., the Indian Divorce Act, 1969 and 
Special Marriage Act, i954, are referred to if they throw 
light on a similar point. This is obvious from a study of 
case-law. 
"Living in adultery" is a ground for divorce under 
S .13, ID (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Here this 
term has a wider meaning than in 5.297 of the Indian 
Penal Code and 5. ^88 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
Modern Hindu law gives a right of divorce on the ground of 
"living in adultery", while a single act of sexual 
intercourse with a person other than his or her spouse 
entitles the innocent party to a decree of judicial 
separation. It is interesting to compare this with the 
situation at Hindu Shastric Law and see what amounted to 
adultery in these days. 
The grounds for divorce, as I have discussed, are 
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based on the doctrine of matrimonial o ffen ce, namely, the 
commission by one spouse (the guilty) of a matrimonial 
offence on which the other (the innocent spouse) petitions 
for relief by way of dissolution of marriage. The relief 
may be refused if the petitioner is not so innocent, as 
for instance, where he has committed adultery or other 
matrimonial affence and the court's discretion is not 
exercised in his favour. 
Under Islamic law, if the family peace is disturbed 
which is not returnable then husband can give divorce 
unilaterally or the wife can take divorce. (The other 
grounds of divorce are, (1) when any one of the spouses 
renounces Islam (2) if the wife embraces Islam. If the 
husband embraces Islam and his wife, belongs to a 
non-scriptural refuses to embrace. In such cases divorce 
is spontaneous. All this grounds of divorce are analysed 
in great large in this chapter. 
While in the third chapter various modes of divorce, 
ways of dissolution of marriage (For Hindu & Muslim) are dealt 
with. Various modes of divorce under Islamic law are very 
clear and it can be taken directly from Hadith and Qur'an. 
Specially the details description can be obtain in 
different books of Fiqh by deferent outhers. I have used 
the various descriptions of Holy Qur'an, Hadith and the 
books of Fiqh for the deferent circumstances. 
As divorce is not allowed in Hindu Shastric law so 
-:VIII:-
there is no question of gating or obtaining any way or 
mode of divorce in Hindu Shastra. But in judicial law two 
types of modes or ways are aval lable to take or gives 
divorce for Hindu. These are the features of this chapter. 
Under which conditions or from which time the 
divorce will come into effects are the matter of 
discussion of fourth chapter. For the Hindu divorce comes 
into effect after the judicial court comes to a final 
decision on the petition filed by any one of the couple 
and the parties are bound to wait upto the final decision 
of the court about the divorce. As full descriptions are 
available in Hadith and in the books of Figh so the 
conditions and the time from which divorce comes into 
effect are discussed in the light of Islamic law. The 
various important words of the Holy Qur'an and the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH.) have been quoted with full explanation. 
In fifth chapter I have discussed the modification 
of the divorce law in Independent India for both the 
communities the divorce laws for the Hindu have been 
modified many times from time to time. The details 
description of this modification, after independence , 
have bee given in this chapter. 
Where as the rules and conditions of divorce are 
available in Islamic books so there were no need of new 
rules of divorce for the Muslim. It has been taken from 
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Islawic books without any considerable change. And hence 
there was no need of further modi fication, It was 1939 when 
the divorce laws for Muslim were described in a little 
different manner, without any change in original laws. 
In sixth chapter a qualitative comparision and the 
points of the similarties and dissimilarities of divorce 
laws for both the Hindu and the Muslim, in respect of 
grounds, Modes, effects, etc, have been discussed. 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIVORCE UNDER 
THE HINDU AND THE MUSLIM LAW 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Mottov of $l|tlos;opI}p 
IN 
SUNNI THEOLOGY 
BY 
MOHD. YUNUS Abl 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF 
DR. ZAINUS SAJIDIN SIDDIQUI 
Reader 
DEPARTMENT OF SUNNI THEOLOGY 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
1994 
^l ^ V-
-"0 ;,.- ., 
2;3,FE3199S 
CBEcr: 
^J200B 
T4648 
DEDICATED 
to MY 
LOVING MOTHER 
DEPARTMENT OF SUNNI THEOLOGY 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH—202 002 (INDIA) 
Dr. Zainus Sa j id in S i d d l q i _ . , .o -««/ 
-' Dated.. 1A.12...19.94. 
Supervisor 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
This is to certify that the research work 
embodied in this thesis entitled "A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF DIVORCE UNDER THE HINDU AND THE MUSLIM LAW (IN 
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE)" is an original work carried 
out by MR. MOHD. YUNUS ALI and is suitable for the 
submission for the award of the degree of DOCTOR OF 
PHILOSOPHY in SUNNI THEOLOGY. 
A d)-v->-v>~^ ^'>-\^Cii— j>x^6'-V' 
( DR. ZAINUS SAJIDIN SIDDIQI ) 
C O N T E N T S 
1. Acknowledgement l-ll 
2. Qur'ani Aayat 111-v 
3. Introduction : 1-10 
What does Divorce mean ? General and legal 
effects. 
4. Chapter - I : 11-83 
(A) Divorce according to the leading Hindu 
sources Books-Vedas Shastra-Manu Shastra-
Yajnavalkya etc and Government at Acts. 
(Hindu court Bill) and various schools. 11-65 
(B) Divorce according to the Quran/Hadith/Leading 
School of Jurisprudence. The Latest acts-pre-
post Independent India. 66-83 
5. Chapter - II : 84-125 
(A) Grounds of Divorce under Hindu Law. 84-110 
(B) Grounds of Divorce under Islam (Muslim Law) . 111-125 
6. Chapter - III : 126-184 
(A) Modes of Divorce/Dissolution of Marriage 
under Hindu Law. 126-136 
(B) Modes of Divorce/Dissolution of Marriage 
under Islam (Muslim Law). 137-184 
7. Chapter - IV : 185-228 
(A) Effective Divorce under Hindu Law. 185-193 
(B) Effective Divorce under Islam (Muslim Law). 194-228 
8. Chapter - V : 229-270 
Hindu and Islam (Muslim Law) on Divorce and the 
concerned acts causes of the Independent India. 
9. Chapter - VI : 271-281 
Point of Similarities and dissimilarities (in the 
both Laws) in the above fields. 
10. Conclusion : 282-287 
Recapiutulation 
11. Bibliography 288-299 
IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, MOST GRACIOUS AND MERCIFUL 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
It is my first duty to express my gratitude to 
the "Almighty Allah" for providing and guiding all the 
chan^ls of the work in cohesion and coordination to make 
this study possible. 
It is a great pleasure to express my indebtedness 
and deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Qazi 
Zalnus Sajldin Siddiqui, Reader in the Department of 
Sunni Theology, Aligarh Muslim University for 
encouragement, expert advice and valuable guidance. 
4^ 
( MOHAMMAD YUNUS ALI ) 
I iil) 
- r 
> > ? ^ ' ^ ' . / ^ . ' j J 
(^<u) 
rr^\ oJ^\ ' 4^-^ ^ * j ^ JUii cy^<^^ 
, * ^ ' * . / / / • » . > * • • • ' 
vrt5o>-lt • > : y * t / > ^ ^ u \ <:j\ 
W) 
clx'^y***^ 
. / i *" 
.v»^v d;LJ\ 
» >, 
_ / y -* — . / 
X t > / » ' ' • . • > / » • ^ • • 
- yr^' 
.^ ^ - - ' >" ^ , , .'^, >» / / ' r ^ r ' ' . ." ^ } •^d> ^ •* • • ^ 
' Vij> 
INTRODUCTION 
WHAT DOES DIVORCE MEAN? GENERAL, AND LEGAL, EFFECTS 
Meaning of Divorcer- "Divorce" as a verb, has been defined 
as meaning to "separate" and it has been held that 
"separation" or "dissolution" of marriage means divorce, 
but not every such separation or dissolution can properly 
be so designated. So, while the term "divorce" has 
sometimes been broadly defined or applied to include both 
decrees of nullity and decrees of dissolution of marriage, 
especially where the marriage was not vaid but only 
voidable at the option of the injured party, this has been 
declared to be not in accord with modern usage, and 
generally the term denots only dissolution or suspension 
of a marital relation. It does not mean annulment of an 
(1) 
invalid marriage. 
"Divorce is the dissolution in whole or in part of 
(2) the tie of marriage". It includes both the complete 
abrogation of the marriage relation known as a divorce a 
vincula matrimonial which carries with it the power of 
re-marriage on the part of both the parties to the 
marriage and also that incomplete weverance not involving 
powers to re-marry, which was formerly known as divorce a 
mensa et thro, and is now termed "Judicial Separation". 
Less strictly, divorce is commonly understood to inclu(3e 
Judicial declarations of nullity of marriage, which while 
practically terminating the marriage relation and proceed 
2:-
in law on the basis of the marriage never haviny been 
( 3) legally established. 
In Hindu Religion, marriage being a sacramental 
union - an inviolable and immutable union thus even 
death cloesnot dissolve the marriage. The Dharmashastra do 
not recognise divorce, and any attempt to reduce from 
_!. o- • -J.- 0. J. ('*) The Christian concept of marriage stary Simiriti texts. '^ ^ 
is intended to last for life, whereas under the Hindu 
Shastric law marriage is deemed to be a sacramental bond 
continuing upto heaven. The proposition that divorce 
recognised by some Smritikars is nothing but one's 
inability to comprehend the basic concepts that the 
Dharmashastra propounded. However, the Dharmashastra's 
adherence to the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage 
did not hamper the recognition of the peopl's need of 
divorce, and a particular section of Hindus say lower 
class^ did enjoy the right of divorce. This was under 
the custom which prevailed over the sacred law customary 
modes of divorce made easy. In some cases a marriage could 
( 5) be dissolved by mutual consent. Some times divorce 
(6) 
could also be purchased. Very little formalities for 
dissolving a marriage were needed. Many time it was 
purely a private act of the parties. In some communities a 
forum was nocessary in the shape of either a Panchayat or a family 
CounciT. ''customary divorce was the privilege of the lower 
castes and higher castes seldom had a custom with 
- • •? 
(8) 
permited divrce. 
Meaning of Divorce in Islam (Muslim Law)s-
Talaq "Divorce" is an Arabic word which means "Undoing of 
or release a Knot", It is used by Muslim jurists to 
denote the release of a woman from the marriage tie, and 
means a Talaq (divorce). 
The term talaq is explained in the dictionary is 
(9 ) th taking off of any tie or restraint. In the language 
of Law it is the taking off of the marriage tie by 
appropriate words. Talaq in its primitive sense means 
dismission. In law it signifies the dissolution of a 
marriage by the annulment of its legality by pronouncing appreciates 
words. The terra has acquired a clear and definite 
meaning as the dissolution of the marriage tie by a 
declaration of the husband. It is not only used in the 
sense in the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet 
(peace be on him) but habitually as a matter of usage 
although its root meaning is "setting free" or "letting 
loose". The word talaq and its grammatical variations 
are terms of art and the technical meaning which they have 
acquired by usage is "freedom from the bondage of marriage" 
(12) 
and not from any other bondage. 
-:4:-
"Divorce". The term "divorce" is sone what ambiguous and 
has been often indiscriminately used as synonym with 
Talaq. The term "Talaq," in law is used in two senses 
(1) a restricted sense in which it is confined to 
separation effected by use of certain appropriate words by 
the husband; and 
(2) a wider sense, in which it covers all separations for 
causes originating in the husband. 
Baillie uses the term "divorce" for all 
separations originating from the husband and "repudiation" 
for talaq in the limitd sense, namely of saparation effcted 
0.3) by use of appropriate words. The term has got a still 
wider connotation in this thesis. Certain forms of 
dissolution of marriage Khula and Mubaraat are covered by 
the generic term "divorce",. The various forms can be enu-
merated as under:-
A valid Muslim marriage *may be dissolved by 
divorce in the following forms as stated in the sections 
of this chapter noted below:-
(1) Talaq, or repudiation by the husband; 
(2) Ila or the vow of continence by the husband; 
(3) Zihar or injurious assimilation of the wife by the 
husband to certain prohibitd relations; 
(4) Khula or redemption by the wife; 
(5) Mubarra or separation by Mutual cnsent; 
- • 5 •-
(6) Li'an, or imprecation. 
Divorce with and without intervention of Court;-
A divorce may be made in some cases through the Court and 
in other cases without intervention of the Court. They may 
be analysed as below:-
(1) Divorce without intervention of court:-
(a) by the husband by talaq. H a or Zihar; 
(b) by the wife by talaq-e-tafweez; 
(c) by mutual agreement between the parties by Khula or 
Mubaraat . 
(2) Divorce through the Court:- ' 
(a) by the husband by li'an; 
(b) by the wife by claim under Act 8 of 1939. 
(1) Pre-Islamic Period;- Among the pre-Islamic Arabia, 
the power of divorce occupied by the husband was unlimitd. 
He could repeat the word Talaq (divorce), divorce again as 
many times as he may prefer. He could, moreover, if 
he was so bent, swear that he would has no 
intercourse with his wife, though still living with 
her. He could arbitrarily accuse his wife of 
adultery, dismiss her and leave, her with such notoriety 
as would deter other suitors; vrtiile he himself would go 
exempt from any formal responsibility of maintenance or 
(L4) legal punishment. 
-: 6: -
According to Abdur Rahim, at least there existed 
four various types of dissoulution of marriage known in 
Pre-Islamic Arabia. These were Talaq, Ila, Zihar and 
Khula. A woman if absolutely separated through any of 
these four modes was probably free to re-marry, but she 
could not do so until period called Iddat, had passed. 
It was to ascertain the possibility of the child. 
But it was not a strict rule. Some times. Pregnant v/ife 
was divorced and was married to another person under an 
agreement. It is interesting to note that the period of 
Iddat in case of death of husband then was one year. 
After the advent of Islam;- The Holy Prophat (PBUH) of 
Islam looked upon these customs of divorce with extreme 
disapproval; and regarded their practice as calculated to 
undermine the foundation of society. It was impossible, 
however, under the existing conditions of society to 
abolish such customs entirely. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) had 
to mould the mind of an uncultured and semi-barbarous 
community to a civilized society. Accordingly he allowed 
the exercise of the power of divorce to husbands under 
certain conditions. He permited to divorce parties three 
distinct and separate periods within which he might 
endeavour to become reconciled; but should all attempts at 
reconciliation prove unsuccessful, then in the third period 
the final separation become effective 
-:7:-
Holy 
The reforms of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be on 
him) marked a new departure in the history of Eastern 
legislation. He restrained the unlimited power of divorce 
by the husband, and gave to the woman right of obtaining 
the separation on reasonable grounds. He pronounced "talaq 
to be the most detestable befor God of all permitted 
things" for it prevented conjugal happiness and interfered 
with the proper upbringing of children. 
Effect of Dissolution of Marriage;-
The dissolution of marriage either by talaq 
(divorce) or otherwise gives to the following results: 
(1) The marriage, becomes dissolved immediately in the 
case of an irrvocable divorce and in the case of a 
revocable divorce on the expiry of the wife's iddah. 
(2) The parties become absolutely prohibitd to each 
other on the pronouncement of triple divorce and cannot 
even remarry until and unless the wife marries another 
person and that marriage is dissolved after consummation. 
Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 in 
force in Pakistan, has modified this rule to some extent. 
Thus it is laid down as under. 
Talaq (i) Any man who wishes to divorce his wife, shall as 
soon as may be after the pronouncement of talaq in any form 
whatsoever give the chairman notice in writing of his 
having done so, and shall supply a copy therof to the 
wife. 
(ii) "....a talaq, unless revoked earliar, expressly 
expiration of ninety days from the day on which notice 
under sub-section (1) is delivered to the Chairman of the 
Union Council. 
(iii) If the wife being pregnant at the time talaq is 
pronounced, talaq shall not be effective untill th period 
mentioned in sub-section (3) or pregnancy whichever be 
later, ends. 
(iv) Nothing shall debar a wife whose marriage has been 
terminated by talaq effective under this section from 
re-marrying the same husband, without an intervening 
marriage with a third person unless such termination is 
for the third time so effection." Under the generalMuslim 
law the parties came remarry, without the necessity of an 
intervening marriage only if the divorce has been 
pronounced once or twice. 
(3) Cohabitation between the parties becomes unlawful 
from the time of the pronouncement of an irrevocable 
divorce and in the case of a revocable divorce from the 
time of expiry of the wife's 'iddah. 
(4) The wife shall be entitled to contract another 
marriage on the expiry of her 'iddah. 
(5) The husband cannot marry after divorce, certain 
women, prohibited to him on account of his marriage He 
-:9:-
also cannot marry another woman during this period if the 
divorced wife was one of four living wives. 
(6) The v/ife has to observe, 'iddah for the prescribed 
period unless she is exeirpted for its observance. 
(7) The husband's liability for maintenance of the wife 
terminates on the expiry of the period of the wife's 
'iddah. 
(8) The wife's prompt dower becomes due in the case of 
revocable divorce on the expiry of the wife's 'iddah and 
immediatly in the case of irrevocable divorce without any 
demand being made by the wife. 
(9) The parties right to inherit to each other ceases 
immediately an irrevocable divorce is pronounced. In the 
case of a revocable divorce the right shall ceases on the 
expiry of the period of the prescribed 'iddah'. 
(10) Nasab or Legitimacy of a child shall be established 
only if it is born within a certain period from the time 
of dissolution of marriage. 
General Effect of Dissolution of Marriage;-
From the above one can see that Talaq has been very 
much condemned who both in the Holy Qur'an and Hadith and 
thus is treated as most disfavoured act creating a number 
of problems for the parties involved. Not only the parties 
even the society is very much effected. Talaq/ in the 
present time has an economic affect also. It affects the 
-:10:-
children, their up bringing and alround progress either 
without mother or father. In brief, the general effects of 
Talaq are very bad and far reaching in very rare case it 
becomes peace for the parties who are thus separated. 
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CHAPTER-I 
UNIT-A 
Divorce according to the leading Hindu Sources Books -
Vedas Shastra-Manu Shastra-Yajnavlakya etc and Government 
at Acts. (Hindi court Bill) and various Schools. 
1. The Nature of Hindu Marriage:- In Hindu law, that is 
to say, in the dharma Shastra or 'orthodox' Juridical 
theory of India, marriage (Vivaha) is one of the ten 
samkaras necessary for men of the twice born classes and 
the only Vedic sacrament for women. (1) As in canon law 
and moral theology matriminum is treated under sacraments, 
so in Hindu law vivaha is not treated under vyavahara 
(litigation) but under samskara. A samskara is a sacrament 
or a purificatory act. Marriage is considered sacred 
because it is said to be complete only on the performance 
of the sacred rites attended with sacred procedure. This 
samskara gives rise to the status of wifehood and its 
performance cannot be annualed by the fact that the 
husband or wife lapses from virtues i.e. by committing 
adultery.(2) It is almost impossible to define marriage 
in legal terms but the Shastric concept of marriage would 
seem to be as a union between a man and a woman which 
arises at the time when the ceremony of marriage (i.e.) 
(samskara) has been compleleted, the bridegroom having the 
requisite equalifications for taking a girl in marriage 
and the bride the qualifications for being given in 
marriage, and this procedure having been completed before 
the nuptial fire.(3) Marriage is a sacramental rite, 
which is performed for the girl for the purpose of making 
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her a wife and is marked by the holding of hands along 
with its entire procedure and subsidiary details.(4) It 
gives the status of husband and wife to the married 
couple. The mantras used in ceremony of wedding create a 
wife. The sacrament becomes complete by the use of those 
mantras. As regards the marriage of a Sudra, there are no 
mantras but other ritesapply excludingthe mantras.(5) 
2. The Purpose of the Samskarasi- The exact purpose of 
Samskaras was left rather vague in our authorities. A 
critical look at the list of Samskaras will reveal that 
their purposes were manifold. According to ancient Hindu 
religious belief man was surrounded by superhuman 
influences which were powerful for good or evil 
consequences. These influences could interfere in every 
important occasion in man's life. Therefore/ the Hindus 
tried to remove hostile influences and attract beneficial 
ones, so that man might grow and prosper without external 
hindrances and receive timely directions and help from 
gods and spirits. Another purpose of the Samskaras was the 
attainment of heaven. It had also a psychological value, 
impressing on the mind of the person concerned that he had 
assumed a new role and must strive to observe its rules(6) 
The Vivaha-Samskara consists essentially in an acceptance, 
which produces the mental impression that the girl is 
man's wife, and wifehood arises from her having undergone 
the Samskara, which Samskar itself could not occur but for 
the marriage.(7) 
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During the samskara of marriage a bride groom is 
said to be an active receiver of the bride, who is taken 
by him and given by her father or other guardian. From the 
Shastric point of view the religious aspect of marriage 
was so highly rated that a father was supposed to be under 
a sacred duty to give his daughter in marriage at the 
appropriate age, neglect of which duty was regarded as a 
sin.(8) A critical look at the concept of Hindu Shastric 
marriage \.ill show that ithas underwent changes from time to 
time. 
3. Marriage in the Vedic Period;- It was a simple 
religious ceremony consisting of grasping the hand of the 
bride by the bridegroom. The Rigveda enjoins, "I take the 
hand for good fortune, that thou mayest attain old age 
with me as thy husband; the gods have given thee to me 
that I may be master of the household."(9) 
4. Maarriaqe in the Sutra Period;- The procedure of 
marriage became complex during the Sutra period. The 
bridegroom was to lead the bride three times round the 
nuptial fire, and the ceremony was completed on taking the 
seven steps by the couple. The wife was shown the pole 
star, which was symbolic of the fact of her stability in 
her husband's home.(10) 
5. Marriage in the Sinriti Period.;- During this period we 
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During this period we notice various forms of 
marriage, eight of which are briefly dealt with below, 
(i) The Brahma;- The gift of a daughter, after decking 
her with costly garments and honouring her by presents of 
jewels, to a man learned in the Vedas and of good conduct, 
whom the father himself invites, is called the Brahma 
(12) 
rite. Medhatithi on Manu XXVII comments that there is 
nothing to indicate the conection of special dressing with 
either the bride only or with the bridgegroom only; hence 
they should be taken as relating to both. This seems to be 
the correct view, because in practice eve today both the 
bride and the bridegroom are specially dressed ad adorned 
, for the wedding. 
(ii) The Daiva;- This was a gift of a daughter whom her 
father had beautifully clothed when the sacrifice had 
already begun, to the officiating priest, who performed 
that act of religion. 
(iii) The Arsha;- When the father gave away -his daughter 
according to the rule, after receiving from the 
bridegroom, for the fulfilment of the sacred law, a cow 
and a bull or two pairs, that marriage was termed the 
Arsha. On the face of this text it appears that the taking 
of the consideration from the bridegroom rendered this 
form inferior to the above two and the Prajapatya below. 
. (13) But this IS doubtful, for Medhatithi on Manu III, 29 
comments that such receiving of the cattle by the father 
was done in obedience to law, and not with the idea of 
receiving it in exchange for the price of the girl. 
(iv) The Prajapatya;- When the father gave away his 
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daughter with honour saying distinctJ^y, "May both of you 
perform together your civil and religious duties." Again 
Medhatithi(l4) comments that the formula implies the 
condition that the daughter is to be given to the 
bridegroom only if he fulfills his duty, properly and 
pleasure along with her. Therefore, this form was regarded 
as inferior by reason of this condition. Ludwick 
Sternbach,(15) whose study is based on the Dharmasastra, 
Arthasastra, Kamasutra, Grihya-Sastras . and the 
Mahabharata, concludes that when the forms of marriage are 
closely examined there existed in ancient India not eight 
but eleven forms of marriage. The difference betvjeen the 
Projapatya and the Brahma is that the bridegroom in the 
former is the suitor, i.e. he has solicited the girl, and 
is not invited by the father of the bride . He is an 
applicant for the bride's hand and this makes it inferior 
to the Brahma form, where the bridegroom is voluntarily 
and respectfully invited by the father of the bride to 
accept his daughter. A Hindu marriage, being a gift of the 
bride, loses a part of its merit if it is not voluntary or 
wilful, but has to be applied for. The Prajapatya was 
probably used only for a monogamic and hvjsband could not 
renounce his wife and take to the order of Sanayasa or 
Vanaprastha without her consent or her company. In fact 
the Brahma was originally identical with the Prajapatya, 
because Apastamba and Vasishtha do not mention Prajapatya 
at all. The Prajapatya was added later, therefore, the 
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Smriti writers fail to bring out the difference between 
the two.(16) Prajapatya is the second best and approved 
form. (17) As in the Brahma form so in the Prajapatya one 
the bridegroom is invited and honourably received by the 
father of the bride.(18) 
(v) The Asura;- The bridegroom having given as much 
wealth as he could afford to the father. Paternal Kinsman 
and to the girl herself took her as his bride. This being 
a sale of the bride was regarded as a base form of 
marriage and was prohibited by Manu.(19) This form was 
recognised by the Hindu law during the British period. In 
Kailasanatha V. Parasakthi. (20) It was hold that the 
distinctive feature of the Asura form of marriage is the 
giving of or money's worth to the bride's father for 
his benefit or as consideration for his giving the girl in 
marriage. However, a courtesy or complimentary present 
given to the bride or her family has to be distinguished 
from bride-price.(21) Money paid by the bridegroom for 
the specific purpose of making jewellery for the bride is 
not bride-price and does not make the marriage an Asura 
one.(22) Now after India Independence the whole situation 
was reviewed by the Supreme Court,(23) which held that the 
Asura is an unapproved form of marriage and the test of it 
is that there shall be not only benefit to the bride's 
father, but that benefit shall form a consideration for 
the sale of the bride. 
(vi) The Gandharva;- This was a marriage arising out of 
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mutuai d08lre of a man and a woman^ and can b« compared 
with the modern love marriage. It was enjoined by the 
Sastra that a Brahmana could contract ' a marriage 
legitimately in one of the first four forms.(24). 
However, in practice at least according to the Mithila 
School of law the Brahmins.(25) In Bhaoni V. Maharaj(26) 
the Gandharva was equated with concubinage. It was held 
that this form had become obsolute as a form of marriage 
giving the status of wife and making the issue legitimate. 
This case is unlikely to be followed in view of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 and changing public opinion, which 
tends to encourage grown up persons to make their own 
decision in the choice of their life partenrs . 
(vii) The Rakshasa;- This was a marriage by seizure of a 
girl by force from her house while she wept and called for 
assistance, after her kinsmen and friends had been slain 
in battle or wounded and their house broken open, 
(viii) The Paisacha;- Where the suitor secretly reduced 
the girl while she was asleep or drunk or disordered in 
intellect that sinful marriage was called Paisacha. This 
is. the eight and the basest. 
The first four marriages are regarded as 
"approved" marriages. It was a Hindu reigious belief that 
sons born of these marriages were radiant with knowledge 
of the Vedas and were honoured by good men. Having these 
qualities of beauty and goodness, possessing wealth and 
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fame, obtaining as many enjoyments as they desire and 
beiny most riyhteous, they would live a hundred years. The 
remaininy four are regarded as blameworthy, from which 
spring sons who are cruel and liars, who hate the Vedas 
I 21) 
and the sacred law. Rakshasa and Paisacha, which were 
condemned by Manu as base and sinful, however did not 
legalise force or fraud as the marriage ceremony had in 
(29) theory to be performed with sacred rites, v/ithout 
which the marital relationship did not arise. Their 
recognition can be justified on the ground that they 
existed in order to validate the circumstances of which 
the unfortunate woman was the victim. The jurists were 
concerned with the results flowing from the circumstances 
preceding the marriage and classified those circumstances 
accordingly. 
According to the sastra inferior forms of 
marriage, namely, Asura, Gandharva, Rakshasa and Paisacha 
do not involve a change of the gotra of the bride, 
which is an essential part of the ceremony, of the Vedic 
marriage, because in such forms there is no voluntary gift 
of the bride by her father to the bridegroom. Approved 
(31) forms were meant for Brahmans who were an important 
caste. According to Manu the first six forms of marriage 
were lawful for a Brahmana, the four last for a Kshatriya, 
and the same four, excepting the Rakshasa, for a Vaisya 
(32) 
and a Sudra. The significance of the approved and 
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unapproved forms of marriage was that it determined the 
devolution of a woman's property on her death. In the 
former the husband and his family/ while in the latter the 
(33) 
father and his family succeed to her Stridhana. Where 
a woman was married in the unapproved forms, her death 
ceremonies were to be performed by a member of the gotra 
of her father, whereas in case of the approved marriage, 
they might be performed either by her husband's gotra or 
her father's. The reason for this distinction seems to be 
that approved marriages were authorised by the families of 
the couple concerned, while the unapproved were contracted 
against the wish of family of the woman concerned, if we 
reserve the case of the Asura marriage, which originally 
did not imply a sacramental transfer but only a 
sale-spiritually (so the sastra seems to imply) she 
remained a member of her natal gotra. That is why she 
retained the gotra of her father. 
If we look critically at the above mentioned eight 
forms of marriage, it will be evident that they were a 
mere eleboration of the concept of marriage (vivaha). They 
took account of local custom and usage, which were 
developing alongside the sastra. A survey of the 
Dharma-Sastra smritis, Nibandhas and the Commentaries 
will prove that Hindu law was never static, but was 
modified by the practice of the time to suit the just 
demands of the people. With the advent of the British 
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rule, the ancient sources of Hindu law began to be 
modified by judicial decisions and legislative enactments, 
while Hindu society assumed a new character because of its 
contact with the Western education, civilisation, economic 
(34) 
and scientific progress. In fact the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955 is the result of the influence which had started 
in the British period, thus the dharroa-sastra's contact 
with actual usage, though sometimes difficult to trace, 
has been, in practice, continuous. 
According to Kautilya, whose Arthasastra (a 
predominantly secular book), reflects practical usages, 
there can be no divorce in case the marriage is contracted 
in one of the approved forms. But if the marriage is in an 
unapproved form, then it can be dissolved by mutual 
consent, if both have come to hate each other. There can 
be no release at the instance of only one party to the 
marriage who has begun to feel aversion to the other party 
in whatever form the marriage may have been 
(35) performed. Kautilya actually says amokso 
dharma-vivahnan "The law does not allow the dissolution of 
marriage between spouses who have undergone a dharmic 
vivaha." The first four marriages are dharmya, i.e., 
connected with righteousness, because they are brought 
about under the authority of the father. Such marriages do 
not admit divorce. 
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6. Nuptial Ceremonies;- According to the plain smriti 
texts marriages in the unapproved forms do not require the 
performance of the religious ceremony, but the sastric law 
as applied by the courts during the British period in 
India held that such ceremony was essential for the 
(37) 
validity of the marriage. This is so even in modern 
(38) 
Hindu Law. It was held in Deivani V. Chidambaram that 
there are two essential elements to constitute a valid 
marriage, viz.; a secular element, which is the gift of 
the bride in the four forms, the transference of dominion 
for consideration in the Asura form, and mutual conset of 
the spouses in the Gandharva form. These must be 
supplemented by the actual performance of marriage by 
going through the forms prescribed by the Grihya-Sutras, 
of which the essential elements are 'panigrahana' (joining 
of hands of the bride and the bridegrooms)• and 'saptapadi' 
(taking of seven steps by the bridal couple). In the case 
of Rakshasa and Paisacha forms also (should these be 
capable of validity in modern times), there should be a 
marriage ceremony prescribed by the sastras. In Bhaurao V. 
(39) State of Maharashtra it was laid down that 
solenmisation of the marriage with proper rites and 
ceremonnies was essential in the Gandharva 'form'. 
Similarly it was recently held by the Supreme Court in 
a case of bigamy that in order to prove the validity of 
the second marriage it is necessary to prove that the 
essential nuptial ceremonies were performed. 
The performance of rites and ceremonies according 
:21:-
to religious beliefs (e.g, saptapadi)or according to 
custom and usage has bnnn reserved by the Hindu Marriage 
(41) Act. 1955. The modern law has been developed xnsuch a 
way as to show that the ceremony though vital to the 
religious purpose is no longer vital to the working of 
secular rights. Thus where a man and woman live as husband 
and wife and have children who are recognised as such by 
their community by the custom the rights of the spouses 
and their children will not be destroyed merely by 
someone's attempting to bring forth evidence that no 
ceremonies of marriage were performed on the couple. 
Whether or not such ceremonies are essential, 
their non performance or wrong performance can be excused 
under certain circumstances by the doctrine of factum 
valet, e.g., where the saptapadi (taking of seven steps) 
is not completed because of an accidental fire or some 
other mishaps, the validity of such a marriage cannot be 
upset subsequently. Where a marriage takes place under a 
custom according to which saptapadi" is not an essential 
ceremony, the non-performance of saptapadi does not 
invalidate the marriage. In considering the validity of a 
marriage it is necessary to distinguish between the 
(43) 
essentials and non-essentials of the custom. The 
presumption that a valid marriage took place can be raised 
where it is established that the marriage was duly 
solemnised but some unessential ceremony was not performed 
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(44) 
or there was some defect in the completion of the rite. 
Thus the sacramental and sastric characteristic of the 
Hindu marriage so far as the performance of the religious 
ceremonies is concerned is still in existence. 
According to the sastric view the spiritual aspect 
of marriage was so important that the husband was said to 
have received his wife from the gods and not wedded her 
according to his own will, for he was doing what was 
(45) 
agreeable to gods. The consequence of marriage was 
that man and woman became one person, as the Veda 
expresses, "Her bones become identified with his bones, 
flesh with flesh, skin with skin." From the time of 
the marriage, they are united in body and mind as well as 
(47) in religious ceremonies. As a river loses its identity 
by merging itself into the ocean, so a wife was supposed 
to merge her individuality with that of her husband. In 
the revealed texts of the Veda, in the traditional laws of 
the Smritis, and in the popular usage, the wife is 
declared to be half the body of her husband, equally 
sharing the outcome of good and evil act. So a Hindu 
marriage was a sacred union of two personalities into one 
for the purpose of the continuance of the society and for 
the uplistment the two by self-restraint, self-sacrifice 
and mutual co-operation for the performance " of holy 
(49) . 
rites. This IS the central concept of Hindu ethics and 
law. 
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7. The Object Of Marriage;- It was threefold, namely 
dharma (the performance of religious and righteous 
duties), praja (progeny) and rati (pleasure). Where the 
Hindu lawgivers regarded dharma as the first and the 
highest aim of marriage, and procreation as the second, 
dharma, according to the sastra, dominated marriage. 
Marriage was a means not merely for satisfying sexual 
desire or to obtain progeny, but to secure a partner for 
the performance of religious duties. It enabled a man, by 
becoming a householder to perform religious sacrifices to 
the gods and to procreate sons. It was the duty of the 
husband to require and the right of the wife to give 
(51) 
co-operation in all religious acts. Manu on the 
authority of the Veda declares that religious rites must 
be performed by the husband and wife together. Women were 
not allowed to perform any sacrifice, vow or fast apart 
from their husbands. They could obtain heaven merely by 
being obdedient to their husbands. 
It was a Hindu belief that a Hindu from his birth 
(52) IS born with three debts, i.e., he owes brahmacarya 
(study of the vedas) to the sages, sacrifice to the gods, 
and progeny to pitris (ancestors). The second purpose of 
the marriage was to procreate sons, who were supposed to 
save a man from hell. A son is called putra because he 
(53) delivers his father from the hell called put. So much 
importance was attached to the birth of a son that a man 
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was said to have conquered the spiritual . worlds and 
(54) 
obtained immortality and heaven by having a son. 
Immediately upon the birth of his first-born son a man was 
(55) . . 
freed from his debt to the ancestors. Legitimate 
progeny being the objective, marriage was a religious 
., (56) 
necessity. 
The purpose of the marriage is further evidenced 
by the procedure of the marriage ceremony, when the 
bridegroom addresses the bride as, "I am heaven you are 
earth, Come! Let us join together so that we may generate 
A male child, a son, for the sake of the increase of 
( 57 ) 
wealth, a blessed offspring of strength." Marriage 
enabled a man to make himself complete by the association 
of his wife and his son. His sacred obligations, i.e., 
the proper performance of his religious duties, faithful 
service to gods, his offspring, highest conjugal 
happiness, heavenly bliss for himself and his ancestors, 
{59) depended on his wife alone, as he was incompetent to 
perform the above mentioned acts without the help and 
presence of the latter. 
The Dissolution of Hindu Sastric Marriage;- It has 
been seen that a Hindu marriage, being a sacrament, once 
performed before the nuptial fire with the sacred texts, 
becomes irrevocable on the completion of the ceremony of 
taking seven steps by the couple. There is no evidence 
as to the practice of divorce as such during the Vedic and 
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Post Vedic periods. It was a holy union of mind, body and 
soul of the spouses and, it was believed, that even death 
did not put an end to it, for the wife remainedtinked with 
her husband in soul after death in the next world. It 
was the highest duty of husband and wife to remain united 
/ go ) 
in marriage and be utterly faithful to each other. ^  It 
was ordained by the Creator that a husband could not 
release his wife by sale or repudiation. The wife was 
required to be obedient to her husband under all 
circumstances. She was expected to worship him as God even 
if he was lacking in good qualities and virtue. 
( CC. ) 
According to Apastamba if the solemn vow of 
marriage is transgressed both husband and wife certainly 
go to hell. Hindu marriage was regarded as an eternal and 
sacred bond which united the husband and wife for the 
performance of their religious sacrifices. Dissolution of 
marriage was thus not contemplated by the sastra, for it 
was un-dharmic, unrighteous and sinful. 
9. Remarriage of Females:- It has been seen that the 
sastra did not countenance divorce. From this the question 
arises whether the remarriage of females was allowed? The 
procedure of performing sastric nuptials was available 
only for virgins, and never for girls who had lost their 
virginity. A girl was fit for being given in marriage 
only once as Manu has said, "Once is a maiden given in 
marriage and once does a man say, 'I will give', this is 
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I en ) 
done only once." The bride is free to be transferred 
from the father's house to that of the husband; but she is 
not allowed to leave her husband's home and go elsewhere, 
i.e., take another husband. This is supported by a hymn of 
the Atharvaveda, which reads, "Hence from the father's 
house, and not thence from the husband's house, I send the 
bride free. I make her softly fettered there so that she 
may live with her husband blessed in fortune and 
(68) 
offspring." This shows that no separation was allowed 
between husband and wife. 
According to the sastra a woman was expected to 
lead a life of chastity and self-denial and was not to 
mention even the name of another man after the death of 
her husband. She who remains virtuous and chaste after 
the death of her husband reaches heaven, although she may 
have no son. On the contrary a woman who from a desire 
to have offspring violates her sacred duty towards her 
deceased husband, brings on herself disgrace in this world 
and loses her place in heaven. "Nowhere is a second 
72 
husband perscribed for a virtuous woman." Thus the 
non-existence of nuptial ceremonies for a second marriage 
and the prohibition of remarriage of women are evidence 
against the recognition of divorce in the matrimonial 
system known to the sastra. 
However, Narada, Parasara and Vasishtha authorise 
a woman to take another husband in five cases, i.e., when 
-'.21:-
her husband is lost or dead, when he becomes a relligious 
ascetic, when he is impotent and when he has been expelled 
(72) . 
from caste. A wife must wait for six years if her 
husband had disappeared, twelve years if he went to a 
foreign country for the purpose of studying. If he was 
heard of she should go to him.^ According to Narada ' 
if the husband had gone abroad a Brahmana wife should wait 
for eight years, or four years if she had no issue. A 
lesser number of years was prescribed for Kshatriya and 
Vaisya wives. After that period she was entitled to take 
another husband. Manu says that if the- husband went abroad 
for sacred duty, the wife should wait for eight years, six 
years if he went for knowledge and fame, and three years 
( 76 ) 
if he went for pleasure or for another wife. He does 
not mention what the wife should do after these years of 
waiting, but remarriage is obviously envisaged in such a 
case. 
Narayana, Kulluka and Raghava following Vasishtha 
say that she should go to see her husband in the place 
where he might be expected to be present. But Nandana and 
ither 
(78) 
(77) Devala are of the opinion that she could take anoth
husband and in doing so there would be no sin at all 
It is argued on the authority of these texts that the 
second marriage of the wife presupposes the dissolution of 
(79) . 
the first. It IS also contended on the authority of 
the Atharva-Veda IX. 5, 27-28, that a widow could remarry 
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on performing the 'Aja Panchoudana' sacrifice. A second 
husband dwells in the same world with his re-wedded wife 
if she offers the 'Aja Panchoudana' to the memory of her 
deceased husband. This argument is supported by the 
funeral hymn in the Rig-Veda X. 18. 8, which reads, "Rise 
woman, thou art lying by the side of one whose life is 
gone; come to the world of the living away from him, thy 
husband that is dead, and become the wife again of him who 
is willing to take thee by the hand and marry thee." 
However, this view did not find favour with Sir 
Gooroodas Banerjee, who explained these texts on the 
ground that these rules either, like the practice of 
raising up issue by a kinsman on an appointed wife, relate 
to an earlier stage of Hindu society in which rapid 
multiplication of the race was regarded as an impoortant 
object, or they merely show the existence of some 
difference of opinion among the Hindu sages on a point on 
which absolute unanimity of opinion can hardly be 
expected. The prevailing sentiment of Hindu society has 
always been repugnant to the second marriage of women. The 
true explanation seems to lie rather in the need of the 
sastra to recognise utilitarian practices. This is evident 
from the Arthasastra of Kautilya, whose provisions reflect 
/ go ) 
customary law and usage. Kautilya allows a woman to 
remarry under certain circumstances, e.g., where her 
husband had gone away on a long journey, or had become an 
•:29: 
ascetic or was dead. She was expected to wait for certain 
periods of time depending upon whether she had children 
and was maintained by her husband's family. Remarriage of 
women in such cases could be attributed to custom and 
usage which were developing alongside the sastra. The 
texts authorising or presumed to be authorising a woman to 
take a second husband may alternatively be construed as 
cases of presumption of death-actual death and civil 
death-and could be seen by the orthodox as only apparent 
breaches of the sastric pattern of the indissolubiity of 
marriage. 
According to the commentaries and digests the 
above mentioned texts do not apply to the present 
(Kali) age. The human race having degenerated from its 
original virtue and purity, the sages of Hindu law, for 
the benefit of human race declared that the remarriage of 
widows in the 'Kali' age is forbidden. A.S. Altekar on 
the authority of the Adityapurana, Devanabhatta and 
Madhava, the commentator on parasara, admits that 
widow-remarriage is no longer valid in the 'Kali' age. 
Widow-remarriage in the present age was so much 
disapproved of that an extended meaning was given to the 
word 'widow' so as to include the betrothed girl whose 
prospective husband had died before the performance of the 
marriage ritual. If by mistake a man happened to marry 
such a girl, he was to perform a penance and abandon her. 
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Mowever, this practice did not find much approval in a 
society which continued to be guided by Manu's sensible 
opinion that no marital tie arises before the marriage 
ceremony is performed. 
The stigma attached to the twice-married woman 
proves that widow-remarriage was not prevalent in orthodox 
Hindu society to which especially the sastra applied. She 
was called a punarbhu, who might be of three kinds, namely 
a 'widow' whose marriage had not been consumated/ one who 
after having left the husband of her youth and betaken 
herself to another, returns to the house of her former 
husband, and the woman, who on failure of brothers-in-law, 
is delivered by her relations to a sapinda 
(blood-relative) of the same caste. 
The Punarbhu was regarded as an inferior 
( Qf.) (87) 
wife, but her issue wore legitimate, though 
according to the quality of her marriage they occupied an 
I 88 ) 
inferior status, as her son (paunarbhava) did not 
inherit his father's property as an heir but as a 
Kinsman. He was not fit for being invited to a 
sradha (a feast given to the Brahmins in the memory 
one's ancestors). The husbands of remarried women were not 
to be associated with nor to be invited to the 
( 91) 
sraddha. The daughters of the Punarbhus were to be 
(92) 
avoided and regarded as girls of the lowest birth. 
They were treated as equal to the "mothers of Sudras." 
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(The mothers of Sudras were fourth-caste wives of a 
Brahmana, wedded for lust, and of low social status), the 
children of these women were not admitted to social 
(93) 
meetings; they were considered as unfit for society. 
Apastamba enumerates the twice-married woman among those 
who are unfit for being taken in marriage. He condemns 
remarriage of females altogether when he says, "If one has 
intercourse with a woman who had already another husband, 
then sin is incurred; in that case the son also 
sinful."^^^^ 
(95) 
According to Vatsyayana who harmonises Kama 
with dharma so that they may not clash in any way, there 
was no regular marriage for a widow, but if a woman who 
had lost her husband was of weak character and was unable 
to restrain her desires, she might unite hersef to a man, 
who was a seeker after pleasure and was an excelent4.over, 
and such a woman was caled punarbhu. In the choice of such 
a lover it was best for her to follow the natural 
inclinations of her own heart. However, the connection 
with her v/as of a loose character. She was more 
independent than the wife wedded according to sacramental 
rites. She assumed the place of a mistress, patronised his 
wives, was generous to his servants and treated his 
friends with familiarity. She was expected to show greater 
knowledge of the arts than his wedded wives and to please 
the lover with the sixtyfour arts of love (karaakalas). She 
-:32:-
participated in sports, festivities, drinking parties, 
garden picnics and other amusements. Vatsyayana says that 
it was improper to establish sexual relations with the 
punarbhu, but such an act was not absolutely condemned, 
because pleasure was the guiding motive in all such 
connection. Thus the position of the punarbhu was quite 
distinct from that of the wedded wife who participated 
with her husband in all reigious performances and had to 
live with decency. The inferior position accorded to the 
punarbhu, the imposition of social penalties upon her 
children, and sometimes upon her husband are evidence 
against the approval of widow-remarriage by orthodox Hindu 
society. 
Divorce, in the sense of dissolution of marriage 
whereby the status of husband and wife ceases to exist as 
such, marital rights and duties are severed by law and the 
spouses are free to remarry, was not recognised at Hindu 
law by the sastra.^ This is also supported by a hymn of 
the Atharva-Veda, which reads, "Be not divided, 0 husband 
and wife; live together all your lives, sporting with sons 
/ 97) 
and grandsons, rejoicing in your happy home." 
According to Vatsyayana even the Gandharva marriage 
(an approved form) when solemnised before the holy fire 
could not be dissolved. He treated this form of marriage 
as the best. In this respect he seems to be more 
humanitarian than religious. By marriage a girl normally 
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became integrated into her husband's family. She formed 
part of the hosehold, which consisted of his parents, 
brothers, unmarried sis. ers and sisters-in-law together 
with their children, all of whom enjoy commensality and 
worship jointly. Whether or not her marital relationship 
with her husband was happy, she could not be uprooted from 
the family by abandonment or supersession. Therefore, 
there was no divorce acknowledged by the dharmasastra. 
However, a husband could abandon or supersede his 
wife under certain circumstances (see later the distiction 
between abandonment and supersession). Such an abandonment 
had to be just and reasonable otherwise a very humi'lating 
(99) punishment is prescribed for such an act by Apastamba 
who says, "He who has unjustly forsaken his wife shall put 
on an ass's skin skin with hair turned outside, and beg 
in seven houses saying, 'Give alms to him who forsook his 
wife.' That shall be his livelihood for. 6 months." 
Similarly if a wife forsook her husband she had to perform 
a hard penance for twelve night. According to Manu a 
wife is punished for her sin of disloyalty to her husband 
in her next life by being born in the womb of a jackal and 
tormented by disease. Narada enjoins that if a man 
leaves a wife who is obedient, of pleasant speech, 
skilful, virtuous and the mother of male issue, the king 
shall make him mindful of his duty by severe punishment. A 
person who leaves a blameless wife should be punished as a 
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thief. Vasishtha makes a sweeping remark when he 
states that though tained by sin, whether she be 
quarrelsome, or left the house or has .suffered criminal 
force or has fallen into the hands of thieves, a wife 
cannot be abandoned. 
She should be abandoned, however, if she yields 
hersef to her husband's pupil, or to his teacher, or a man 
of degraded caste or attempts to kill her husband. 
This shows that even unjust abandonment was not allowed by 
Hindu law, let alone the dissolution of marriage. 
Steele as a result of his enquiries in the early 
British period understood 'abandonment' in the above case 
as equal to divorce, but it is submitted that this was 
incorrect. 'Abandonment' coud be treated as relating to the 
wordly and/or the spiritual purposes of marriage. The 
former would be frustrated, where a wife was addicited to 
drink, was of bad conduct, was diseased, insane, guilty of 
adultery, had attempted to kill her husband or committed 
other heinous crime including procuring abortion. The 
latter purpose of the marriage would be frustrated, if she 
was barren, bore daughters only and had reached the 
menopause. Therefore, the husband would be justified 
in ceasing to cohabit with such a wife, but this 
'abandonment' never had the effect of divorce. 
10. The Distinction Between Abandonment and Supersession;-
Since it might be apprehended that the right to 
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abandon was tantamount to a right to divorce even under 
sastric law, the vocabulary needs to be examined. The 
Sanskrit word used for 'abandonment' is tyaga. 
Medhatithi defines tyaga as giving up all intercourse 
with her and forbidding her to do household work. He says 
that for the wife going off in anger, caused by 
supersession, there are two optionall alternatives in the 
shape of confinement or divorce. Here Jha's translation 
needs to be checked. Medhatithi in fact says tyaga or 
samnirodha, abandonment or confinement in that order are 
alternatives. Tyaga denotes separation from conjugal 
intercourse as opposed to Moksa, which might be teachnical 
divorce. It is not clear whether after being 
abandoned by her husband, a wife was free to marry again. 
Therefore, the word 'tyaga' can denote several things. It 
implies supersession, e.g., where the husband abandoned an 
obedient, pleasant speaking, sonbearing and skilful 
•^  (110) ^^ . , ^. . .. ^u 
wife. It may imply a divorcium a mensa et-thara, 
where the wife became pregnant by another, or attempted to 
kill her husband, or committed heinous crime. In such 
cases she was abandoned from marital intercourse and 
religious ceremonies. It may mean temporary separation, 
where a wife was abandoned for three months for the 
purpose of reforming her. But abandonment in any case 
did not amount to dissolution of marriage whereby the 
status of the husband and wife ceased to exist as such and 
the marriage-tie was severed at law. Some coincidence with 
-•.set-
Christian teaching on divorce is visible here, but the 
point is not appropriate for further exploration here. 
Manu says, "But she who shows aversion towards a 
mad man or an outcaste, a eunuch, one destitute of manly 
strength or one afflicted with such diseases as punish 
crimes, shall neither be cast off nor deprived of her 
property." G. Banerjee on the authority of Kulluka 
and Jagannatha rightly states that what Manu excuses 
here is 'aversion', which means want of diligent 
attention, and not absolute abandonment. Thus the text 
does not authorise even abandonment. This is supported by 
a popular verse which says that a husband could not 
release his wife by sale or repudiatiort. 
The object of 'abandonment' was to punish the wife 
for her misdeeds, e.g., a wife who had committed adultery 
v^ as required to wear clothes smeared with clarified 
butter, and was to sleep on a mat of grass, or in a pit 
filled with cowdung; until her penance had been 
perforemd. The 'abandonment' consists in not allowing 
her to participate in religious rites and conjugal 
matters, not casting her away onto the streets. She was to 
be kept apart in one room and provided with •food and 
raiments. She was to wear dirty clothes and was treated 
with scorn. But after her periodical illness the sin was 
expiated and she was to be restored to her original 
position with her usual rights of a wife. ' Similarly a 
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wife who was disrespectful to her husband; was addicted to 
some evil passion; was a drunkard or diseased should be 
abandoned for three months after depriving her of her 
ornaments and furniture. The object of this temporary 
punishment was to correct the wife and bring her to the 
right way. A husband should bear for one year with a wife 
who hated him. After that he should deprive her of her 
property and cease to cohabit with her. Abandonment 
under the above circumstances is regarded as virtually 
legal dissolution of marriage.^ This is not 
justifiable, for divorce as such did not exist at sastric 
Hindu law. Abandonment in the above cases is reasonable, 
(122) because according to Manu, a husband must be 
constantly worshipped as a god by a virtuous wife. The 
wife was expected to follow the same principle as her 
husband. By doing the above mentioned disgraceful act& , 
she was violating her sacred duty of obedience to her 
husband and was accordingly punishable. 
Supersession (like 'abandonment') could be treated 
as relating to the worldly and/or the spiritual aspects of 
marriage. The former would be defeated and the wife would 
become unfit for the society of her husband, who might 
supersede her at any time, if she was addicted to 
spiritucil liquour, was of bad conduct, rebellious, 
diseased, mischievous or wasteful. Manu allows 
supersession of a barren wife in the eighth year, one all 
o 
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f whose children die in the tenth year, of her who is 
quarrelsome without delay. Baudhyana allows 
supersession of a barren wife in the tenth year of 
marriage, bearing daughters only in the twelfth year, all 
of whose children die in the fifteenth year and uttering 
unpleasant word at once. Kautilya allows 
supersession if a wife remains barren for eight years, if 
she bears still-born children for ten years and if she 
bears only females for twelve years. Then if he is 
^ • ^ u • u • (126) 
desirous of having sons, he can marry again. 
Supersession under the above circumstances is 
justifiable. As the purpose of the Hindu sastric marriage 
is to perform religious rites and beget male progeny, if 
either of the two is frustrated, a man is entitled to take 
(127) 
another wife. The above grounds defeat the religious 
aspect of marriage, because the delivery of the ancestors 
from hell after the death is considered to be brought 
about only by the continuation of the line through sons. 
The supersession had to be just and reasonable, and in the 
case of a sick wife who was virtuous and kind to her 
(128) husband her consent had to be obtained. However, in 
practice husbands could supersede their wives without 
their consent and even against their wishes merely on the 
ground that the wife was of a harsh and disagreeable 
(129) 
nature. Sometimes she was superseded even if she was 
virtuous and was the mother of male issue. But in 
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such a case she continued to occupy her status as a wife, 
and her marital rights remained unimpaired. She must be 
maintained properly and be given compensation as 
Vijananesvara comments, "Though superseded by another 
wife, she must be treated with courtesy, and receive gifts 
and respect as before," In fact she had precedence 
over her husband's subsequent wife in the performance of 
(132) 
religious sacrifices. But if superseded wife goes out 
of her husband's home in anger, she must either be 
instantly confined or abandoned in the presence of the 
. ., (133) family. 
Both in abandonment and supersession the wife 
retained her status of a wife and had to be maintained. In 
the former she lost her conjugal, religious and household 
rights unless and until she was restored to her former 
position after the performance of the appropriate penance. 
unjust abandonment was punishable. Prof. Indra on the 
authority of Daksha Smriti, IV, 45 asserts that the wife 
even though she be fallen should not be abandoned, and a 
man violating this principle is born as a woman in his 
next life and bears the agony of abarrenness. Thus 
according to the sastra a Hindu marriage being a sacrament 
cannot be dissolved, because the wife is a gift from gods 
which cannot be revoked by the act of human beings. 
11. Divorce Under Custom or Usage;- The position under 
the sastra has been indicated briefly. How then is it 
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possible to claim that Hindus in India are familiar with 
divorce? The answer lies in the field of custom. The 
sastra itself recognised custom as a source of law. The 
acts productive of merit which form part of the customs of 
daily life, as they have been settled by the agreement of 
those who know the law, have authority. The 
time-honoured institutions of each country, caste and 
family should be preserved intact. The laws of 
countries, castes and families, which are not opposed to 
(137) 
the sacred law, have also authority. The Veda, the 
sacred tradition, the customs of virtuous men, and one's 
(138 ^  
own pleasure are means of defining the sacred law. 
When it is impossible to act up to the precepts of sacred 
law, is becomes necessary to adopt a method founded on 
reasoning, because custom decides everything and overrules 
(139) 
the sacred law. Customs prevalent m a country must 
be acknowledged as authoritative. There is evidence 
that the smritis themselves represented the existing 
practices. Thus custom is transcendent law according 
to the sages so far as it is consistent with the sastric 
principles. The Vedas, the smritis and the practices of 
good men are the sources of law. 
'^^ "'^ The right of dissolution of marriage recognised by 
custom has been preserved by S. 29 (2) of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 The writers belogning to high 
castes attribute this to the low cultural level and high 
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degree of illiteracy of tribes rendering the enforcement 
of the provisions of the Act both inexpedient and 
(144) (145) 
difficult. According to O'Malley divorce is 
opposed to the saramental idea of marriage/ but is 
permitted by many law castes, on such grounds as the 
unchasity of the wife or be failure to bear sons. Even 
among them, however, it is regarede as a concession to 
ahusband rather than as a right. Divorce or deviations 
from the ordinary Hindu law are to be found only among the 
aboriginal tribes and the lower classes of Aryans; they 
are to be met with among the higher castes of Aryans only 
vi7here (as in Southern India) they are surrounded by 
non-Aryans or have been influenced by non-Hindu 
communities However, this view popular to higher 
caste written is not correct for divorce is known in 
communities which are not necessarily low, e.g., in the 
states of Maharashtra and some parts of the Punjab. 
Divorce is practised custom even by Brahmins.. 
Widows can validly remarry under the custom of 
'Karewa' or 'Darewa'. The most usual form of 'Darewa' is 
when a widow marries the brother of her deceased 
husband. The origin of this custom can be traced from 
(149) the time of the RigVeda. The second marriage is 
contracted under the form known as Chaddar Andazi. 
The fact, that dissolution of marriage and remarriage of 
females are recognised by customary law, is no evidence 
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that people governed by such customs are of low culture or 
of low morality. On the contrary it rather militates 
against it, for public morality is better served by a good 
system of divorce than by ineffective orthdoxy. Moreover, 
the courts do not recognise a custom which is contrary to 
reason, morality and public policy. 
Among the Khasas in the Himalaya districts of 
Uttar Pradesh, marriage is not a sacrament, but a secular 
transaction. The main features are the transfer of 
dominion over the woman for consideration and her actual 
or constructive appropriation as a wife. No stigma is 
attached to divorce and widow-remarriage. Whether a wife 
divorces her husband for just cause, e.g., leprosy or 
impotency, apostacy, etc., or without such a cause, the 
second husband is in all cases required to refund the 
marriage expenses. The marriage can also be dissolved 
by mutual consent of the spouses among the Khasas and the 
a Pra 
(153) 
(152 ) Patwas of Madhy desh. Widow-remarriage is also 
frequently practised. 
In the Assam valley, among some agriculture 
classes, the interchange of pan-leaf constitutes the 
ceremony of marriage, and tearing of the pan-leaf by the 
husband and the wife indicated its dissolution. 
Second marriage is contracted in the forms of 'Sagai' and 
'Shugna' in northern India. Among the Lingayat of 
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south Canara the remarriage of a wife deserted (i.e., 
divorced) by her husband is valid. The remarriage is 
called Serai Udiki. The ceremony consists in tying a toli 
(necklace) and giving a new cloth to the woman.^ ' This 
could only happen if the original bond of matrimony were 
severed. 
Among the lower castes women can remarry under 
certain circustances, e.g., where the husband is impotent 
r where there are constant quarrels between the spouses, 
and the husband with the consent of his wife breaks her 
neck ornament and tears her saree and gives her a chor 
chitti, i.e. a deed of releasement. After this the 
wife is free to contract a second marriage, which is 
called the Pat in the Maharashtra and Natra in 
^ . ^ (158) Gujarat. 
According to the custom prevailing in Manipur 
divorce or Khainaba is permissible even amongst the 
Hindus. There is no condition attached to it, and it can 
be obtained at the pleasure of either spouse, even on a 
slight pretext. The remarriage of a divorced woman is alo 
recognised. The caste system is still practised by 
the orthodox Hindus in India. Particular communities 
governed in their social relations by their castes 
recognise the authority of the Panchayats (i.e. important 
and influential members of the caste) to dissolve the 
marriage. The proceedings of the Panchayats are informal 
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and their judgements are not recorded. Therefore, 
there is lack of material and knowledge on the working of 
divorce under caste rules. The courts do not recognise the 
authority of the caste Panchayat to dissolve a marriage 
without the consent of both parties. However, if such 
divorce is obtained by custom, its existence has to be 
proved by the party alleging it. 
As it has been shown (above at p.33) S. 29 (2) of 
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not disturb the position 
which a customary divorce occupied before the enactment. 
For the operation of this section it must be proved as a 
fact that such customary dissolution of marriage was 
effected. In Andhra Pradesh in the Shepherd's 
community, divorce in accordance with custom is prevalent. 
Where such divorce is obtained it is not necessary for the 
parties to have again to go before the court under S. 10 
or 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and obtain sanction 
of the court to render the divorce valid. 
From all that has been said earlier it must be concluded 
that divorce as such was not recognised by the sasrta. 
Marriage being a sacrament once solemnised with the sacred 
rites before the nuptial fire was irrevocable, and was 
believed to exist even after the death of the husband. So 
a widow was not allowed to remarry, and it was not until 
the passing of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act, 1856 that 
the harshness of this sastric principle was abolished by 
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legalising the remarriage of widow. It is the most 
fashionable view of Indian writers belonging to the high 
castes that dissolution of marriage was actually practised 
by the aborigines and lower communities of non-Aryans to 
Hindu culture cannot be calculated with certainty. As we 
have seen before there has been a mixture of the sastric 
principles and the practice of the people. This is 
testified to by the Arthasastra of Kautilaya and other 
customs. Customary divorce is practised by many 
communities which are by no means completely tribal or 
low. such customs have been rightly preserved by the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955, which recognises a utilitarian concept 
of law. 
12. Legislative Measures;- The Native Converts' Marriage 
Dissolution Act, 1866 provided an indirect way of divorce 
for converts to Christianity. Under this Act when one of 
the spouses adopts Christianity and the other refuses to 
live with the convert on that ground for a period of six 
months, the latter may applly to the court or 
alternatively to dissolve the marriage. 
Under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, the Indian 
Christians could get divorce on the following grounds. 
Under Section 10 any husband could petition for divorce on 
the ground that his wife has, since the solemnisation of 
the marriage, been guilty of adultery. Similarly a 
petition could be presented for divorce by a wife on the 
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ground that her husband has exchanged his Christian 
religion for that of some other, and had married another 
woman; or has been guilty of incestuous adultery; or of 
bigamy with adultery; or of marriage with another woman 
with adultery; or of rape, sodomy or bestiality; or of 
adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery 
would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa at thoro; or 
of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable 
excuse for two years or upwards. 
The Indian Divorce Act, 1869, applicable to 
Christians, was also made available to Hindus marrying 
under the Special Marriage Act, 1872. This was repealed 
and replaced by the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which 
provides under S. 27 that either spouse could petition for 
divorce on the ground that the other has committed 
adultery; or has been guilty of desertion for three years; 
or is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for seven 
years or more for an offence as defined in the Indian 
Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) provided that divorce shall 
not be granted on this round, unless the respondent has 
prior to the presentation of the petition undergone at 
leat three years imprisonment out of the said period of 
seven years; or has treated the petitioner with cruely; or 
has been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period 
of not less than three yeas; or has for a period of not 
less than three years immediately preceding the 
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presentation of the petition, been suffering from venereal 
disease in a communicable form, the disease not having 
been contracted from the petitioner; or has not been heard 
of as being alive for a period of seven years or more; or 
has not resumed cohabitation for a period of two years or 
upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial 
separation against the respondent; or has-failed to comply 
with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights for a 
period of two years or upwards after the passing of the 
decree against the respondent; and by the wife on the 
ground that her husband has been guilty of rape, sodomy, 
or bestiality. Section 28 provides for divorce by mutual 
consent. 
Drastic changes were effected in the personal laws 
of the Hindus by the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. The 
introduction of divorce was an innovation for a proportion 
of Hindus and not all, because by S. 29 (2) of the same 
Act any right recognised by custom or conferred by any 
special enactment, such as the Travancore Nayar Act 
(2 of 1100), to obtain the dissolution of Hindu marriage, 
whether solemnised before or after the commencement of the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been saved. The motive behind 
this enactment was to open the way towards a progressive 
society and to recognise the independence of women. It 
abolished polygamy and introduced divorce and judicial 
separation, which are based on the principles borrowed 
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from the (English) Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 (as 
modified by the (English) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965). 
/^nder S. 13 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 
divorce is available on the following grounds, namely, 
that the other spouse is living in adultery; or has ceased 
to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or has 
been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of 
not less than three years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition; or has, for a period of not 
less than three years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition, been suffering from a 
virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or has, for a 
period of not less than three years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition, been suffering from 
veneral disease in a communicable form; or has renounced 
the world by entering any religious order; or has not been 
heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or 
more by those persons who would naturally have heard of 
it, had that party been alive; or has not resumed 
cohabitation for a space of two years or upwards after the 
passing of a decree for judicial separation against that 
pary; or has failed to comply with a decree for 
restitution of conjugal rights for a period of two years 
or upwards after the passing of the decree. 
The following additional grounds are provided for 
a wife petitioner. In the case of any marriage solemnised 
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before the commencement of this Act, that the husband had 
married again before such commencement or that any other 
wife of the husband married before such commencement was 
alive at the time of the soleminisation of the marriage 
provided that in either case the other wife is alive at 
the time of the petition; or that the husband has been 
guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality. 
The Act is based mainly on the provisions of the 
Matrimonial Cause Act, 1950, whereby under Section 1 (1) 
either spouse may petition for divorce on the ground that 
the other has since the celebration of the marriage 
committed adultery; or has deserted the petitioner without 
cause for a period of at least three years immediately 
preceding the presentation of the petition; or has treated 
the petitioner with cruelty; or is incurably of unsound 
mind and has been continuously under care and treatment 
for a period of at least five years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition; and by the wife on the 
ground that her husband has, since the celebration of the 
marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality. 
Under Section 14 either spouse can petition for a 
decree of judicial separation on the same grounds as are 
available for divorce, or on the ground of failure to 
comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, 
or on any ground on which a decree for divorce a meansa et 
thoro might have been pronounced before the Matrimonial 
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Cause Act, 1857. 
Kenya followed the Indian example by passing the 
Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, 1960 for Hindus 
domiciled there. Under Section 10 (i), either party can 
petition for divorce on the ground that the respondent has 
since the celebration of marriage committed adultery; or 
has deserted the petitioner withour cause for a period of 
at leat three years immediately preceding the presentation 
of the petitioner with cruelty; or is incurably of unsound 
mind and has been continuously under care and treatment 
for a period of at least five years immediately preceding 
the petition; or has ceased to be a Hindu by reason of 
convrsion to another religion; or has renounced the world 
by entering a religious order and has remained in such 
order apart from the world for a period of at least three 
years immediately prceding the persentation of the 
petition; or a decree of judicial separation has been in 
force between the parties for a period of at least two 
years immediately preceding the presentation of the 
petition, and the parties have not cohabited since the 
date of the decree. 
A wife can petition on the additional ground that 
her husband has since the celebration of the marriage, 
been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiaility; or in the case 
of a marriage solemnised before the commencement of the 
ordinance, at the time of the marriage was already 
married; or married again before such conunencement/ the 
other wife being in either case alive at the date of the 
presentation of the petition. 
Uganda Passed the Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance, 1961. Under Section 9 (2) in addition to the 
grounds for divorce mentioned in the Divorce Ordinance, 
Matrimonial Causes, Chapter 112, a petition for divorce 
may be presented by either party to a marriage on the 
ground that the respondent has ceased to be a Hindu by 
reason of conversion to another religion; or has renounced 
the world by entering a religius order and has remained in 
such order apart from the world for a period of at least 
three years immediately preceding the presentation of the 
petition; and by the wife, in the case of a marriage 
solemnised before the commencement of this Ordinance, on 
the ground that her husband at the time of marriage was 
already married; or married again before the commencement 
of this Ordinance, the other wife being in either case 
alsive at the date of the presentation of the petition. 
165 The Divorce Ordinance (1904) Section 5 (1) 
provides that a husband may petition for the dissolutioon 
of his marriage on the ground that since the solemnisation 
thereof his wife has been guilty of adultery. Under 
Section 5 (2), a wife may petition for the dissolution of 
her marriage on the ground that since the solemnisation 
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thereof her husband has changed his profession of 
Christianity for the profession of some other religion, 
and gone through a form of marriage with another woman; or 
has been guilty of incestuous adultery or of bigamy with 
adultery; or of marriage with another woman with adultery; 
or of rape, sodomy, or bestiality; or adultery coupled 
with cruelty; or adultery coupled with desertion, without 
reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards. 
In 1923 Tanganyika had passed the Marriage, 
Divorce and Succession (Non Christian Asiatics) OOrdinance 
(Laws of Tanganyika, Cap. 112). This, in brief, gave the 
High Court jurisdiction to hear and determine all 
matrinonial suits and suits aristing out of marriages 
v/hich were valid marriages within the Ordinance, and 
authorised the court to apply the 'law of the religion', 
in matters of succession, the law of the religion 
including caste custom in the case of Hindus, and being 
specifically open to be determined by the court by any 
means which if thought fit, whether evidence on the 
subject were legal evidence or not Under Section 8, text 
books on Hindu law, such as those of Mulla and Mayne, will 
be used, and the Indian cases upon which they rely. 
Kenya Ordinance, 1960 is similar to the (English) 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 in this, that adultery is a 
ground for divorce. Both of these differ from the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955, under which 'living in adultery' forms 
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a ground for divrce, but single act of sexual intercourse 
by the husband or wife with some one who is not his or her 
spouse gives the other party a ground for judicial 
separation. Uganda differs from all of 'these because in 
the case of a wife petitioner, adultery has to be 
incestuous or coupled with bigamy; or coupled with 
marriage with another woman; or cupled with cruelty, or 
coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two 
years or upwards in order to provide a ground for divorce. 
The provision for presumption of death does not appear in 
the Kenya or Uganda ordinances. 
The Keya and Uganda ordinances are more in accord 
with (English) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 than with the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This is evident in the 
provisions and phraseology of the former. Yet the 
prohibition of second marriage of the husband is common to 
both the East African ordinances and the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955, and so are the grounds for renunciation of the 
world and conversion to another religion. However, the 
provisions for venereal disease and leprosy do not occur 
in the Kenya or Uganda statutes. The provision of care 
and treatment for unsoundness of mind does not appear in 
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, because the large number of 
poopulation makes it impracticable that such mental 
patients are properly looked after in the mental 
hospitals. Here poverty is one of the causes. But care and 
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treatment is provided for both in the (English) 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 and the Kenya Ordinance/ 
1960, S. 10 (2). Failure to resume cohabitation for a 
period of two years or upwards after a decree of judicial 
separation has been granted does not appear as a ground 
for divorce under the Uganda Ordinance. The Kenya and 
Uganda Ordinacnes differ from each other as they do from 
the Hidnu Marriage Act, 1955 and the (English) Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1950. 
Though the provisions of the English and Hindu 
statutes have been adopted by the Kenya and Uganda 
ordinances, the result of the application may not be the 
same in every case, e.g., the economic, social, 
educational and cultural outlook of the Hindus in East 
Africa is different from those in India and from the 
English. However, the concept of divorce was unfamiliar to 
the Hindus there as it was in India and was first 
introduced by the legislature and divorce laws were 
enacted on the western notion of marriage and divorce. 
This is claimed by many vocal crities to have destroyed 
the purely sacramental nature of the Hindu marriage and 
has turned it into a civil contract, which like any other 
contract can be terminated by the parties on the 
prescribed grounds. This is a superficial view, society 
has its own notions of what marriage is. Conventionally 
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these are contained within the juridical concept of 
"Sacrament". It may be more true to say that remedies have 
been provided for those to whom their sacrament is no 
longer meaningful. 
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CHAPTER-I 
UNIT-B 
DIVORCE ACCORDING TO THE QUR'AN/HADITH/LEADING SCHOOLS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE, THE LATEST ACTS-PRE-POST-INDEPENDENT INDIA 
A Muslim marriage, unlike marriages in certain 
other Religions, is not a sacrament. It has been stated by 
some writers and also held in some cases that it is a 
civil contract. But this view is equally incorrect and 
Muslim marriage is not a mere civil contract. Great 
importance has been given to marriage by Islam and 
al-Durr-ul-Mukhtar, Al-Ashbah wan Nazair and Hedayah and 
other books have called in on act of devotion. The former 
has stated it to be incumbent on a person whose passion in 
ungovernable. The Holy Prophet (peace be on him) has said, 
"Marriage is my Sunnah", But in spite of the above point 
it is ot to be considered a sacred and indissoluble tie 
and al-Durr-ul-Mukhtar goes so far as to state that when 
there is any fear of injustice, marriage becomes 
abominable. Similarly it is stated in Tahtavi that 
marriage when injustice is certain is unlawful. A 
sacrament can not be violated but Muslim Law 
unquestionably allows divorce. On the other hand there is 
no virtue a-lrtached to a civil Contract but marriage in 
Islam is considered a virtuous act. Hence to say that it 
is a sacrament or to describe it as a mere civil contract 
is not correct. As pointed out by Abdur Rahim in his 
well-known book, Muhammaden Jurisprudence, marriage under 
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Muslim Law Partakes of the nature of both a sacrament and 
a civil contract. Being commended by religion it tends 
to be treated as a holy injunction. It holds a position 
midway between the two. But so far as the rights and 
obligations of the parties in relation to each other are 
concerned, they are governed by the ordinary law of 
contracts. It is open to the spouses to specify and 
restrict each other's rights and obligations wising out 
of the marriage and fix the conditions for its termination 
by mutual consent. Muslim writers treat it as something 
between religious matters and worldly affiars. The Muslims 
have been enjoined to contract marriags safeguard against 
loose living. - A marriage also unites two different 
individuals aby love and affection and two different 
families by a bond of Kinship. When these objects, amongst 
others, fail, the continunance of a marriage may not be in 
the interest of the spouses and so its dissolution is 
permitted. Divorce is not regarded as a disgrace in Islam 
nor necessarily a sequel that follows misconduct by either 
the husband and the wife or by both. 
^ Muslim law does not compel the spouses to lead a 
miserable life when their marriage has proved a failure, 
but grants them the right to separate. At the same time it 
does not contemplate separation on frivolous and trivial 
grounds, such as are now recognized sufficient in some 
parts of the world. 
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In Arabia itself divorce, prior to Islam, was a 
frequent occurrence without any regard to marital 
obligations and every individual took as many wives as he 
could afford and then divorce them at his sweet will. 
In Islam Divorce, when not absolutely necessary, 
is strongly disapproved of and discouraged. Talaq 
(divorce) is strongly condemned by the Mohammadan religion 
and it should not be pronounced unless it has become quite 
impossible for the parties to live together in peace and 
harmony, but once it is pronounced it is upheld and valid 
although there may be no good cause for it. It is 
described in a precept of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as the 
worst of all the things that law permits. It has been done 
in two ways namely, condemning divorce except in certain 
circumstances and commending forbearance and the 
continuation of marital relationship even in the case of 
disagreement and some suffering. The Holy Prophet (r-eace 
be on him) has said, "of all the permitted things divorce 
(lA) is the most abominable with Allah." Even when a man is 
not satisfied with his wife, the Holy Qur'an enjoins 
forbearance. It says, "And retain them (the wives) kindly. 
Then if you hate them, it may be that you dislike a thing 
(2) 
while Allah has put abundant good in it." The Holy 
Prophet (Peace be on him) has said, "That man is better 
' (3) 
amongst you who is better to his wife." On another 
occasion he said, "The most perfect amongst the faithful 
in respect of faith is he who is best in disposition among 
them (women) and better among you are those who are better 
(4) 
towards their wives." 
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Abu Hurayrah (Rad ) reports that the holly Prophet 
(peace be on him) said, "Let not the faithful man hate the 
faithful woman; if he dislike some of her habits, he may 
like others."(5) He is also reported to have said, 
"Marry, donot divorce, for Allah does not like men and 
women who relish variety in sex matters. "(6) In short, 
the husbands have been enjoined not to divorce their wives 
except in the case of their being unfaithful.(7) 
Divorce, when permitted;- If it is established that a 
husband and wife can not live togather in peace and 
harmony, they are given the option to separate. Divorce is 
also permitted when the wife's conduct is undsirable as 
when she does injury to her husband or is not chaste. 
Divorce is obligatory on a husband when he is incapable of 
matrimonial intimacy or can not maintain his wife, and the 
like.(fi) This rule is based on a Qur'anic text wherein the 
husbands have been enjoined, "to keep the wives with 
kindness.(9) 
\./t>ivorce is permitted as a matter of necessary for 
the avoidance of greater evil which may result from the 
continuance of a marriage. But even in such cases an 
attempt is first to be made for reconciliation by 
referring the matter to arbitration. Thus it is laid down 
in the Qur'an, "And if you fear a breach between the two 
(husband and wife), then appoint an arbiter from his 
(husband's) people and an arbiter from her (wife's) people. 
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If they desire agreement, Allah will effect harmony 
between them."(10) According to the spirit of the law, it 
is only when disagreement continous and efforts to bring 
about a reconciliation prove unavailing that the parties 
may dissolve the marriage. Judicial separation in which 
the aggrieved spouse is allowed to live separate from the 
other without the marriage being dissoloved is an 
institution not recognized by the Muslim Law. The reason 
for this is that the objects of marriage are not restored 
by judicial separation, while it may result in immorality 
which in Islam is an evil far greater than divorce. The 
Muslim Law, while it permits divorce, insists.that there 
shall be some guarantee that the husband or the wife if 
not acting from caprice or frivolity or on the impulse of 
a momentary provocation. For this purpase certain 
restrictions are imposed by the law upon the spouses, 
right to dissolve their marriage. The object of these 
restrictions, as stated above, is to ensure that the 
spouses should not act in haste such as under the 
influence of wine, anger, excitement, and the like, and 
that an opporunity is provided to the parties for 
rapprochement. This cautious attituds towards divorce 
forms the basis of the al-talaq al-sunnah under v/hich 
marriage is terminated only after a minimum period of 
there terms of the wife's menstrual courses from the time 
of the pronouncement of divorce. During this period the 
husband has the option to take the wife back. 
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The above discussion will make it clear that a 
Muslim husband can not justly divorce his wife in the 
absence of reasonable grounds and without having recourse 
to an attempt at reconciliation. It is unfortunate that 
this basic principle regarding divorce has been lost sight 
of and divorce given capriciously and without any 
justification, whatsever, is considered good in law though 
it is strongly discouraged in religion. This conception of 
law ignores the strong condemnation and disapproval of 
divorce in Islam and has led many a husband to make an 
unscruptuous use of his power misery and unhappiness for 
the wife and has made marriage insecure and the wife's 
possition very precarious. 
Muslim jurists have held different views regarding 
divorce in Islam. According to some, divorce is prohibited 
but is permissible in case of necessity. It is stated in 
al-Radd al-Muhtar, dealing with Hanafi Law, that no doubt 
it (divorce) is forbidden, but it becomes mubah 
(permitted) for certain outside reasons. Its ibahah 
(permission) arises from the necessity for release (from 
the marital tie) in certain cases. Therefore, when there 
is no cause for separation whatsever, there is no 
necessity for release, and if there is no legal ground for 
talaq, or release, then it must be considered unlawful. 
Holy 
for the Qur'an says, "So if they (your women) obey you, 
seek not away against them".(11) The Hanafi Jurists also 
assert that divorce in itself is a pernicious thing and is 
a disapproved procedure, as it dissoves marriage, a tie or 
relationship which involves many considerations of 
temporal as well as spiritual nature nor is its propriety 
at all admitted except on the ground of urgency of release 
from an undesirable wife. (12) They further add that the 
propriety of divorce rests upon the cause of the urgency. 
The urgency itself being a matter concealed and 
unascertainable (but by virtual proof) and the act of 
preceding to divorce is proof of the urgency.(13) The 
explanation of the Hanafi Jurists is based on too 
technical a ground. The underlying principle is however, 
clear. Most of the Muslim Jurists, while discussing 
talaq, say that 'talaq being in itself a pernicious 
and disaprroved procedure, it is only the urgency of 
release that can give sanction to it. (14) It is a very 
reasonable and sound view of the matter and it is not 
clear why it was not adopted by all the jurists who, 
however, agree that divorce is pernicious and should be 
discouraged. Hence, if a person divorces his wife without 
there being an urgent need for release, he shall be guilty 
of sin. Abu Hanifah (Ra ) is of the opinion that if there 
is no urgent need for release from the marriage-tie, the 
divorce is 'haram' (Forbidden).(15) 
The author of al-Bada'i'wa '1-Sana'i' has 
discussed the matter at length. He says, "Marriage is a 
beneficial union which becomes the means for obtaining 
benefits in the hereafter and in this world and divorce 
destroys it and the destruction of a good thing is 
reprehensible. Allah has said/ "And verily Allah does not 
like mischief. And this means that in law it (divorce) is 
undesirable, for Allah does not love it. It can happen 
that sometimes on account of disparity in temperament and 
nature or due to disputes the advantage of marriage is 
lost; the husband knows that the benefits bypass him 
because of his marriage with a particular woman and on 
account of his living with her, and that is such cases 
advantage would lie in divorce so that the objectives of 
marriage might be fulfilled by marriage with another 
woman. However, there is constant likelihood that he may 
not have thought over the matter as carefully as its 
gravity requires and he might not have visualized all the 
possible consquences, so the Shari'ah and reason both 
require that he should reconsider the matter and for this 
reason he is expected to give her one revocable divorce so 
that the woman may repent her sisconduct and dislike (for 
him) and might return to the path of rectitude. But when 
she has tasted the betterness of separation and does not 
repent, the husband will consider his over situation 
whether he can stay away from her. And if he facts he will 
not be able to bear a separation, he might bring her back, 
but if he feels that he will be able to bear the 
separation, he may divorce her again in the second tuhr" (16) 
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It is unfortunate that some later jurists have 
over looked this basic concept regarding divorce, nor have 
they taken into consideration the hardship caused to a 
wife as a result there of. It can not be gainsaid that the 
present practice which allows a husband to divorce his 
wife unscrupulously, does not only contravene the basic 
principle of Muslim law of marriage and divorce but also 
very ften r ins the life of the wife and even leaves her 
absolutely destitute. There is no Bayt al-Mal (public 
treasury) to support her now, and it is, therefore 
necessary that this autlook should be changed and a 
reasonable view in keeping with the basic principle of 
Muslim Lav; be adopted. 
Modifications in Mulsim Law;- Many Muslim Jurists of the 
past did not hesitate to modify the law to make it suit 
the needs of their own times and we should also do the 
same. These Jurists considered tha.iselves bound only by 
express injunctions of. the Qur'an and the traditions 
regrading obligations to do a thing or to abstain 
from doing a certain thing. But, where the law was not 
obligatory and was merely permissive, they allowed its 
modification however necessary. Muslim law is very 
elastic. The muslim jurists in later times, however, 
considered themselves absolutely bouned by the law laid 
down by the early jurists, without caring to see if it 
suited the needs and conditions of their times and so they 
made the law very rigid. 
Muslim law however, is full of instances where 
necessary modifications, to meet the requirements of their 
own times had been made by the jurists. To quote a few 
instances drinking was punishable with fortly stripes 
during the caliphate of Abu Bakr, but 'Umar increased the 
number to eighty in order to put a stop to the evil 
habit.(17) Pronouncement of three divorces at one and the 
same time was considered tantamount to one divorce in the 
time of Prophat (peace be on him) and Abu Bakr,(R)andduring 
the first two or three years of the caliphate of 'Umar. 
People, however, used to wantonly repeat the pronouncement 
many times siraultanoouslythere by ignoring the seriousness 
of divorce. Umar considered it necessary to discourage 
this practice and held that repetition of three 
pronouncements at the same time would amount to three 
divorces. To give another example, conquered lands were 
Holy 
distributed amongst the Muslim warriors by the Prophet 
(peace be on him), but 'Umar stopped this practice in the 
public interest. Again, marriage with a Kitabiyah 
Holy (Christian or Jewish woman) was permitted by the Prophet 
(peace be on him) and the first three caliphs, though the 
second caliph discouraged it, and when a Governor had 
married a Jewess, the caliph ordered him to divorce 
her. (18) But 'Alii;R)the fourth Caliph, took up a very 
strong attitude and according to the majority of 
Shi'i'ulama' such a marriag is absolutely forbidden. 
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According to some other Shi'i Jurists the marriage is not 
forbidden though it is considered highly undesirable. The 
Supreme Court of Pakistan has accepted the latter view. 
For a learned and interesting discussion of the subject, 
see Syed Ali Nawaz Shah Gardezi V. Lt-Col Mohammad Yusuf 
Khan, P.L.D.1962 (w.p.), Lahore.558. 
This practice of modifying rules of law continued 
even after the orthodox caliphs as can be seen from the 
following instance. 
(a) Formerly, if a husband wanted to take his wife to 
another place and she refused to accompany him, then, 
according to Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, and Imam Mohammad, she 
was considered disobedient and lost her right to 
maintenance. But later, Abu Qasim Saffar held that the 
rule was applicable in the times of those Imams, but in 
Suffar's time the husband could not take her to another 
city (against her wishes).(19) The modification in the 
rule is probably due to the fact that travelling had 
become d^>ngerous in later times. Also, because the Muslims 
had then spread out to very distant lands and means of 
communication were difficult and it was not considered 
desirable to force a wife to leave her relations and 
country in such circumstances. 
(b) In the 'Alamgiriyah it is stated, " If a person 
divorces his wife while under the influence of hemp or 
bhniiy , then, according to Tandhib, divorce would not be 
effected. But a divorce under such circumstances would now 
be given effect to and the husband would also be liable to 
punishment because of the prevalence of the vice (of the 
taking) of bhang or hemp amongst the people in our times 
and the Fatwa in our time is in accordance with view."(20) 
To give instances of our own times, we may quote some 
important changes introduced in the Muslim law of divorce 
by the dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939. The 
bill was introduced in the Central Legislative Assembly by 
the late Muhammad Ahmad Kazimi, a member of the working 
Committee of the Jamiyyat al-Ulama'-i Hind, because it was 
considered necessary to bring about certain important 
modifications in the then prevalent provisions of Muslim 
law. The following will show the extent to which 
modifications were made: 
(1) A Muslim girl could not formerly exercise her option 
of puberity on attaining majority if she had been given 
away in marriage, while a minor, by her father or paternal 
grandfather. This rule was based on the reasoning that 
they were so closely related to the girl that it could be 
presumed that they must have acted in the best interests 
of the girl and must have given her away in marriage to 
the most suitable person. But, in course of time, it was 
found that a father or a grandfather gave away his 
daughter or Gran daughter in marriage to- •-a^. v's^ y^ ,. .> 
. ^'^\-\ - • ^  ^ 
undeserable person or even to a man of depraV^ ed character ^ . 
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either through carelessness or simply for the sake of some 
monetory or other gain and thus sacrificed the girl's 
future happiness. The law was, therefore, amended to meet 
this situation and a girl can now exercise her option of 
puberty even when she is given away in marriage by her 
father or grandfather during her minority. 
(ii) The Hanaf i law did not allow the dissolution of a 
marriage on the basis of the husband's cruelty to the 
wife or for his failure to maintain her which was 
found to result in great hardship to her. The Act 
now allows the dissolution of a marriage on these 
grounds. 
(iii) Under the Hanafi law, the wife of a missing husband 
had to wait for at least sixty years before 
contracting a second marriage.(21) But under the 
Maliki law, the period of waiting is four years 
only. The act has adopted the latter rule with some 
modifications in order to save the wife from obvious 
hardship. 
(iv) There was a great difference of opinion amongst the 
the Muslim Jurists about the effect of the conversion 
of a Muslim wife to a revealed religion. The majority 
of Muslim Jurists held the view that the marriage 
would get dissolved on the renunciation of Islam by 
the wife, but the 'Ulama' of Ma-wara al-Nahr 
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(Transoxiana) held a different opinion and stated 
that the marriage would not be dissolved under these 
circumstances.(22) The Act has adopted the latter 
opinion. 
Reason for Differences of Opinion;- We sometimes find 
that the Muslim Jurists have expressed different views ©n 
a particulars point. It may be mentioned here that the 
difference is often due to a difference in the mode of 
interpretation as explained below: 
(a) One group of Muslim Jurists considers that a verse of 
Holy 
the Qur'an or a tradition is to be interpetated 
literally, but the other group prefers to look into 
the underlying idea and to apply the basic principle 
according to the changed conditions and to meet the 
requirements of their own times. They consider that 
the spirit of a rule cannot be changed, but its 
application changes with time, environment, 
circumistances, conditions etc. It is obvious that 
these two modes of interpretation will result in a 
difference in the application of the rule though there 
is no difference in the basic rule applied by them. 
(b) The other ground for difference lies in the 
application of a certain rule of law. Thus, some 
Jurists hold that a rule should be followed and 
applied strictly so that people should not take pndue 
advantage in any way and may not lightly ignore it and 
-:80:-
commit a breach of it. But there are other Jurists who are 
of the opinion that Allah wants to be merciful and does 
not want to be hard on man kind and so we should lenient 
in applying the rule of law in order to avoid the 
infliction of hardship on the people. 
It can thus be seen that after there is no real 
difference in the basic rule applied by the jurists, but 
the difference arises out of the process of application of 
a rule. 
As the basic rule in each case is generally the 
same/ it is open to us to adopt such interpretation of law 
us meets the needs and requirements of our own times. 
Some one has aptly stated that all kindness and 
leniency is due to the injunctions of Allah and the 
Prophet (peace be on him) while all hardships and 
difficulties arise out of the rules laid down by Ulama 
Ibn Qayyum has nicely explained that the Shariah (Muslim 
Law) is based on wisdom and is meant for the worldly and 
spiritual benefit of the people, and means complete 
justice for all and absolute kindness and wisdom. Hence we 
cannot consider that code of lav/, a law of the Shariah in 
which there is cruelty instead of justice, hardship in 
place of leniency, loss instead of advantage and 
foolishness in place of reason. He stresses that law 
changes with the change of environment time, place. 
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financial conditions, and customs of the people and that 
misunderstanding has arisen among people due to their 
ignorance of the relation between human society and the 
law, which has constricted the scope of Islamic Shariah. 
They do not realise that such narrow-mindedness can have no 
place in a system which has given most consideration to 
the welfare of the people.(23) 
Wife's Right to Dissolve Marriage;- Under the provisions 
of Muslim law, the right to the dissolution of marriage 
does not rest with the husband alone, but the wife has 
also been given this right though it is not as absolute as 
that of the husband. She can herself terminate her 
marriage under certain conditions or get it dissolved 
through a Qa^i if there are genuine yrounds for such a 
step. But generally speaking, the right of the wife is not 
coextensive with that of the husband. The difference lies 
in the fact that where as the husband can himself divorce 
his wife, the wife can, except under special circumstances 
or conditions, obtain the dissolution of her marriage only 
through the intervention of a t?adi or an Arbitrator. 
Difference in Powers of Husband and Wife;- There are two 
Holy 
verses in the Qur'an which deal with this matter. It is 
stated in the first verse, "They (the women) have rights 
similar to those (of men) even them in kindness and men 
are a degree above them".(24) The other says, "Men are 
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the maintainers of women with that Allah has made some of 
them to excel others and with that they spend out of their 
wealth."(25) 
Reasons for the above mentioned difference;-
The superiority of men over women has been explained in 
the second verse to be due to two reasons, namely: 
(a) because they spend of their property (for the support 
of women),. and 
(b) because Allah has made one of them to excel the other. 
This shows that superiority has been given to man 
because of his responsibility to support and his 
capacity to protect his wife. He has to bear a greater 
burden of domestic life than the wife and so, 
consequently, enjoys greater rights in some matters 
than she does. As regards the second ground, it is 
generally accepted that men are physically superior to 
women. 
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CHAPTER-II 
GROUNDS OF DIVORCE UNDER HINDU RELIGION OR HINDU LAW 
UNIT-A 
Married as it was to the doctrine of 
indissolubility of marriage (marriage being a sacramental 
union was an in rolable and immutable union-thus even 
death did not dissolve the marriage), the Dharmashastra 
did not recognise divorce, and any attempt to deduce from 
s ray Smiriti texts. the proposition that divorce was 
recognised by some Smritikars is nothing but owe's 
inability to comprehend the basic concepts that the 
dharmashastra propounded. However, the dharmshastra's 
adherence to the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage 
didnot hamper the recognisition of the people's need of 
divorce, and a large section of Hindus (i.e., the lower 
classes) did enjoy the right of divorce. This was under 
(2) 
the custom which prevailed over the sacred law. 
Customary modes of divorce were easy. In some cases a 
(3) 
marriage could be dissolved by mutual consent. Some 
(4) times divorce could also be purchased. Very little 
formaties for dessolving a marriage where needed many a 
time it on purely a private act of parties in some 
communities a form was necessory it was either a Panchayat 
or family concil cuslomary divorce was the privilege of 
the lower castes and higher castes selfom had a custom 
which permitted divorce. 
Later on when insanity was added as a ground for 
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divorce the guilt or offence theory suffered a jolt, since 
it could not be said that the party suffering from 
insanity or unsoundness of mind was guilty of matrimonial 
offence of insanity. Insanity is a misfortune, not a 
guilt. "With insanity being recognised as a ground some 
other diseases like leprosy also came to be recognised. 
This led some to re-name the doctrine and it was given the 
name of fault theory, i.e., if the respondent has some 
such fault which makes contimuance of cohabitation almost 
impossible or very difficult, then the petitioner is 
entitled to divorce. 
It was in this background of English law, that the 
special Marriage Bill and Hindu Marriage and Divorce Bill 
came before Parliament. It may be noted that in 1950 the 
Matrimonial Causes Act was passed by the English 
Parliament which consolidated and reformed the then 
existing English matrimonial law. A basic knowledge of the 
provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 is 
essential as we have freely (it is submitted, at times, 
thoughtlessly) drawn from it. Section 1 of the Act 
recognized four grounds of divorce on the basis of any one 
of which either party to the marriage could present a 
petition: viz., adultery, desertion, cruelty and insanity. 
Wife could also present a petition on the ground that 
since the solemnization of marriage the husband is guilty 
of rape, sodomy and bestiality. Section 2 laid down a 
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three years bar to divorce (which is also known as the 
fair trial clause). We have adopted this section almost 
verbatim in section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and 
in section 29 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Section 4 
deals with the bars to relief which we have substantially 
copied in section 23, the Hindu Merriage Act, and in 
section 34, the Special Marriage Act. The basic 
modification we introduced is that we have made all of 
them as absolute bars. This basic structure of divorce in 
English law was adopted by us in both the statutes, viz., 
the Special Marriage Act, and the Hindu Marriage Act. The 
guilt or fault theory was also adopted by us without much 
ado. In respect of grounds of divorce in the Hindu Marriage 
Act, what we did was to adopt a conservative stance and 
made all the three traditional fault grounds of divorce, 
i.e., adultery, cruelty and desertion, as grounds of 
judicial separation. We thought one act of adultery should 
not be sufficient for divorce and, therefore, we laid down 
the ground as 'living in adultery'(to be more precise 
•respondent is living in adultery', is the ground of 
divorce). We made insanity, venereal diseases and leprosy 
as common grounds of divorce and judicial separation (with 
a very irrational distinction of period and use of some 
superficial words), and added some typical Hindu 
grounds of divorce, such as conversion and renunciation of 
the world. "Presumption of death and dissolution of 
marriage" which is a separate provision under the 
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(7) 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 was made as one of the 
nine grounds of divorce. Divorce on the basis of 
non-compliance of decree of restitution of conjugal rights 
and non-resumption of cohabitation after a decree of 
judicial separation are the provisions borrowed from the 
state laws of the Commonwealth of Australia. What need to 
be emphasised is that in both the statutes Parliament 
enshrined the guilt or fault theory of divorce, though 
under the Special Marriage Act, the consent theory had 
also been accorded recognition. 
The Divorce Law Reform Act, 1969 substantially 
accepted the third alternative proposal of the Law 
Commission. It also accepted the recommendation of the 
Mortimer Committee inasmuch as it accepts only one single 
ground of divorce. But curiously enough, what has been 
done is this that indirectly the three traditional grounds 
of divorce too have been retained. The Mortimer 
Committee's recommendation is incorporated in section 1 
which lays down that after the commencement of the Act the 
breakdown of the marriage shall be the sole ground of 
divorce. Section 2 formulates certain criteria of 
breakdown; these are: (a) adultery of the respondent, but 
then the petitioner has also to establish that on this 
count he finds it impossible to live with the respondent; 
(b) cruelty of the respondent, (which is stated in the 
following terms: the repondent has behaved in such a way. 
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that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expeocted to live 
wi th the respondent); (c) two years desertic^ n^; (d) two 
years living apart of the spouses, provided the lYespondent 
agrees to divorce (this is the English version of \ divorce 
by mutual consent); and (e) five years living apart ot •-.he 
spouses (in this consent or non-consent of the respondent^ 
(8) is immaterial). Sectin 2 of the Matrimnial Causes Act, 
1973 lays down something in the nature of condomation and 
clarification in respect of the first three facts of 
breakdown of marriage (from sub-section (1) to sub-section 
(9) (5). Sub-section (6) explains the meaning of living 
apart."....a husband and wife shall be treated as living 
apart unless they are living with each other in the same 
household." Section 3 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 
enacts the three bar (or fair trial to marriage clause) in 
the same as it had existed in earlier Matrimonial Causes 
Acts. However, a petition for divorce on the ground of 
five years separation may be opposed "on the ground that 
the dissolution of marriage will result in grave financial 
or other hardship to him and that it would in all 
circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage." When 
the petition on the ground of five years separation is 
opposed, 
the court shall consider all the circustances, 
including the conduct of the parties to the 
marriage and the interest of those parties and of 
any children or other persons concerned, and if it 
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is of opinion that the dissolution of the marriaye 
will result in grave financial or other hardship 
to the respondent and that it would in all 
circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage it 
(12) 
shall dismiss the petition. 
Under the Act the court has a duty to attempt 
113) 
reconciliation. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 makes 
adequate provisions for financial relief for parties to 
(14) 
marriage and children of the family. 
In Australia also in 1966 the breakdown principle 
was accepted as a ground for divorce. Five years 
separation is considered to be evidence of breakdown of 
marriage. Thus divorce may the obtained on the ground that 
the parties to the marriage have separated and 
thereafter have lived separately and apart for a 
continuous period of not less than five years 
immediately preceding the date of petition, and 
there is no likelihood of cohabitation being 
(15) 
resumed.* ' 
However, a clarification is made:"The parties to a 
marriage may be taken to have separated notwithstanding 
that the cohabitation was brought to an end by the action 
or conduct of only one of the parties, whether 
constituting deseration or not". 
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It is in this background-of the world laws of 
divorce-that the Indian provisions of divorce in the 
Special Marriage Act, 1954 and the Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955 and the proposal of the Ministry of Law for reforms 
and the recommendations of the Law Commission are to be 
looked at and judged, in our own social background, and 
also realizing that there is a basic unity in the 
matrimonial law all over the world. 
When the Rau Committee submitted the DraftHindu 
Code Bill, 1948 it had no model like the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1950. The divorce provisions of the Hindu Code 
Bill make a strange reading as an attempt had been made 
(17) 
for blending the law of nullity and divorce. But when 
the Special Marriage Bill and the Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Bill were drafted, the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1950, was readily available and our draftsmen had no 
hesitation in freely drawing on it, though hither and 
thither they made their own innovations. Probably, the 
Special Marriage Bill was meant to be a pregressive 
measure, a measure for the educated and enlighted and, 
therefore, it seems, that both the fault theory and 
consent theory of divorce are given a place in the Act. 
Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, lays down 
eight fault grounds. The three traditional guilt grounds, 
adultery, cruelty and desertion (three years); three 
grounds pertaining to certain diseases, such as insanity. 
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incurable and continuous venereal diseases in a 
communicable form, leprosy (all of at least three years 
duration); and seven years sentence of imprisionment, 
presumption of dealth (it may be interesting to note that 
under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 the 
divorce may be obtained if whereabouts of the husband are 
not known for a period of four years). The three 
additional guilt grounds on which the wife alone can seek 
divorce are: rape, sodomy or bestiality. The divorce by 
mutual consent was enacted in section 28. It is ensured 
that no hasty divorce may be obtained on this ground. 
Every petition must precede by a separate living for a 
period of at least two years and no decree can be passed 
dissolving the marriage unless a period of one year 
elapses after the presentation of the petition (that also 
only on a motion moved by either parties). At that time 
divoce on the breakdown principle was not even in the 
contemplation of Parliament. 
The breakdown principle was also not in the 
contemplation of Parliament when the Hindu Marriage Act 
was passed in 1955. Rather, the Hindu Marriage Act 
displays a strange conservatism, a strange faltering 
attempt at reform, a half-hearted endeavour to march with 
the time. The feeling, the psychosis that Hinduism is 
conservatism, orthodoxy and almost a make-belief that 
Hindu society will not tolerate any rapid or radical 
reforms of its law, make one proceed very cautiously. One 
point that is forgotten is that the dharmashastras have 
touched the common people only at the fringe. The lower 
classes of Hindus-who have always formed a large section 
of society-have always a very liberal law of divorce. 
Conservatism and Orthodoxy have prevailed mostly among the 
elite, the purohits, the ruling classes and the Vaishyas. 
Dharmashastras have not been conservative. The Law 
Commission is as much aware of this as any one of us: 
Hindu law was never static; it was dynamic and was 
changing from time to time. The structure of any 
society, which wants to be strong, homogeneous and 
progressive, must, no doubt, be steady but not 
static; stable but not stationary; and that is 
exactly the picture we get if we study the 
development of Hindu law carefully before the 
British rule began in India. 
But unfortunately that is not the picture of Hindu 
law ever since the Britishers left India. 
Suffering from the psychosis that Hinduism 
symbolizes conservatism and orthodoxy, the reforms that 
were made in Hindu law of marriage and divorce are far 
from being satisfactory. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 did 
not represent a picture of progressive law when it was 
enacted and the reforms that are proposed by the law 
ministry and the recommendations that have been made by 
the Law Commission fail to make the Hindu matrimonial law 
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(even if all the recommendations are accepted) an example 
of progressive law. One may be permitted to quote what the 
Law Commission had quoted in its introduction to the 
report from Radhakrishnan: 
To survive, v;e need a revolution in our thoughts 
and outlook. From the alter of the past we should 
take the living fire and not the dead ashes. Let 
us remember the past, be alive to the present and 
create the future with courage in our hearts and 
faith in ourselves. 
Let us then look at the revolution in thoughts and 
examine the matrimonial law that we are going to reform 
from that angle. 
Even a cursory glance at the provisions of Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 will indicate that the framers of 
divorce structure of Hindu Marriag Act founded their 
grounds on the guilt or fault theory. In fact it is the 
guilt theory which loomed lare in the minds of the framers 
of the Act and which is still looming large in the mind of 
the Misnistry of Law and the Law Commission. But even the 
guilt theory was made more rigid by the framers of the 
Hindu Marriage and Divorce Bill so much so that in the Act 
of 1955 it becomes virtually a reactionary theory. The 
three traditional fault or guilt grounds, adultery, 
(19) desertion and cruelty, are not grounds of divorce. 
Starn-gely, one signle act of adultery is not considered 
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to undermine the foundation of marriage and, 
therefore,'living in adultery' is made a ground of 
divorce. Then virulent leprosy, incurable and 
continuous insanity and venereal diseases (all for at 
(21) least three years) are made grounds of divorce. 
Conversion to another religion and renunciation of the 
world as grounds of divorce are included in the typical 
(22) background of Hindu society. Then there were added two 
more grounds: the non-compliance of a decree of 
restitution of conjugal rights and non-resumption of 
cohabitation for a period of two years or more after the 
decree of judidial separation entitled the petitioner for 
the restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation, 
as the case may be, to divorce./-o\ mi. a. u ^ 
-^  (23) These too were based 
on the fault theory. The wife is entitled to sue on the 
ground of rape, sodomy or bestiality by the husband after 
(24) the marriage. Thus section 13 of the Hindu Marrxage 
Act contains the matrimonial offences or fault theory and 
section 23 contains the matrimonial bars. The dichotomy of 
fault theory viz., one party at fault and the other 
innocent, was enacted in Hindu Marriage Act. 
In 1964 it occurred to a member of Parliament to 
introduce breakdown principle in Hindu law of divorce on 
the basis of the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959. 
He moved a private member's Bill and very quietly the 
breakdown principle was enacted in the Hindu Marriage Act 
by remodelling clauses (viii) and (ix) of section 13(1) 
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and numbering the provision as section 13(1A). The 
provision runs as under: 
Either party to a marriage, whetheer solemenized 
before or after the commencement of this Act, may 
also present a petitioon for the dissolution of 
the marriage by a decree of divorce on the yround-
i) that there has been no resumptin of 
cohabitation as between the parties to the 
marriage for a period of two years or» upv;ards 
after the passing of a decree for judicial 
Separation in a proceeding to which they were 
parties; or 
ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal 
rights as between the parties to the marriage 
for a period of two years or upwards after the 
passing of a decree for restitution of 
conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they 
are parties. 
It is obvious that under this provision even the 
guilty party is entitled to seek divorce. Only basis of 
divorce is that despite the decree of restitution of 
conjugal rights, there is no cohabitation between the 
parties for a period of two years or more or 
cohabitiation has not been resumed for a period of two or 
more after the decree of judicial separation. This way of 
living apart is considered to be evidence enough of the 
breakdown of the marriage. That this was so is abundantly 
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clear from the statement of objects appended to the Bill. 
It was stated therein: 
The right to apply for divorce on the ground that 
cohabitation has not been resumed for a space of 
two years or more after the passing of a decree 
for judicial separation or on the ground that 
conjugal life has not been restored after the 
expiry of two years or more from the date of 
decree for restitution of conjugal rights should 
be available to both the husband and the wife as 
in such a case it is clear that the marriage has 
proved complete failure. Therefore, there is no 
justification for making the right available only 
to the party who has obtained the decree in each 
(25) 
case. 
The breakdown principle was thus introduced in the 
Hindu matrimonial law very quietly, without the Ministry 
of Law making any preoposals of reform and the Law 
Commissin its recommendation. And prbably this quietness 
caused the difficulties of interpretation. It is 
interesting to note that with a similar quiteness a 
similar provision was introduced in the Special Marriage 
Act, in 1970, though in each case the minimum period is 
one year. 
This is the divorce structure of Hindu Mariage 
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Act, 1955, (basically this is also the divorce structure 
of the Special Marriage Act, 1954). It is in this 
background that the prooposals of the Ministry of Law and 
the recomendations of the Law Commission should be taken 
into consideration. The proposals of the Minsitry of Law 
and the recommendations of the Law Commission with regard 
to dissolution of marriage may be divided into three 
heads: (i) some modification in the guilt grounds; (ii) 
reduction of period from two years to one in the breakdown 
grounds; and (iii) addition f new grounds. The Law 
Commission accepts some of the proposals of the Ministry 
of Law and recommends their implementation. The members of 
the Law Commission have also made their own 
recommendations all of which fall under head (i), i.e., 
some modification in the guilt grounds. We would proceed 
to consider the proposals of the Ministry of Law and the 
recommendations of the Law Commission together. 
In the report of the Law Commissioon some new 
grounds of divorce have been recommended under the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 and some of the existing grounds have 
been recommended to be refoormed. The general approach of 
the Law Commission on divorce is based on the fault 
theory. It has been observed: 
....ur approach in this regard has been that while 
all reasonable efforts must be made to protect 
stability of the marriage, at the same time, if 
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circumstances exist which show that conjugal life 
is impossible either by reason of a matrimonial 
offence or by reason of disease, or other 
specified circumstances, then reality must be 
recognized and provision should be made for 
• .-• ^K K ^ ^ • (26) terminating the bond of marriage. 
Thus, it seems that breakdown of marriage is not 
(27) 
within the approach of the commission. 
Adultery has been suggested to be made a ground of 
divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The proposed 
language of this ground runs: "has, after the 
/ 28 ) 
solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual 
intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse". 
This is the language of clause (f) of section 10(1), only 
the word 'voluntary' has been added before the word 
'sexual'. It is a common knowledge that adultery means 
voluntary extramarital sedual intercouse. It is submitted 
that one is at a loss why two works "committed adultery" 
have not been considered sufficient (clause(a) of section 
1(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, it may be 
interesting to note, uses the words; "has since the 
celeberatin of marriage committed adultery)". 
In this connection the Law Commission uses the 
words, "after the solemnization of the marriage", but in 
connection with "cruelty" it insists that these words 
(29) 
should not be used. It is obvious that one cannot 
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commit adultery before marriage, but one can commit 
cruelty. It is submitted that these words should either be 
used with both the clauses or should be omitted from both. 
It is neeedless to say that cruelty and adultery should be 
grounds of divorce, and should bave been so even in 1955, 
since the former is the destructor of "mutual confidence", 
the very basis of marriage, and the latter of the very 
foundations of marriage, marriage being an exclusive 
union. 
The Law Commission also suggests two years 
desertin as a ground of divorce and adopts the definitin 
of "desertion" given under sectin 9(1)(a) and explanation 
to that section of the Hindu Marriage Act, for both the 
Hindu Marriage Act, and Special Marriage Act. 
Thus, the three traditional guilt grounds of 
divorce which have been recognized almost all the world 
over from the nineteenth century onwards are now proposed 
to be made grounds of divorce under Hindu law in the 
latter part of the twentieth century. 
The Law Commission has also suggested some reforms 
in the three grounds of divorce relating to certain 
diseases, both under the Hindu Marriage Act and the 
Special Marriage Act. First recommendation relates to 
(31) insanity. It is recommended that the three years 
period of insanity should be deleted; and the clause 
should be reworded as, "incurably of unsound mind". The 
second recommendation is in respect of venereal diseases. 
It has been already seen that the Law Commission has 
recommended the deletion of the words, "the disease not 
having been contracted from the petitioner" from section 
10(1)(d), the Hindu Marriage Act. A similar suggestion is 
made in regard to the similar proViision in section 
27(1)(f) of the Special Marriage Act. The Law Commission 
observes: 
In conformity with our recommendation as to the 
corresponding provision (provision has been marked 
with footnote number and footnote number 1 runs: 
"See discussion as to section 13, Hindu Marriage 
Act, with reference to venereal disease. No page 
number is stated) in the Hindu Marriage Act, we 
recommend that from section 27(1)(f) of the 
Special Marriage Act, (i), the period should be 
removed, and (ii) the requirement that the disease 
should not have been contracted from the 
petitioner, should als be removed. 
It is submitted that no suggestion as to the 
removal of the period has been made by the Law Commission 
in connection with venereal diseases under the Hindu 
(33) 
Marriage Act, though on reading the passage quoted 
above one tends to believe that, that is what the Law 
Commission recommended earlier. Further, in the summary of 
recommendations of the Law Commission given in the report 
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mention of this has not been made. 
In respect of leprosy, the Law Commissin, while 
making recommendations on the reform of the Special 
Marriage Act observes: 
In conformity with our recoommendatin as to ('to' 
is marked with fotnote number 2 and in footnote 
number 2 it is stated: "See recommendation as to 
section 13, Hindu Marriage Act, with reference to 
leprosy. Again, no page number is mentioned) the 
corresponding provision in the Hindu Marriage Act, 
we recommend that the period should be removed. 
The clause should, therefore, be revised so as to 
read as follows: "has been suffering from leprosy, 
the disease not having been contracted from the 
.-.• (34) petitioner. 
The Ministry of Law has suggested an additional 
ground of divorce to the wife in the following terms: 
"that an order has been passed against the husband by a 
Magistrate awarding separate maintenance to the 
petitioner, and the parties have not had marital 
intercourse for three years or more since such order". It 
(35) 
seems (and the Law Commission also thinks so), that 
the Ministry of Law proposed to make the grounds at par 
with section 13(lA) of the Hindu Marriage Act, with this 
basic distinction that under section 13(lA) either husband 
or wife may present a petition, while under the proposal 
of Ministry of Law only the wife can present a petition. 
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The question, therefore, arises if this proposal is on the 
analogy of section 13(1A), why both the parties should not 
have the right of divorce, as, after all if failure of 
conjugal life for three years (or two or one year) is 
indication of breakdown of marriage under section 13(lA) 
it is equally an indication when parties are living 
separate after an order in favour of the wife has been 
passed under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code). 
probably in this International Year of Women, the Ministry 
of Law wants to put up a show of special privilege to the 
wife, by denying the equal right to man. It is interesting 
to note that the Law Commission has considered the 
question of husband being granted the relief, but rejected 
it. 
The Law Commission has rejected the husband's 
claim of seeking divorce on this ground as it has 
converted it into a fault ground. It observed: 
Moreover, we do not think that the guilty party 
namely the husband who is proved to have neglected 
or refused to maintain his wife, should be allowed 
to take advantage of his own wrong and get rid of 
the obligatin impoosed by the order for 
. ^ (36) 
maintenance. 
Earlier the Law Commission gave another reason too: 
....having regard to the social conditions 
prevailing in our country, if liberty is given to 
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the husband to apply for a decree of divorce in 
cases under which an order has been passed under 
the code, in a large majority of cases, it may 
work great hardship to the wife. 
This social problem has been a focus of attention 
in several countries and we are well in a position to take 
advantage of their experience. In the past we have been 
modelling our laws, including matrimonial laws, on common 
English laws. We have drawn a good deal in the Hindu 
Marriage Act, and the Special Marriage Act, from the 
English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, even the Law 
Commission has drawn copiously fromthe English law. But it 
has ignored the recent trends in English law, the Divorce 
Law Reform Act, 1969, whose provisions have now been 
re-enacted in the consolidation statute, the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1973 has given new direction to divorce law. 
The Law Commission has also ignored the experence of other 
countries with the breakdown principle. 
The proposals for the reform of the Hindu Marriage 
Act and the Special Marriage Act have been made after 
twenty-five years of their enactment and yet these are 
half-hearted, ill-conceived and not-very-thoughtful 
measure. It is very unfortunate, and is a dereliction of 
duty that we owe to posterity. The members of the Law 
Commission are very proud that they have coompleted "the 
work within a month and a half" and that in the total 
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pile-up of reports it was their fifty-ninth report. The 
author wishes that how nice it would have been had the 
country taken the pride that the members of the Law 
Commission have produced a document which goes to a great 
extent to subserve the social needs of our contermporary 
society. In that respect the author feels that this report 
of the Law Commission is singularly disappointing. 
It is submitted that the country should accept 
without any reservation the breakdown principle as the 
basic structure of divorce in both the statutes. In the 
present state of social development probably the Soviet 
pattern would not suit, but we can one again draw from the 
English experience and make suitable modification to suit 
our conditions. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and 
sections 27 and 28 of the Special Marriage Act may be 
drafted on the following lines: 
(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after 
the commencement of this Act may, on a petition presented 
by either party to a marriage, be dissolved by a decree of 
divorce on the ground that the marriage has broken down 
irrectrievably. 
(2) Any one of the follwing set of facts, when proved, 
shall constitute breakdown of marriage irretrievably: 
(i) that cohabitatioon between the parties has been 
disrupted (or the parties have not been cohabiting 
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with each other) for a period of two years or 
more, without any possibility of its being 
resumed; 
(ii) that cohabitation has not been resumed between the 
parties for a period of one year or more after the 
passing of the decree of judicial separation; 
(iii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal 
right for one year or more after the passing of a 
decree of restitution of conjugal rights; 
(iv) that the parties have been living separate and 
apart for a period of one year and the respondent 
consents to a decree being passed; 
(v) that the respondent has committed sodomy or 
bestiality; 
(vi) that the respondent has treated the petitioner 
with cruelty or has been guilty of wilful neglect 
of the petitioner; 
(vii) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner 
for a period of one year or more; 
(viii) that the respondent has committed adultery; 
(ix) that the marriage has not been consummated on 
account of wilful refusal of the respondent or on 
account of his incapacity to consummate it for a 
period of one year or more; 
(x) that the respondent has been suffering from 
insanity for a period of one year or more; 
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(xi) that the respondent is suffering from leprosy for 
a period of one year or more: 
prc'vided that if leprosy is in virulent form the petition 
may be presented earlier; 
(xii) that the respondent is suffering from a venereal 
disease in a communicable form; 
(xiii) that for any other reason the petitioner finds it 
impossible to cohabit with the respondent. 
(3) On a petition for divorce it shall be the duty of 
the court to inquire, so far as it reasonably can, into 
the facts alleged by the petitioner and the 
^ ^ (38) 
respondent. 
It is evident that some of the grounds mentioned 
in section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act do not find a 
specific mention in the grounds suggested above. It is 
submitted that all these grounds will eb covered either 
under clause(2)(i) or clause (2) (xiii), disruption of 
cohabitation under clause (2)(i) may be on account of the 
imprisonment of the respondent for a period of two or 
more years, or it may be on account of renunciation of 
the world or because the whereabouts of the respondent are 
not known for a period of two years or more. Conversion 
will be covered under clause (2) (xiii). It is submitted 
that conversion per se should not be a ground of divorce. 
If the petitioner finds it impossible to cohabit with the 
respondent on account of his conversion, then she may seek 
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divorce. Clause (2)(xiii) is contemplated to include all 
types of other cases where the cohabitation stands 
disrupted on account of some reasons for which the 
petitioner finds it impossible t cohabit with the 
respondent. 
In clause (2)(i) the language of section 1(2)(d) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act/ 1973,-"the parties....have 
lived apart"-has not been used, because in the Indian 
social background it is possible that the parties are 
living in the same home, but cohabitation stands 
disrupted. The words "separate and apart" have existed in 
some state statutes and now exist in the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1959-1966. There is a divergent interpretation 
(39 ) . 
of these words. In Main v. Main it was held that these 
words mean both physical and spiritual dissociation, a 
destruction of the consortium vitae was not enough. In 
( 4 0) 
Murphy v. Murphy where the wife finding it difficult 
to get a separate dwelling after a decree of judicial 
separation continued to live in the matrimonial home, but 
completely estranged from her husband, the court held that 
parties were living separate and apart. 
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CHAPTER-II 
REFERENCES UNIT-A 
(1) The Law Commission in its Fifty-nine Report at p.65 
quotes Parasara, IV. 30, because, it seems that it 
is ordained that Parasara is to be followed in 
Kalyuga. See also Narada, XIII. 93. 
(2) Collector of Madura V. Mootoo Ramalinga, 12 M.I.A. 
397 (1868). 
(3) Sankeralingoma Chetty, I.L.R., 17 Mad. 475 (1894); 
Thangammal V. Gengammal, (1945) 1 M.L.J. 299; Jina 
Mangan V. Bai Jethi, (1941) I.L.R. Bom. 535; 
Memabai v. Vhannoolal, 1963 P.M. 57; Kishenlal V. 
Piabhu, A.I.R. 1963 Raj. 95; Madho V. Shakuntala, 
A.I.R. 1972 All. 1119. Divorce by mutual consent 
was also recognised under certain regional 
statutes. Just as under the Cochin Marumakhthyama 
Act, 1938; the Cochin Nair Act. 1931; the 
Travancore Ezhava Act, 1925; the Travancore Nayyar 
Act, 1925; the Madras Marumakhthayam Act, 1933; the 
Madras Alisanthana Act, 1924, See also Nangu v 
Appi, A.I.R. 1966 Ker. 41 (F.B.); Vasappan V. 
Sarda, A.I.R. 1958 Ker. 39 (F.B.). 
(4) Sankaralingam v. Subhan Chetty, supra note 2; 
Kashibai v. Bai Gandi, (1915) I.L.R. 39 Bom. 538 
(consent of the other party is essential). 
(5) See Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage, 175-1/6 (11th ed.) 
1953. See also Moni v. Zaboo, A.I.R. 1926 Nag. 488. 
(6) See ss. 10 and 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
The words, "disease having not been contracted" are 
part of clause (d) of s. 10(1) and are not used in 
clause (v) of s.l3(l). If at all these words were 
necessary these should have been added with clause 
(v) of s. 13(1) since divorce is bigger matrimonial 
cause, though as has been submitted these words are 
of no significance. One year's virulent leprosy is 
a ground for judicial separation, while it is three 
years for divorce : s. 10(1)(c) and s. 13(1) (iv). 
Three years' venereal disease is a ground both for 
divorce and judicial separation : s. 13(1) (v) and 
s. 10(1) (d). 
(7) See. ss. 16 and 14, Matrimoial Causes Act, 1965, 
replaced by s. 19, Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. 
(8) Now s.l(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. 
(9) S. 2. Now sub-ss.(l) and (2) of s. 2 of the 1973 Act 
(10) S. 2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, 
reproduced in s. 2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965. 
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(11) S. 5(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. 
(12) 5(2). See also sub-s.(3) Which is based on the 
observation of Begnell, J. in Rule v. Rule, (1971) 
3 All E.R. 368. 
(13) S.6. (14) Part II of the Act. 
(15) S. 28(m) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959-1966. 
(16) S. 36(1). 
(17) See clauses 35 and 36 of the Draft Hindu Code Bill 
(18) Law Commission, Fifty-Ninth Report, 7(1974). 
(19) S. 10 of the Act. 
(20) S. 13(l)(i). See Rajani v. Prabhakar, A.I.R. 1958 
Bom.264; Bhagwan v. Amar, A.I.R. 1962 Punj. 144; 
Maganlal v. Bai Devi. A.I.R.1971 Guj. 33; Narayan 
V. Parakutty, 1973 K.L.T. 80; Jagan v. Swaroop, 
(1972) 2 M.L.J. 77; Kamlesh v. Bedi, A.I.R. 1973 
P. & H. 150. 
Cls.(iii) to (v) of s. 13(1). 
Cls. (ii) and (vi) of s. 13(1). 
Before the amendment of 1964 they were cls.(viii) 
and (ix) of s. 13(1). 
13(2) (ii) of the Act. 
Gazette of India, Extra, Part II, s. 2, 1963, p.86 
Supra note 44, para 7.5 p. 71. 
It may be of interest to note that the Law 
Commission has used the words, "irretrievably 
broken down" only once and that too in connection 
with the Philosophy that the Law Commission had 
behind these recommendations:see p. 12. Basically 
the approach of the Law Commission is based on the 
fault theory. It observes: 
But we may state, at the outset, that our 
general approach in this regard has been that 
while all reasonable efforts must be made to 
protect the stability of marriage, at the same 
time, if circumstances exist which show that 
conjugal life is impossible either by reason of 
a matrimonial offence or by reason of a decease 
of other specified circumstances, then the 
reality must be recognized,and provision should 
be made for terminating the bond of marriage, 
(p.66, emphasis given by the author) 
( 2 1 ) 
( 2 2 ) 
( 2 3 ) 
( 2 4 ) 
( 2 5 ) 
( 2 6 ) 
( 2 7 ) 
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(28) This goes very well with the general flaw of fault 
or guilt grounds: The Law Commission has 
formulated legal cruelty thus: "has treated the 
petitioner with cruelty." the report, supra 
note 44 at 22. 
(29) Id. at 71. 
(30) These recommendations should be looked into the 
background that most of the countries of our 
contemporary society (including the United Kindom, 
which still continues to be our model in most 
legal matters) have almost totally abandoned the 
guilt theory and have based their divorce law on 
consent theory or breakdown theory and sometimes 
on both. 
(31) Supra note 44, para 7,13, p. 62. 
(32) The report, id. at 101-102. 
(33) Id. para 2.18, p. 19. (34) Id. para 9.20, p. 102. 
(35) Supra note 44, para. 2.20, p. 23. 
(36) Id. para 2.25, p. 26. 
(37) Ibid. 
(38) This is based on s. 1(3) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act, 1973. 
(39) (1949) 78, C.L.R. 636. 
(40) (1956) C.L.Y. 25, 8 A.C. 
CHAPTER-II 
UIIIT-B 
GROUNDS OF DIVORCE IN ISLAM (MUSLIM LAW) 
Dissolution of Marriage;- The Muslim Jurists and Qadis 
used to follow faithfully the following injunction laid 
down in the Qur'an, "To keep them(the wives) with 
kindness or separate (from them) with humanity."( 1 ) Imam 
Mohammad has stated a very useful rule in this connection. 
He says that if a marriage causes injury to the wife on 
account of any defect in the husband then let the marriage 
be dissolved. (2 ) The Qadis in earlier times used to 
follow this rule of law. They used to be realistic in 
considering the wife's complaint and scrupulously guarded 
her happiness. They would free a wife from the marriage 
tie if they were unsatisfied that it was impossible for 
her to live happily with her husband owing to some defect 
in him. Thus in a case a wife was granted divorce when her 
husband was found suffering from halitosis (foul breath) 
to such a degree that the wife could not tolerate it.( 3 ) 
In course of time, however, the wives' right to 
get their marriages dissolved became greatly restricted 
due to incorrect and sometimes adverse interpretation of 
law. Many of their rights have however, been restored to 
them during the last decade. The Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriage Act, 1939 (now in force in Pakistan and India). 
Adoption of Other Laws by the Hanafis:- The Hanafi Law is 
favourable to women in many respects, but in some matters 
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it is very hard (in its application) as Abu Hanifah was 
prove to be over cautious, and a wife is sometimes put to 
great hardship on this account. Later Hanafi Jurists have 
tried to overcome the difficulty in several cases. Thus 
al-Radd al-Muhtar has stated that the Hanafis have adopted 
the Maliki law in some cases and it states that 
Abu'l-Layth Samar Kandi has written in his book 
Ta'sis-un-Naza'ir that in case no authority of Hanafi law 
can be found in any particular case then return may be had 
to the law of Maliki because his law is more akin to the 
Hanafi law.(4 ) It is also stated in al-Radd al-Muhtar 
that when a wife is put to hardship for not being 
maintained by her husband it is open to a Hanafi Qadi to 
have recourse to Shafi'i law. He can not however, decide 
the case himself according to the Hanfi law, but he can 
appoint a Shafi'i Qadi as hie agent (deputy) to decide the 
case according to the Shafi'i law. The decision of the 
latter shall be binding on the parties.( 5) Again, in the 
case of a miRsln, husband the Hanafis have adopted the 
Maliki law.( g) These cases seem to lay down the rules of 
law that it is a open to a Hanafi Qa<Ji to have recourse to 
the law enunciated by another Imam of the Sunni seat whose 
law may be more equitable in a particular case. This is 
borne out by some cases discussed by them. This rule was 
made use of by the Hanafi Qadis of old when they would 
refer a wife to a Shafe'i, Maliki or Hanbali Qadi for the 
discision of her case. Unfortunately the courts during the 
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British rule in India ignored this very useful rule and 
decided the cases according to the law of the particular 
sect to which the parties belogned. They ought to have 
followed the rule to decide a case according to the law 
laid down by any of the Imams necessary in the interest of 
justice, equity and good consiquence. Besides, a Court 
should take a broad view in cases of separation and should 
not lose sight of the spirit of the law. Such a view can 
Holy 
be supported by many traditions of the Prophet (peace be 
on him) who repeatedly commanded that women should be 
treated with kindness. 
Reasons of Difference in Sunni and Shi'i Law;- There is a 
difference in some rules applicable to marriage and 
divorce under the Sunni and the Shi'i Laws. It is 
important to understand the basic principles underlying 
these differences. The Sunni Jurists seem to consider that 
a marriage brings about a new and a very important change 
in the status of the spouses. They consider it essential 
that all necessary safeguards should be taken so that the 
newly acquired status is not Jeopardized in any way. They, 
therefore make it a condition for the validity of a 
marriage that all necessary precautions should be taken to 
establish the creation of the new status. Hence, they want 
full publicity of a marriage and insist on the presence of 
at least two witnesses at the time of its celebration as 
Holy 
necessary under a tradition of the Prophet {peace be on 
him) . 
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They, however, seem to think that a divorce merely 
restores the spouses to their original status, and so, 
while greatly approving of the presence of witnesses at 
the time of divorce, they do not consider the presence of 
witnesses at that time an essen ial condition for its 
validity. They also consider that the presence of 
witnesses at the time of marriage is necessary to 
discourage immorality for, in the absence of such a 
condition, it can always be open to a man and woman 
charged with adultery, which is a very serious offence 
under Muslim law, to plead that they had been secretly 
married in the absence of witnesses and so escape the 
consequences of their immoral conduct. 
The Shi'i Jurists, on the other hand, relying on 
their interpretation of a verse of Surah at Talaq, insist 
that the Qur'an commands the presence of two witnesses for 
a valid divorce. The verse leads: "So when they have 
reached their prescribed time limit, retain them with 
kindness, and call to witness two just ones from among 
you, and give upright testimony for Allah."(7 ) As 
pointed out at another place, the Sunnis consider that the 
injunction about calling of witnesses relates to 
retraction or rajah.(8 ) 
They further seem to think that it is not 
necessary for the Qadi to probe into the conduct of the 
parties and he must accept the statements of a man and 
woman charged with adultery that they have been married 
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secretly as correct-particularly when they shall have to 
live in future as husband and wife in view of their 
explanation. 
Failure of Marriage;- The failure of marriage can be due 
to certain circumstances. It may also be due to certain 
defects or faults in one or both of the spouses. The 
spouse at fault is held responsible for failure of the 
marriage and the other spouse becomes entitled, under 
certain conditions, to the dissolution of the marriage on 
that account. 
Marriage when to be Dissolved;- As already stated, the 
Muslim Jurists are guided in the matters of marriage and 
divorce by injunction of the Qur'an, "Retain them (the 
wives) in kindness or separate (from them) with 
kindness."( 9 ) The Muslim Jurists state that a husband 
cannot be said to be keeping his wife in a becoming or 
kindly manner when the wife cannot live happily with him 
because of a 'defect or fault in him and that under such 
circumstances the husband becomes a transgressor of this 
injunction of the Qur'an. The Qa^i can, therefore, 
dissolve such a marriage in order to remove. The husband's 
transgression and to give relief to the aggrieved party. 
There is another verse in the Qur'an, which is 
equally important in this connection and defines the 
rights of the spouses. It states, "And women have rights 
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similar to those against them in a just manner."do) This 
verse shows that men and women have similar rights and 
obligations against one another. A party failing to 
discharge his or her obligations with be failing in his or 
her duty towards the other and will thus be a transgressor 
of this injenction of the Qur'an. In such a case marriage 
shall have to be dissolved on the comptaint of the aggrieved 
party. It is not an essential condition for the 
dissolution of marriage that the party at fault should 
have actually committed some act which results in misery 
for the other party. It is quite possible that the husband 
or the wife may be the victim of causes beyoned his or her 
control. Whether the aggrieved party can live with the 
other spouse in a manner where by the objectives of 
marriage are not defeated. If that is not possible then 
the dissolution of marriage becomes desirable. 
Marital Obligation;- It is also to be seen for the 
dissolution of amarriage whether the spouses are 
faithfully and sincerely fulfilling the marital 
obligations incumbent on them. 
(i)^ The, following are some of the important 
obligations of a husband according to the Muslim Jurists: 
(a) to protect the wife; 
(b) to maintain her; 
( e ) t o pay h e r dovTer t o h e r ; 
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(d) to make himself attractive and to be ocjually fit so 
that she (the wife) should not feel completely 
neglected or be dissatisfied with the marriage on that 
ground; 
(e) to treat the wife with affection and kindness. This 
includes permission to her visit her parents and 
relatives; 
(f) not to -obstruct her in the performance of her 
religious duties and 
(g) to grant her freedom from the bond of marriage when he 
has no inclinations towards her. 
(2) The important marital obligations of the wife are; 
(a) to lookafter the domestic comforts of her husband; 
(b) to be respectful, obedient and faithful to him; 
(c) to make herself available to him at all reasonable 
times; 
(d) to make herself attractive to him; 
(e) to suckle the children during the prescribed or usual 
period of time, if so desired by the husband, and to 
bring up the children properly. 
Some of these obligation cast a legal duty on the 
husband or the wife, as the case may be, while others are 
in the nature of moral obligations only. 
It is not every failure of the marital obligations 
on the part of one party that entitles the other party to 
the dissolution of the marriage and such right can be 
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exercised only when the failure is of a serious nature. 
A marriage can be dissolved when a wife has an 
'invincible' repugnance or aversion for her husband. The 
dissolution of marriage at the instance of the wife will 
be disToi vod in the chapter on Khula. 
As already stated, a marriage can also be 
dissolved when one of the spouses suffers from some 
serious defect physical, social, cultural or moral. It 
may, however, be stated that when one or more of the 
objects of a marriage are lost due to a defect in one of 
the spouses, the marriage does not ipsofacto cedse to 
exist but that it gives option to the other party who may 
or may not like to continue such a marriage. Thus, a man 
may Tnarr:? a woraan "who may" be beyond her dge ^st jmhich^she 
can bear children simply to escape from loveliness or to 
have someone to attend to his domestic requirements. 
Similarly, a woman may, for the sake of financial support, 
marry a man who she knows is suffering from incapacity. 
Right to Dissolve Marriage;- A Muslim marriage is 
ordinarily a relationship for life based on mutual consent 
of the parties. But under the Muslim law, unlike some 
other systems of law, marriage is a special type of civil 
contract. It follov/s that the parties continue to it have a riyht, 
as in other contracts, to continue the contract of 
marriage or to discontinue it on reasonable grounds. 
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Who can Dissolve Marriage;- A marriage can be dissolved 
by either the husband or the wife or by their mutual 
consent or by the Qadi or the Arbitralor. It can also get 
terminated automatically on the happening of certain 
contingencies. The cause, that constitutes a ground for 
dissolution of marriage can be the conduct or physical or 
mental condition of the husband or of the wife. The 
marriage can also be dissolved when it is ill-assorted. 
Dissolution of Marriage by the Husband;- A marriage can 
be dissolved by the husband through divorce ila or Zihar. 
(a) Divorce: The present Muslim practice allows the 
husband full powers to dissolve the marriage at his 
sweet will without assigning any reason or without 
even there being a reasonable ground for the divorce. 
All the Muslim sects, with the exception of the 
Mu'tazilites, conceds this absolute power to the 
husband. Some of them do admit that marriage being 
commended, it can be terminated only in case of 
urgency for its dissolution and that when there is no 
valid necessity for its termination then the husband 
is not justified in dissolving it. But in spite of it, 
they do not hold a divorce without justification to be 
legally invalid; they only consider it to be sinful. 
The view of the vast majority of the Juri^ its ' may, for 
all practical purpose, be taken in the present times 
to be the Muslim law on the point. The matter is fully 
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discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
(b) Ila' and Zihar: These are two other methods of 
dissolving the marriage by the husband, that will be 
disscussed in subsequent chapter. 
Dissolution of Marriage by the Wife;- A wife can herself 
dissolve her marriage by the exercise of Khiyar al-bulugh 
(option of puberty) or under tafwid, that is, when the 
power of divorce has been delegated to her by the husband. 
She can also have recourse to Khula. 
Dissolution of Marriage by Mutual consent;- It is always 
open to the spouses to mutually agree to the termination 
of their marriage for a consideration or without it. This 
they can do by Khula, mubarah, or tal^ .q bi' iwad al-mal. 
Dissolution of Marriage by the Qa<ji;-
At the instance of the husband. A husband can get 
his marriage dissolved by the Qa^i without usually 
becoming liable for the payment of the dower in the 
following cases: 
(a) If the wife or the guardian of a minor wife has been 
guilty of fraud in certain respects;. 
(b) When the husband was married during his minority by 
his guadian for a dower unreasonably high; 
(c) When the spoused non-Muslim and the husband embraces 
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Islam but the wife refuses to do so; 
(d) When the wife is suffering from some serious defects: 
physical, social or mental. 
The Malikis, the Shafi' and the Hanabalis among 
the Sunnis, and the Shi'is hold that a marriage can be 
dissolved by the Qadi at the instance of the husband on 
serious blemish in the wife. The Hanafis donot agree with 
this view and do not allow the termination of marriage on 
this ground as it deprives the wife of a portion of her 
dower. 
At the Instance of the Wife;- A marriage can be dissolved 
by the Qadi at the instance of the wife on the following 
grounds: 
(a) When the husband's conduct is such ao has been 
specifically disapproved of by Islam; 
(b) When the husband is suffering from a serious mental or 
physical defect which renders the continuation of the 
marriage unsafe or undesirable for the wife; 
(c) When she was given in marriage by her guardian and her 
dower is unreasonably low, that is, is lower than the 
customary dower; 
(d) When she was a minor at the time of her marriage; 
(e) When the spouses are non-Muslim and the wife embraces 
Islam but the husband refuses to do so; 
(f) When the husband accuses her of unchastity; 
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(g) When she embraces Islam and chooses a Muslim state for 
her domicile but her husband remains dv/elliny in a 
non-Muslim state. (Applicable to non-Muslims). 
The above grounds are briefly discussed below:-
Undesirable Conduct of the Husband;- The conduct or 
behaviour of the husband that becomes cause for the 
dissolution of marriage must be such as injuriously 
effects the wife, such as when the husband: 
(i) attributes unchastilry to the wife; 
(ii) takes a vow not to be intimate with his wife for a 
period of four months or more and this constitutes 
ila • ; 
(iii) makes it unlawful for himself to be intimate with 
his wife by Zihar; 
(iv) absents himself from the conjugal domicile for a 
period of four years or longer, and his where 
abouts, are not known or 
(v) is guilty of inequality between two or more wives, 
etc. 
Automatic Dissolution of Marriage;- Under Muslim law 
marriage becomes automatically dissolved on 
(i) the death of one of the spouses; 
(ii) apostasy of one of the spouses; 
(iii) under the Sunni law, on the fulfilment of a 
condition in the case of a conditional divorce, or 
-:123:-
(iv) Change of domicile in case of non-Muslims. 
The various methods of dissolution of marriage 
shall be discusssed in detail in the subsequent chapters. 
If a marriage is dissolved for a cause imputable 
to the husband then it has, generally speaking, the effect 
of talaq or divorce on the ground the dissolution of the 
marriage has been brought about on account of the husband 
and so he should be deemed to have divorced his wife. 
Thus, if the marriage is dissolved on the ground that the 
husband is important or insane and the like, then the 
dissolution of the marriage will have the effect of talaq 
even though the marriage is dissolved by the Qadi at the 
instance of the wife. The dissolution of marriage by or at 
the instance of a wife is called Faskh (termination). If 
the marriage is dissoved due to a cause attributable to 
the wife then also it shall have the effect of Faskh or 
termination of the marriage by the wife. Thus, if it is 
dissolved by the wife in the exercise of the option of 
puberty or by the Qa^i on the ground of some serious 
blemish in her, then it shall be deemed to be Faskh by the 
wife.( 11) It may be added here that the above is not an 
invariable rule of law and there are certain exceptions to 
it. Thus, if a marriage is dissolved on account of the 
apostasy or conversion to Islam of the husband or his 
adoption of a domicile in dar al-harb when the wife 
resides in dar al-Islam, then the dissolution shall be 
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considered to be Faskh, although the marriage is dissolved 
for a cause attributable to the husband. 
The effect of both these methods, namely, talaq 
and Faskh is the same as for as dissolution of marriage is 
concerned. The difference lies in the extent of the 
husband's liability for payment of dower and the number of 
divorce effected. 
The termination of marriage by the Qadi either on 
his own initiative or at the instance of the wife or a 
third person is called Faskh. 
The automatic termination of marriage is called a 
Furqah(separation). 
At the Instance of a Third Party;- A marriage can be 
dissolved at the instance of certain near relations of the 
wife if she contracts a marriage for a dower which is less 
then the customary dower in her family of if the husband 
is otherwise unequal to the girl's family. 
By the Qa4i on his Own Instiative;- It is duty of the 
Qa<^ i to dissolve a marriage if he comes to know that it 
is Fasid or irregular. 
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CHAPTER-III 
UNIT-A 
MODES OP DIVORCE/DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 
UNDER HINDU LAW 
DIVORCE UNDER CUSTOM OR SPECIAL ENACTMENT 
Sub-section (2) of 5.9 provides that nothing contained in 
this Pet shall be deemed to affect any right recognized by 
customor conferred by any special enactment to obtain the 
dissolution of a Hindu marriage whether solemnized before 
or after the commencement of this Act . Thus both in 
repect of pre-act and post act marriage. 
(1) The customary mode and forum of dissolution of 
marriage are preserved, and 
(2) Grounds and Jurisdiction of dissolution of 
marriage under special enactments are retained. 
Divorce under Custom;- Before 1955 among the Hindus 
divorce was available only Under custom, and customary 
modes of divorce unless found to be contrary to public 
policy or morality, were given effect to The customary 
mode of divorce and the customary form of divorce are 
(2) 
still available to these who are governed by custom. 
and it seems, neither the three years bar to divorce nor 
one year's bar on re-marriage after a decree of divorce 
applies to customary divorces. Customary divorce may be 
obtained through the agency of panchayats or caste 
tribunals or by private act of parties such as by 
agreement, bill or divorcement, tyag Patra or Furkat 
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(3) 
nama. Such a custom must satisfy the standard of 
reasonableness. A custom permitting one spouse to divorce 
the other against the will of the latter is void, being 
unreasonable. 
The panchayat and caste tribunals continue to 
exercise jurisdiction; How this jurisdiction is exercised 
and how the courts may interfere with such jurisdiction is 
illustrated by Penabai V. Channoo Lai. . The marriage of 
parties was dissoloved by the panchayat on the basis of 
mutul consent of parties. A suit was filed in the court in 
the court by the wife for a declaration that marriage 
still existed on the averment that when she gave her 
consent before the panchayat she was only fourteen years 
old and was not capable of giving her free consent. The 
court rejected the suit and observed that the wife had 
sufficient understanding when she gave her consent and 
that such a divorce was recognized in the caste (parties 
weer put was) by costom. Kishen Lai V. Prabhu adds a 
new dimension to the matter. The court said that it should 
be clearly proved that the panchayat has jurisdiction to 
dissolve the marriage and that rules of nutural justic 
have been followed. This seens to be an attempt to bring 
customary divorces under judicial scruting. 
Divorce under special Enactments:- Before the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955, in the erstwhile. State of Madras and 
the former State of Travancore and Cochin several statute 
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were passed to regulate marriage and divorce in various 
(7) castes or group of castes. Under these enactment. 
divorce by mutual consent and by deed executed by parties 
is recognized. Among the matrilineal communities, such as 
mrumakhathayam and Diyasantana, marriage has been always 
considered to be a consensual union and not a sacrament. A 
full bench of the Kerala High Court recently held that the 
right to obtain divorce by mutual consent under the 
Travancore. Nayar Act remains unaffected by the Hindu 
( f t ) 
Marriage Act. The same is trul about other special 
enactments. 
Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage act, grants a decree of 
judicial seperation to an aggrieved spouse on grounds of 
desertion, cruelty, venual disease, insanity, lepiosy. & 
sexual misconduct of a spouse. According to one point of 
view this decree does not gurantee couplex a permanent 
conjugal pease rather in the long run it encourager them 
to seek divorce. The judicial seperation decree too, in 
many cases, it is said, fails to up the differences 
between the extranged couples. 
Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, was enacted 
by parliament for avoiding easy & hasty divorces on the 
ground that Hindu society does not favour divorce & 
further, divorce creates many social problem. Section 10 
thus offers the exicted and estranged couples the cooling 
of period and an appartunity to dissolve their marital 
differences like a good spartsman and a good old friend. 
But it may be submitted that the decree of judicial 
seperation can hel'^  those who either afford the idea of 
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divorce or do not appreciate it. But what does about those 
who want divorce and are not interested in leading a cruel 
married life? 
Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act allows 
(9) 
divorce to a Hindu spouse on certain grounds. Some of 
the grounds are available to both the parties to 
marriage, but the others to the wife only. A Hindu wife 
has two additional grounds for claiming divorce against 
her guilty husband and one of these two is rape. Sodomy 
and bestiality committed by the husband. One may 
question the wisdom of the law makers, that why the wife 
alone should enjoy this ground of divorce can a wife be 
not guilty of committing bestiality? The nindu marriage 
Act does not allow a Hindu to seek divorce on the 
following grounds viz-desertion, mutual consent, cruelty, 
imotency, and breakdown of marriage irretrearably. Mutual 
consent and desertion should grounds of divorce in the 
special Marriage Act, 1954.^ Mutual consent (Mubarat) 
is also a ground of divorce in Muslim law. It is a ground 
of divorce in customary divorces too. 
The suggestion, that it should be made a ground 
for divorce in the Hindu Marriage Act, needs a thorough 
consideration and necessary caution. Hindu Marriages in 
most of the cases are arragned marriages and ceremonial in 
character and therefore, to permit divorce by mutual 
consent may not be much helpful, as in the case with 
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intercaste and interreligion marriages conducted in a 
court of law. Further, among Hindus, child marriages are 
much in vague uptil now. It is also a fact that, in a 
Hindu marriage, validity of marriage does not depend on 
the consent of parties to the marriage and a Hindu 
marriage in not invalid for lack of concert. Therefore, 
when consent is not material for contracting a valid Hindu 
marriage, why it should be a ground for terminating the 
Hindu marriage? In civil and Muslim marriages consent 
plays a dominant role in validating a marriage moreover, 
divorce by mutual consent possener its own merits and 
demerits and its utility has already been judged by 
(12) 
scholars on Hindu law. Therefore, it is submitted that 
if it is incarf orated in section 13 (1) of the Hindu 
Marriage act. It should have only a restricted application 
and he relief on this ground be so checked and controlled 
that it is not readily or hastily enjayed by contesting 
parting parties in vaccum. 
Cruelty has become a ground of divorce in Uttar 
Pradesh by a local amendment it is reasonably expected 
from parliament, that sice cruelty can be practised in all 
states by the Hindu spouses, it should be made a ground of 
divorce for all Hindus residing in any part of India. 
Deseration is not a ground of divorce in the Hindu 
Marriage Act, it can be made a ground us in the case in 
(13) England as well as in India in the case of the 
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(14) 
special Marriage Act. Where polygamy is allowed or 
where interreligion marriages thake place, the possibility 
of desertion in greater than in a Hindu marriage; 
nevertheless, it cannot be denied that it is a serious 
matrimonical offence and it should git its due place in 
section 13 (1) of the act. Because it in honestly, belived 
that a deserted spouse is much in need of an established 
home than a more hope or assurance of an "established 
Rome" which unfortunately sometimes collapses with no hope 
of repair; due to the most hostile attitude of the 
deserting spouse. For desertion, divorce is a better 
remedy than judicial seperation and further it is in tune 
with the current norms of the society. Impotency is a 
ground of divorce in Muslim Law, but in the Hindu Marriage 
Act, a spouse can obtain only a decree of aullity on this 
ground. It appears to be a sound logic that where parties 
op to live together; irrespective of having no sexual 
pleasure, their martial tie should not be disturbed by 
law. But where people marry a younger age with a view to 
desirving legitimate seacual pleasure. They should not be 
tied up with impotent parteners and indirectly allowed to 
satisfy their physical needs outside the legal wedlock. 
Where impotency is in curable medically or surgically, it 
is too much to expect from a younger couple to continue 
the martial tie, on the gound that impotency did not exist 
at the time of marriage, but existed at the time of 
filling. The petition only. It is t that a Hindu never 
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r.iarrics for sex alone; but when it has great importance r^, 
married life; how can it be forgotten easily? 
Now consummation of amrriage has been suggested to 
be c ground of divorce too but one fails to understand, how 
it can mark further complicate them and morover, to prove 
the fact of non consummation of marriage in many wife 
during subsistence of marriage, many engage hereself in 
extra-martial activities, the court may find it difficult 
to ascertain the fact of non-confermation of marriage.The 
court at the most can look to the medical report for 
confermation of non consunomation, but how for it will be 
reliable one may only wonder in owe. 
Some of the grounds of customary divorce have 
been found to be quite effective in granting speedier 
divorce to the extranged couples belogning to the lower 
class of Hindu. Therefore, a plea for this incorporation 
in the act may not sound unresonable, if some of these 
grounds are thoroughly studied and if found suitable are 
granted to Hindus. It may also be noted that the procedure 
for obtaining customary divorce is easy, simple; non 
technical as well as speedier. The plea for liberalizing 
divorce is beeing forward that tthese days. Therefore 
a suggestion is put forward that three years bar for 
obtaining divorce should be suitably reduced to one year. 
It appears to be just and human suggestion, because one 
cannot wait too long for terminating his or her marriage. 
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without being cruel towards each other. 
It is just plea that estranged couples have lost 
all. faith and charms of married life and are fed up with 
the tortures of conjugal union; they should be given a 
fresh opportunity to re- orient their matromonial life 
new, if they so desire, instead of dragging on 
unsucessful martial life unnesserily and that too far a 
very long time. Where divorce is granted too late, the 
parties to the unsucessful marriage not only exhaust their 
energy; money and reputation in terminating it, but suffer 
much embrassment and disappointment also in future life. 
The sancity of judicial institution is also affected, when 
it becomes a source of further embrassment to the 
litigants; who are already frustrated with their 
matrimonial liver 
The procedure of first obtaining judicial 
seperation and then divorce appears to be a dilatory 
process and it unnecessarily delays justice to the parties 
in dispute justice delayed in justice dnied in such easer. 
It is not too much to expect that extranged spouses, who 
are much in need of divorce, should get it only after 
three years or more after the total satisfaction of the 
court and in many cases at such as late stage of life 
that, all their future charm of another marriage is 
diminished, because they find them selver now too old for 
it. Where conjugal relations are damaged irreparably soon 
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after marriage or within few years of marriage, the 
extranged couple expect speedier divorce. To delay the 
divorce in such cases will not only be inhumane but absurd 
too. Therefore the Hindu Marriage act should be so 
moderated that it ensures the estranged couples divorce at 
an earlier date i.e., when they are much in need of it . 
But in doing so regard must be had, that the sanctity of a 
Hindu marriage is not associated beyond repairs. Because 
the unstitution of marriage is more respectable than the 
institution of divorce and the later is a part of the 
former and not above it. 
The younger generation it appears, does not posses 
that much of regard for the institution of marriage, as 
the people of the past had, neverthless if it desires easy 
divorce, its demand should be conceded to with almost care 
and caution; and on university accepted principles of 
marriages and divorce law. 
Bisider above observations, it may also be pointed 
(17) (18) 
out that section 5 (i) and (vi) and section 16 of 
(19) 
the Hindu Marriag Act also need a better drafting, so 
that the law laid down in it is further clarified and made 
up to date. 
It is reartening to note that the law commision 
recomendations or contained in its 50th report have 
taken note of the in adequancies of matromonial reliefs 
granted in the Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955 (Special Merrage Act 1954) and the commisions has been 
right in recommending the following reformss Viz. 
(i) Guelty shoould be made a ground of divorce. 
(ii) Adultery should be made a ground of divorce. 
(iii) Two years desertion should, on the part of either 
party be made a ground of divorce. 
(iv) There should be deletion of three years period for 
grounds based on diseases Viz insanity, leprousy and 
vencral diseases 
(v) I regard to section of 13(A), Hindu Marriage Act 1955 
the period be reduced to one year i.e., divorce should be 
allowed to either party one year after the non compliance 
of the decrees of judicial seperation of restitution of 
conjugal right. In other word two years period of waiting 
be reduced to one year in the above cases. 
(vi) Three years bar for obtaining clivorce as provided in 
section 14 of the Act be removed i.e. section 14 should be 
delated. 
(vii) From section 15 of the Act, the bar of one year for 
remarriage be removed. 
(viii) With a view to avoiding under delay in the disposal 
of matrimonial petitions, the family courts be establish 
and "endeavor should be under delay. 
(ix) Every procedings under the Act should be made in 
camera. 
According to one Fifty ninth report of the law 
commision is very dissappointing; but this view needs a 
through study in a seperate paper. 
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CHAPTER-III 
UNIT-B 
"MODES OF DIVORCE/DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE" 
UNDER ISLAM (MUSLIM LAW) 
Introductory;- Talaq (Divorce) is an Arabic word which 
means "Undoing of or a release from a knot," It is used by 
Muslim Jurists to denote the release of a woman from the 
marriage tie, and means a divorce" 
Among the book written on the basis of Qur'an,^ 
Hadith and Fiqah for Muslim divorce, including that of 
Baillie, Wilson, Tyabji, Ameer Ali, Mulla, Saxana, K.N. 
Ahmad, Justice Mohmood, Abdur Rahim, Ibne Abedin, Qodama, 
Ibne Tayemea, Ibne Nujaim, and Marghinani and Fayzee the 
best classification have been given by Fyzee, K.N. Ahmad 
and Marghinani. Their method of classification are 
scientific and easily accepted by the society and under 
the Qur'an and Hadith. Their basis of classification are 
the following. 
Classification of Divorce;-
A. By the death of the husband or the wife 
B. By the act of Parties 
C. By Judicial process. 
A. By the death of Husband or the wife; 
It is clear and natural that with the death of 
husband or wife the marriage tie automatically terminates. 
The husband can remarry immediately after his wife death. 
But in case of the husband's death the widow has to wait 
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till the expiry of Iddat (Menstrual courses to 4 months 
and 10 days or is pregnant, till the delivary). 
B. By the Act of Parties : 
1. By the Husband:- Talaq - In its literal sense this 
Arabic word means "Taking off any tie or restraint," and 
in law it signifies the dissolution of marriage. In Handi 
law, no special form or phrase is necessary to pronounce 
talaq. The Ithna Ashari Law, however, insist on strict 
adherence to a form, that is, it must be in the Arabic 
language uttered orally, in the presence and hearing of 
two made witnesses, who should be honest and virtuous 
Muslims. 
iLj^alaq (divorce) or dissolution of marriage by the 
husband may conveniently be discussed under the following 
main heads:-
Religious Sanction 
Mode of Expression, and 
Effect of Divorce 
Religious Sanction;- i )Divorce under this head is divided 
under the Sunni Law by the husband into two classes:-
(a) Talaq us-Sunnah, 
(b) Talaq ul-Biddat or Talaq ul-Bid'ah 
ii) Ila (Vow of continence) 
iii) Zihar (Injurious comparison) 
2. By the Wife; Talaq-e-Tafwiz (delegated divorce) 
3. By Mutual Consent; i) Khula (redemption) 
ii) Mubarah (mutual freeing) 
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C. By Judicial Process; 
1. Lian (mutual imprecation) 
2. Faskh (Judicia annulment) 
Description;- Talaq us - Sunnah is regarded as the 
regular on orthodox form and Talaq ul-Biddat as the 
unorthodox or irregular form of talaq. The latter has now 
become the more common and prevalent method of dissolving 
a marriage. 
(a) Taaq us-Sunnah:- Talaq us-Sannah is again subdivided 
into two clsses namely:-
i)Ahsan meaning "Must approved," good and very proper, 
ii) Hasan meaning "Approved" good and proper 
(b) Talaq ul-Biddat;- Talaq ul-Biddat is again subdivided 
into two classes namely 
i) Tripe divorce, and 
ii) One irrevocable divorce (generally in writing) 
Description; Talaq us-Sunnah, that is, a talaq which 
carries the approved of the Prophet. It may be in the most 
approved form, i.e., ahsan; or hasan, i.e., simply an 
approved form. These two forms of Talaq ul-Sunnah are 
decribed below: 
(a) i) Talaq ul-Ahsan;- Talaq ul-Ahsan means the more 
properdivorce or must approved divorce. The words "must 
approved" do not denote any intrinsic merit of this kind 
of divorce. What is meant is that this kind of divorce is 
the least disapproved of its various forms. This is the 
Holy 
best form of talaq which had been approved by the Prophet 
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at the begining of his ministry. According to the Sunnath 
form restrictions have to be observed with repect to-
(a) the number of pronouncements; and 
(b) the time (i.e. whether the wife is in her menstrual 
courses or in a state of purity) 
Hedyah brands or remarks it as the most laudabe divorce, 
where the husband repudiates his wife by a single 
pronouncement in a period of Tuhor (purity) i.e., when the 
wife is free from her menstrual courses), during which he 
has not had intercourse with her, and then leaves her to 
the observance of iddat. 
The divorce remains revocable during the iddat, 
(2) 
and the parties retain the right of inheritance. 
Talaq-E-Ahsan form is considered most laudable both 
because the Prophet held this to be the most excellent 
method and because in pursuing the method the husband 
still has the power of recaling his wife. 
According to the Hedyah, this method of divorce is 
the most approved because the companious of the Prophet 
approved of it, and secondly, because it remains within 
the power of the husband to revoke the divorce during 
iddat, which is three monthly period or till delivary. 
Wath is meant is that this kind of divorce is the 
least disapproved of its various forms. The reason for the 
preference of this form of divorce over others is that it 
does not immediately sever the marital relationship but 
alows an opportunity to the spouses to continue the 
marriage if they so choose and, in pursuing this method, 
the husband can still exercise his right without the 
necessity of an intermediary marriage to retain his wife 
by a reversal of the divorce during the period of her 
'iddat, if he be so inclined. This rule is based on an 
injunction in the Qur'an which says, "Divorce may be 
pronounced twice, then keep them in good fellowship or let 
(them) go in kindness." It is laid down at another 
pace, "So, if he (the husband) divorces her (the third 
time) she shall not be lowfu to him afterwards until she 
(7) 
marries another person." Also because this method is 
the one lawful method of divorce unanimously agreed upon. 
(a) ii) Talaq ul-Hasan;- Talaq ul-Hasan means proper 
divorce or approved divorce. It is not unanimously 
accepted as a lawful divorce by all the Sunni Schools of 
law. Imam Malik considers it to be Bid'ah or an 
(8) innovation. He says that divorce is meant no serve as a 
prohibition and it is secured by one pronouncement and so, 
according to him, a divorce would no doubt be effected in 
this way but the husband would be guilty of sin in 
pronounceing it Iman Shafi; Other Sunni Jurists accept it 
as a lawful divorce in the form of Talaq ul-Sunnah. Khalid 
Rashid says in this form that the husband successivey 
pronounces divorce three times during consecutive periods 
of purity (tuhr). It is therefore "a divorce upon a 
divorce", where the first and second pronouncements are 
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revoked and followed by a third, only then talaq becomes 
irrevocable. It is also essential that no intercourse 
should have taken place during that particular period of 
purity in which the pronouncement has been made. 
Where the wife is not subject to menstrual Courses, 
in interval of 30 days is required between each successive 
repudiation. Talaq Hasan tries to put an end to a 
barbarous pre-Islamic practice to divorce a wife and take 
her back several times in order to ill treat her. Through 
this method of talaq, the husband has been given two 
chances of divorcing and then taking the wife back, but 
the third time he does so, the talaq becomes irrevocable. 
In this way, the process of divorcing and repudiating 
(9) cannot be continued indefinitely. 
"11) Requirement of Talaq ul-Ahsan i-:-The following conditions 
are necessary for Talaq ul-Ahsan: 
(a) In the case of a consummated marriage with a 
menstruating wife, the pronouncement must be made 
during a tuhor (i.e., in a state of purily) 
(c) There must be no sexual intercourse during the tuhor) 
(d) There must be abslinence from sexual intercourse 
during the period of iddat. The period of iddat in the 
case of a pregnant woman extends up to the time of 
delivery. There must therefore be abstinence from 
sexual intercourse till the birth of the child. 
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The restictions about the. ^alestinence from 
intercourse relate only to a mestruating wife whose 
marriage has been consumated. In the case of an 
unconsummated marriage, tuhor or during the actual 
(12) 
occurrence of the courses. So also, in the case of a 
non menstruating wife a talaq may be pronounced after 
intercourse without any time intervening between it and 
the talaq. A pregnant woman may also be immediately'after 
, ,. (13) delxvary. 
Valid retirement would stand on the same footing 
(14) as consummation for the purposes of talaq-us-Sunnah. 
Talaq-ul-Ahsan secures in a large measure against 
the hasty pronouncement of talaq as it pronounced during 
the time in which there is no bar to conjugal intercourse. 
The talaq continues to be in suspense during iddat and 
affers room for reconsideration of the decision by the 
husband. If there is only one declaration of divorce and 
parties continue to live as husband and wife and children 
born from the wife are recognised by the husband as his, 
the marriage would not become dissolved. 
Shia-Law!- The wife must also not be in her puerperal 
(16) 
courses. 
Requirements of Talaq-ul-Hasa;- This is also one of the 
approved forms of talaq. Talaq-ul-Hasan may be made in the 
following manner. 
(a) Three pronouncements must be made. 
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(b) In the case of a wife who is subject to menstruation 
(and is not pregnant), the three pronouncement must be 
made during three consecutive tuhurs; 
(c) In the case of a wife is not subject to menstruation 
or is pregnant, the pronouncement must be made at the 
intervals of 30 days between each pronouncement. The 
condition that the pronouncement should be made 
between two periods of tuhurs would not be applicable 
to a woman who passed the age of menstruation because 
it would be physically impossible to have any such 
periods. 
(d) There must be abstinence from sexual intercourse 
during the three tuhurs (the period covered by 
pronouncements) 
The main difference between the two forms Ahson 
and riasan, is that the period after which the talaq 
becomes effective in the latter form is reduced. In the 
case of the former, the husband has to wait till the 
expiry of the iddat before the talaq becomes final. This 
would in case of a menstruating wife cover a period of 
three menstrual courses after the date of the 
pronouncement. In the case of talaq ul-hasan the period 
may be much shorter. This form also has the same features 
of talaq-ul-ahsan about preventing a hasty pronouncement 
and also about leaving a scope for reconsideration by the 
husband. 
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Talacg of a pregnant wife:- According to Imam Ibu Hanifa 
(Rah) and Imam Abu Yousuf (Rah) a pregnant wife may be 
divorced in the regular way (i.e., by talaq-ul-Sunnah) by 
three talas. He is first to pronounce a single sentence of 
divoorce upon her and then one at the expriation of one 
monthe and a third at the expiration of next succeeding 
month, (i.e., in the ahsan form). According to Imam 
Mohammad the only talaq-ul-Sunnah in the case of a 
pregnant woman is a single divorce (i.e., only in ahsan 
form).(17) 
(b) Talaq ul-Bid'ah or Talaq ul-Bid'i 
Introductory;- The other method of divorce considered 
from a religious point of view is Talaq al-Bid'ah or Tala 
al-Bid'i, unorthodox divorce. Here the husband doesnot 
follow the approved form of talaq i.e., talaq-us-Sunnah, 
and neither pays any attention to the period of purity non 
to the abstention from intercourse. It is so called 
because it is not approved by Muslim Jurists and is 
considered and desirable innovation. Any divorce which 
does not conform to Talaq-us-Sannah is deemed to be an 
inuovation or bid'ah and is called Talaq al-Bid'i. It is 
the most dissapproved forms of divorce. Ameer Ali is not 
exactly correct when he says," which (Talaq 
ul-Bid'ah) was introduced in the second century of the 
Muhammada era. It was then that the ummayad monarchs, 
finding the checks, imposed by the Prophet (peace be on 
him) on the facility of repudiation galling, looked about 
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for some escape from the strictness of law and found in 
the pliability of the jurists a loophole to effect their, 
(17) purpose." Talaq ul-Bid'i was some times resorted to 
Holy 
even in the time of the Prophet (peace be on him). Thus 
there is the well known case of Ibn 'Umar who had divorced 
his wife during the period of meanstruation. The Prophet 
(peace be on him) on being informed of this told him that 
he had acted wrongly and advised him to cancel the divorce 
by raj'ah (cancellation) and then to proceed in the proper 
manner if he still persisted in his desire to divorce the 
(18) 
wife. The fact is that the Prophet (peace be on him) 
strongly condemned it and didnot sanction it. But in the 
course of time it came to be considered a valid and legal 
form of divorce. Moreover/ it assumed many other forms in 
the second century and came to be recognised as an 
effective divorce. 
The above points relating to Talaq al-Bid'ah are fully 
discussed belov\?:-
(a) Divorce in period of purity in which there has been 
intimacy;-
It is not permissible to divorce the wife in a 
Tuhur (period of purity) in which the husband has been 
intimate with her. If he does so, then according to the 
Sunnis a Talaq al-Bid'ah shall be effected reasoning of 
the jurists for this rule is that a divorce is to be given 
only when there is necessity and in the absence of 
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necessity a divorce is not to be given. The fact that the 
husband was intimate with the wife during the period of 
purity shows that he does stand in need of her and so 
there is no necessity for divorce in such a case and a 
divorce cannot be properly given under such 
(19) . . . 
circumstances. The prahibition does not apply when the 
wife is incapable of pregnancy whether on account of 
tender or old age. A girl below nine years and a woman 
fifty five years of a ge or older is supposed to be 
incapable of pregnancy and so a Talaq is permissible in 
such a case in a period of purity in which there has been 
(21) intimacy between her and her husband. Such a talaq 
would be considered to be a Talaq us-Sunnah. 
(b) Repetition of Pronouncement;- The most prevalent 
method of exercising Talaq al-Bid'ah under the Sunni law 
now a days is to pronounce three divorce at the same 
(22) time. It is not necessary that the husband should 
repeat the pronouncement three times in order to 
constitute an irrevocable divoorce. The triple repetition 
is merely one of the many forms by which such a divorce 
can be effected and the same result can be obtained by any 
other method recognized for the purpose. A husband can 
effect such a talaq even by only one pronouncement if he 
makes it clear that he was proonouncing a Talaq al-Bain, 
that is, an errevocable divorce. Thus, to effect such 
talaq the husband may say, "You are repudiated 
(23) thrice.' He can also convey his intention of 
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pronouncing three divorces by saying. "You are divorced 
so many times" and showing three fingers at the same time 
(24) 
which will result in a Talaq al-Bid'ah. 
(c) Divorce during the Period of Impurity;- A divorce 
given while the wife is in her monthly course is 
considered Bid'i or innovation, because it is against the 
prescribed method of divorce. Thus there is a Tradition to 
the effect that Ibn 'Umar divorced his wife during the 
period of impurity (menstruation). The Prophet (peace be 
on him) was told of this and he said to Ibn 'Umar, "Ibn 
'Umar. Allah has not allowed you to act like that you have 
gone against the Sunnah (i.e., against the approved 
religions law). The correct method is to wait till she is 
pure and then to pronounce the divorce in the period of 
purity, "and the further asked him to revoke the divorce 
(25) by raj'ah (retraction). The Hanafi Law holds such 
divorce to be effective, but it is considered proper for 
the husband to revoke it and to pronounce a fresh divorce 
• ^ ^ -^  • ^ \ ^ • (26) 
in a period of purity m order to escape from sin. 
According to some Jurists, the revocation of divorce is 
incumbent on the husband. It is stated in some books that 
(27) this view IS the better view. It is explained m 
al-Hadayah that revocation of divorce is incumbent on the 
husband for three reasons, namely:-
Holy 
(a) The order of Prophet (peace be on him) to Ibn 'Umar as 
cited above. 
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(b) The pronouncement of divorce during the period of 
impurity is sinful, and it is the duty of every man to 
redress the wrong by every means within his power, and 
(c) The protraction of the 'Iddah places an extra burden 
on the wife, which transgresses the limits prescribed 
by the book.^^^^ 
Maliki Law;- Maliki holds that a Talaq al-Bid'ah shall 
effect a separation, but considers it to be disapproved 
of. He makes it an essencial of a valid divorce that it 
should fulfil the following conditions and a Bid'i divorce 
is one which does not fulfil them:-
(a). It must be given when the wife is in a state of 
purity, that is not during the period of menstrual 
felow non during the Nafa (the term child birth). The 
maximum period of Nifas is fixed at foruty days or 
(29) 
according to a woman's usual period in such case. 
(b). The husband should not have been intimate with the 
wife in the period of purity in which the divorce is 
pronounced. 
(c). After pronouncing a divorce no fresh divorce be given 
during the period of iddah 
(d). Note more than one divorce should be pronounced at 
(30) the same time 
If the husband contravenes the conditions given 
(31) 
above he shall be forced to take back his wife. This 
is however, subject to the condition that the marriage has 
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been consummated. If there has been no intimacy then 
compulsion shall not be used and wife shall become 
(32) 
separated on the pronouncement of divorce. 
Shafi'i Law;- Shafi'i has expressed the opinion that a 
Talaq al-Bid'ah is forbidden but nevertheless it effects a 
ion 
(34) 
(33) separat between the spouses. He considers t to be 
sinful. 
Hanbali Law;- Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal agrees with Imam Abu 
Hanifah and holds that a Talaq al-Bid'i would be 
(35) 
effective, though sinful. 
Shi'i Law;- Under the Shi'i law Talaq (divorce) is 
divided in two main classes, namely:-
(a) Bid'i(irregular or heretical), and 
(b) Sunni (regular) 
(a) Bid'i;- Talaq is considered irregular. It is 
constituted in the following three ways: 
i. Divorce against an enjoyed wife is not pregnant and who 
is in her courses, or Nifas (pueer peral discharge) 
when her husband is present with her or absent from her 
for a period less than the prescribed period. It is the 
discharge after childbirth and, according to the Shi'i 
Jurists, its maximam period can be ten days while 
according to the Sunnis it can last for dorty days. 
ii. Pronouncement of divorce against a wife, who is not 
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praynantn in that period of the wife's purity in which the 
husband has been intimate with her. Period purity means 
the period when the wife is free of her meanstrual 
courses. 
iii) Pranouncement of three divorce whether by one 
sentence or one after another when there has been no 
intermediate revocation. The first two forms of 
divorce are considered vaid and absolutely ineffective 
(37) 
under the Shi' i law. This also holds good in respect 
of three pronouncements at the same time. But if they are 
pronounced at different times then the first time 
pronouncement may be given effect to. 
The second class of talaq is called Sunni. The 
word Sunni is used in contradistinction to Bid'i. 
It recognises only Talaq allSunnah of which there 
are three kinds. It is divided by Shi'i Juris, s into three 
classes, namely: 
1. Talaq-i-Bain or absolute, is irrevocable Talaq 
2. Talaq-i-Raja'i that is revocable Talaq, and 
3. Talaq-ul-iddah. 
1. Talaq-i-Bain is that divorce which cannot be revoked. 
It is constituted in the following six ways: 
i) Divorce against a wife who is past child bearing age. 
ii) Divorce against a wife with whom there has been no 
intimacy 
iii) Divorce against a wife who has been thrice repudiated 
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with two intermediate revocations. 
iv) Divorce against a wife of such a tender age that she 
is not subject to meanstrual courses. This age is fixed at 
nine years. 
v). Divorce against a wife who has obtained a Khula divorce 
for consideration. 
vi). Divorce against a wife who has secured a divorce 
under the doctrine of Mubarah. 
It is necessary in the case of the fifths class 
and sixth class of divorce that the consideration for 
Khula or Mubarah has not been revoked. If it has been 
revoked then the divorce shall be a Raj' divorce and not a 
Talaq-i-Bain. 
(b) Talaq-Raj'i;- Talaq Raj'i is that kind of divorce in 
which the husband has got a right to cancel it. This he 
can do before the expiry of the wife's iddah. If the 
period of the wife's iddah expires then a revocable 
divorce is effected. But if the spouses want to unite then 
they can remarry without the necessity of there being an 
intermediary marriage. 
(c) Talaq al-Iddah;- In this form of divorce, the husband 
divorces his wife under the requisite conditions; he then 
recalls her and cohabits with her before the expiration or 
completion of her iddah. He again divorces her a second 
time in another tuhor, that is, other than that in which 
he was intimgte with her. He recalls her again and 
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cohabits with her and then divorces her in a subsequent 
tuhor. This kind of divorce effects what is called a 
mughallazah divorce in which the wife becomes forbedden to 
husband. She can become lawful to him only if after the 
divorce she marries another person and that marriage is 
dissolved after consummation. It is only than that she 
can marry the former husband. It is a necessary condition 
of such Tala and there must be inter course after each 
revocation. If the husband divorce his would be effected, 
but it would not be Talaq al-iddah. 
Divorce considered with Regard to the mode of Expression:-
A divorce can be considered with respect to the 
mode of expression from two aspects, namely, (a) Lucidity 
of expression (b) Whether it is conditional or 
unconditional. 
Divorce condidered with Regard to Lucidity of expression:-
The language used by a husband to divorce his wife 
may or may not be clear enough to denote his intention of 
divorcing her. The pronouncement of divorce considered 
with regard to lucidity of expression is divided into tw 
kinds, namely:-
i) Sarih or express or plain and 
(39) 
ii) Kinayah or implied or ambiguous. 
i) Sarih or clear Expression;- A saih or clear 
proonouncement of divorce is one which is given in such 
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spoken words the meaning of which is unmistakable, as for 
example, when a husband says to his wife. " I have 
divorced you" or "you are divorced," Such a 
pronoucement of divorce includes the use of expressions 
that have acquired a particular significance by long usage 
particular significance by long usage and are not used in 
(41) 
any other sanse than of divorce. As the expressions 
are not used in any sense other than that of divorce and 
are well understood as implying divorce, no proof of 
(42) intention to divrce is required under the Sunni Law. 
In divorces given by Sar or clear pronouncements the law 
will hold that the husband meant what the actual words 
used by him conveyed without permitting him to explain 
(43) that he meant something else. In Sarih expressions tha 
actual intention of a husband who divorces his wife is 
immaterial and a Raj'i divorce shall be effected. It is 
the intention conveyed by his words in repudiating his 
wife that shall be taken into consideration, and the 
validity and effectiveness f the divorce whould not be 
governed by any mental reservation on the part of the 
husband to the effect that the divorce pronounced by him 
(44) 
was not a genme divorce. 
The word Talaq is used in India, Pakistan Bangladesh and 
Shirilangka in the same, sense as in Arabic and is well 
understood by every one and even by illiterate persons. 
The word Talaq has acquired in Urdu the technical meaning 
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by reason of usage and so must be given its technical 
import. The sentences in which the word is used form sarih 
or clear expressions and so no explaination or evidence 
can be given too denote a contrary intention under the 
general rule of the Sunni law. 
If a husband is asked whether he has divorced his 
wife and he replies in the afirmative it would amount to 
(45) 
sarih divorce. If a wife says to her husband, "Ami a 
divorce?" and should he reply, "yes," then too it would 
•u ^ - (46) amount to a sarih divorce. 
A number of such expressions as constitute express 
divorce have been given in al-Hadayah and other books, but 
the expressions given as the form of Sarih divorce are not 
expressions. 
Maliki Law;- According to Imam Maliki, Sarih expressions 
are four in number and can only be denoted by the word 
(47) Talaq. They are such as give below: 
(a) I divorce you, 
(b) You are divorced as regards myself etc. 
Shafi'i Law;- According to Shafi'i Law, expressions which 
clearly indicate severance of marriage relationship are 
termed Sarih (clear) expressions. They denote repudiation, 
separation, dismissal. Such expressions are as "I 
repudiate you," "You are repudiated," "You are free," etc. 
The expression may be explicitly pronounced in any 
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language provided the expressions employed correspond to 
(49) 
the above terms• 
Hanbali Law:- According to Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Sarih 
Talaq is that expression which is not used for any other 
purpase than Talaq. The husband can say,"I divorce you," 
or "You are a divorce." 
Effect of;- In the absence of words to denote an 
intention to the contrary the prenouncement to of a Talaq 
by Sarih expression shall effect a Talaq al-Raj'i or a 
revocable divorce, that is, a divorce that leaves it in 
the power of the husband lawfull to take back his wife at 
any time before the expiration of the period of 
'iddah. But if the marriage has not been finished then 
the very first pronouncement of divorce shall effect an 
(52) irrevocable divorce. Section 7 of the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance, 1961, has done away with the difference 
between a Raj'i (revocable) and a Bain (irrevocable) 
divorce. 
Kinayah or implied expression of divorce;- Kinayah or 
implied expression of divorce means an expression which is 
obiguous as opposed to a clear expression. The ambiguous 
expressions are such as can mean a divorce as well as 
something else and in which real purposse of the speaker 
(53) IS not clear but is concealed. A divorce is not 
effected by a Kinayah expression unless there is intention 
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of which there is proof or it can be gathered from the 
surrounding circumstances or there is a mention of 
divorce. As a Kinayah expression does not denote divorce 
alone but may also mean something else, hence intention in 
requisite in such cases to determine the meaning of the 
^ (54) pronouncement. 
The Sunni Jurists have given a very large number 
of examples of expressions of Kinayah or implied divorce 
which would or would not effect a divorce according the 
the intention of the husband. A few are given below:-
"Your are not to me as a wife," 
"I have not need of you," i 
"Go to your own relations," "Go out," 
"You are nobody to me," 
"You are of no use to me," 
"Leave me" or "Leave me alone," 
"I give up all relations with you and will have no 
connection of any sort with you," "I do not desire you." 
If the wife should say to her husband, "You are not a 
husband to me" and he should say,"I belive you," intending 
divorce, it would take effect and she would be divorce. 
When a man intending to divorce his wife says to her,"You 
are not to me as a wife" or "I am not to you as a 
husband," it takes effect according to Immam Abu Hanifa(Rah ) 
But Imam Muhammad and Imam Abu Yusuf (Rah) do not agree 
(55) 
with him.^^^' 
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As a general rule a divorce by Kinayah expression 
amounts to an irrevocable divorce. But under the 
provisions of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, the 
divorce shall be Raj'i (revocable) only. 
Maliki Law!- Imam Malik (Rah) also agrees with the 
Hanafis about divorce by Kinayah or ambiguous 
(57) 
expressions. He divides Kinayah (ambiguous) 
expressions into two classes namely, 
(a) Kinayah Zahiriah 
(b) Kinayah Khafifia 
(a) Kinayah Zahiriah:- The expression indicates the use 
of-language which refers to divorce but only indirectly. 
In such a case the intention of the husband is immaterial 
and the husband shall be taken to have divorced his wife 
by a revocabole divorce unless there is proof or the 
(58) 
circumstanctial evidence points otherwise. 
(b) Kinayah Khafiah;- Kinayah Khafiah means an expression 
which does not clearly indicate a divorce. Divorce shall 
be effected only when the husband so intended and not 
otherwise. 
Shafi Lav:- Imam Shafi'i agrees with the Hanafis in the 
matter of divorce by Kinayah expressions. But he holds 
that divorce by Kinayah or ambiguous expressions amounts 
to such a divorce as the husband intended. According to 
him to nature and number of Kinayah divorce shall depend 
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on the husband's intention as stated by him. In the 
absence of any intention only one revocable divorce shall 
be effected. All Kinayah divorce, according to him, 
amount to a revocable divorce unless the expression used 
indicates three divorce when it shall amount to an 
irrevocable divorce. He has given his our examples of 
( 62 ) 
Kiayah or ambiguous expressions. 
Hanbali Law;- According to Imam Ahmad b. Hambal the 
nature and number of divorce shall depend on the husband's 
intention.'"' 
Shi'i Law;- The Shi'ahs donot recognise al-Talaq 
al-Kinayah. 
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ZIHAR 
INJURIOUS COMPARISON 
Introductory;- In the pre-Islamic times the half 
civilised Arabs used to deprive their wives of sexual 
enjoyment and to tie them down to a miserable life in a 
number of ways. Zihar is one of them. It is an unusual 
form of temporary prohabitioon in which the husband 
compares his wife to his mother. In Zihar the marriage is 
not dissolved and the woman still remains the wife of the 
penson, but the husband connot be intimate with her and 
she is deprived of all sexual intimacy. Islam has freed 
the wife from this hard lot and has also discouraged the 
use of such expressions. It has made it clear that a wife 
does not become the mother or other relation by the idle 
and poolish talk of a person while a penalty has been 
imp sed on the husband who has expressed Zihar but wants 
to retain his wife. The wife has been empowered to force 
the husband either to divorce her or re-establish the 
matrimonial connection on paying the prescribed penalty. 
In pre-Islamic times Zihar was considered to be a sort of 
divorce Muslim law, while preserving its nature which is 
prohibition from intimacy with the wife, has altered its 
effect to a tempprary prohibition only which does not 
dissolve the marriage, and so Zihar does not exactly 
amount to a divorce and is distinct from it. 
(ii) Religious Senction;- The law about Zihar is based on 
the injunctions in the Qur'an given below:-
"Allah has note made for any man two hearts 
(within him); nor has he made your wives whom(you desert) 
by Zihar, your mothers; nor has He made those whom you 
assert (to be your sons) your sons.These are the words of 
your months. And Allah speaks the truth and He shows the 
right way. 
"Those of you who put away their wives by calling 
them their mother-they are not their mothers: None are 
their mothers mothers save those who gave them birth, and 
they utter indeed a hateful word and a lie. And surely 
Allah is pardoning. Forgiving." 
And those who put away their wives by calling them their 
mothers, then go back on that which they said, must free a 
captive before they touch one another. To this you are 
exhorted; and Allah is wore of what you do. 
"But he who has not the means, should fast for two 
mounths successively before they touch one another, and he 
who is unable to do so should feed sixty needy ones. That 
is in order that you may have faith in Allah and His 
Messenger. And these are Allah's limits. And for the 
(2) disbelivers is a painful chastisement." 
(iii) Definition;- The word Zihar is derived from "Zah«r" 
(back), Zihar means "To oppose back to back." It is 
explained that when there is discord between the husband 
and the wife, they instead of remaining face to face 
towards each other turn their backs against each other. 
In the language of law it signifies a man comparing his 
wife to any of his female relations within such prohibited 
degrees of relationship, whether by blood, fosterage or by 
marriage, as renders marriage with her invoriably 
(3) 
unlawful. Zihar signifies a husband's comparision of 
his wife with his mother or any female relation within the 
prohibited degrees. In Zihar, the usual phrase is "thou 
are to me as the back of my mother." This mode of talaq is 
very reare in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
(iv) Applicabilji-y;- Zihar is very rarely used in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh as is clear from the fact that 
there is practically no case law on the subject. But the 
doctrine of Zihir is still applicable to Muslims in India, 
and Pakistan. Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law 
(Shari'at) Application Act, 1937, and sub-section IX of 
section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 
1939, Make this clear. A remark in Saeeda Khanam Vs 
(4) Muhammad Salim also supports this view. 
(v) Essentials;- Certain conditions have to be satisfied 
for the validity of Zihar. They relate to the following 
aspects. 
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(a) Expression, (b) Comparison, (c) Husband, (d) Wife, and 
(e) Expiation 
(a) Expression or Language;- There is no fixed formula 
for Zihar and any expression can be used for the purpose. 
But the language should be clear, unambiguous and certain. 
There should be no uncertainly attached to Zihar and an 
uncertain expression of Zihar is invalid. Thus if a 
husband says to his wife, "Allah willing you are to 
me " then no Zihar will be established. Zihar can 
be given orally or in writing and even by signs by a dumb 
person if they are well-understood and denote his 
intention in this respect. 
In many cases an expression can amount to a 
divorce by implication as well as to zihar. It becomes 
necessary in such a case to find the effect of the 
expression. According to Muslim Jurists, such an 
expression takes effect according to the husband's 
intention as explained by him. Thus, if he were to say, 
"You are to me like my mother,"it is necessary to 
ascertain his intention. The expression may be used merely 
to show respect or appreciation or to denote a divorce or 
a Zihar or without any definite intention at all. In the 
first and the last cases the expression would neither 
(7) 
establish a Zihar nor a divorce. But in the second and 
the third cases a divorce or a Zihar would be established 
(8) 
according to the intention of the speaker. Hence, if he 
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declears that he had no particular divorce, divorce will 
(9) be established. 
When the expression used consists of a comparison 
of the wife to a part of body of his mother or other 
prohibited women as when he says, "You are to me like the 
back of my mother, Zihar only will be established because 
the expression is used only for Zihar and cannot be used 
for divorce and so no divorce would be effected by such an 
expression even when such be the intention of the 
husband. 
Under the present law, however, the bare statement 
of the husband will not suffice and the Court will give 
its finding on the evidence produced before, it and will 
be guided by the circumstances of a particular case. 
(b) Comparison;- Comparison is a necessary condition of 
Zihar, and so there will be no ?ihar if these is no 
comparison as when a husband calls his wife as his 
daughter, mother etc., without comparison the expression 
may amount to a divorce if he so intends but cannot ammont 
to Zihar. Further, the comparison should be to a woman 
permanently prohibited to him. If the wife be compared to 
a woman only temporarily prohibited, there is no 
(12) Zihar. Thus, a comparison to one's sister-in-law will 
not amount ot Zihar as marriage with her is possible one 
the dissolution of the present marriage by divorce or the 
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(13) 
wife's death. When the compison reelates to a part of 
the body of a woman, the part must be such as is not 
proper for him to see. Hence/ when the comparison is to 
what can be seen decency by him as the face, hands, hair, 
. - (14) 
etc. there is no Zxhar. 
(c) Husband;- It is a condition of Zihar that the husband 
should be a person capable of making expiation, that is, 
(15) he must be save and adult. Hence, the Zihar of a minor 
or an insave person is not valid, further, the husband 
should not be in a faint or under the influece of sleep; 
Zihar by any one in one of these condition is not 
lid) 
valid. But it is not necessary under the Hanafi law 
that the husband should be-in earnest so that Zihar by one 
(17) -in jest or m mistake xs valid. Zihar under compulsion 
is valid and effective according to the Hanafi. BuL 
Imam Shafi'i and Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal do not agree with 
this view and according to then Zihar under compulison is 
(19) 
unvalid. Zihar by a dumb husband is valid when made m 
writing or by intelligible signs and with intention. 
Zihar by a drunker man is valid according to the 
Hanafis. ^ "^'•^  
(d) Wife;- Zihar can only be mode in respect of the 
(22) lawfully married wife of the speaker. Hence, if a 
person say to a woman who is not his wife, "you are to me 
like the bace of my matter" and after wards marries her, 
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Zihar shall not be es ablished because the woman was not 
. - (23) his wife when he used the expression of Zihar. But if 
he says to a woman, "if I marry you then you are to me as 
the bake of my mother" and afterwords marries her then 
Zihar shall be established and expiation shall become 
(24) incumbent on him. It is not necessary that the wife 
should be major, save or Muslimah as Zihar like divorce, 
is valid even when the wife is a major, lunatic or 
Kitabiyah. 
Zihar by the Wife:-
It is not open to the wife to use the expression of Zihar 
• ^ K U K ^ (26) 
against her husband. 
Wife's Right;- A wife is entitled to call her Muzahir 
(i.e. one who has expressed a Zihar) husband to his 
(27) 
matrimonial duties. She can also prevent him from 
intimacy with her till has made the necessary 
(28) 
expiation. If he does not make it, then according to 
the Muslim Law the Qazi, on her complaint, is to imprison 
(29) 
and punish him till he does so or repudiates her. The 
Qazi can also order the beating of the husband is such a 
case. Islam has thus forbidden a husband to keep a 
wife in suspense by giving up intimacy with her and at the 
same time not divorcing her. Thus, there is an injunction 
in the Qur'an namely 
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"But turn not away (from a woman) altogether so as 
(31) to leave her (as it were) hanging (in the air). (i.e. 
in suspense)." 
If the husband declares that he has performed the 
expiation, his declaration is deemed sufficient and the 
Qazi is not required to inquire if the allegation is true 
or not and the husband's version will be accepted as 
(32) 
correct until it is proved to be incorrect. 
(e) Expiation;- It is obligatory on a Muzahar (i.e. a 
husband who has declared Zihar) to make an expiation if 
the inteneds to have intercourse with his wife after the 
(33) Zihar. But if he is determined that she should remain 
unlawful to him and has no intention of returning o 
matrimonal intercourse wife her, he is not liable to 
. ^. (34) expiation. 
(vl) Conditional;- Under the Hanafi law Zihar can be made 
conditional. Thus a husband may say, "If thou entereth 
that house or speaketh to such a person, thou art to me 
like my mother." ^  "^^ ^  
(vii) Limited in time:- Zihar can be limited in point of 
time. Thus, where a husband says to his wife, "you are to 
me like my mother's back for one year," Zihar will be 
effective for the period of one year only and will become 
ineffective after that period, and he can renew his sexual 
-:172:-
relations with her on the expiry of the period without 
(36) incurring expiation. But according to flalik, an 
expression of Zihar limited in time shall amount to an 
absolute Zihar and shall not become ineffective with the 
expiry of the specified time. Expiation would, however, be 
incumbent on him if he is intimate with the wife before 
(37) the expiry of the period. Shafi and Imam Ahmad ibn 
— ( 38 ) 
Hanbal agree with Abu Hanifah. 
(viii) The Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali Laws;-
The Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali Laws are the same 
as the Hanafi Law discussed above at various places. 
(ix) Breach of;- If a man, having pronounced Zihar upon 
his wife, has matrimonial connection with her, he is not 
liable to any penalty other thau the expiation for 
Zihir.(39) 
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ILA 
(i) Introductory;- Ila is not exactly a divorce, but has 
been treated as a form of the same by the Muslim Jurists. 
It was a common practice in pre-Islamic days and is one of 
the expressions for divorce used by the uncivilised Arabs 
of that period to harass their wives. By ila the marriage 
was not completely dissolved; it meant only a cessation of 
sexual relations between the husband and the wife. The 
wife was thus deprived of the sexual intimacy but she 
remained tied down to her husband and could not contract 
another marriage. Islam has put a check to the evil 
effects of this practice. It has discouraged the use of 
such expressions by imposing a penalty on a husband who 
wants to retain his wife after the use of the expression 
while if he does not repent and cancel his declaration 
within the prescribed period, he stands to lose his wife. 
It has also restricted the maximum period for the 
cancellation of Ila to four months. 
(ii) Definition:- The word in its literal sense means a 
Vow and the maker of the Vow is called a muti, who is 
defined as a person who cannot approach his wife for a 
period of four months without incurring some penalty or 
some very trouble some, serious or difficultyliability. In 
Muslim Law it implies a husband's swearing by Allah or 
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making a declaration to abstain from sexual intercourse 
with his wife for a period of four months or a longer 
period or that he shall undergo some specified hardship by 
way of penalty if he is intimate with the wife within the 
specified period of time or make some specified expiation 
(2) " -that shall involve some hardship to him. Ila is when a 
person swears that he will not have intercourse with his 
wife, and abstains from it for four months, the divorce is 
effected. The Hanafi Jurists argue that the husband acted 
unjustly towards his wife, it is equitable that on the 
expiration of four months he should be deprived of the 
(3) benefit of marriage. But according Imam Malik and Imam 
Ahmad bin Hambal, it is necessary to invoke the name of 
Allah but not necessary according to Imam Abu Hanifah and 
Shafi'i for the validity of Ila'. It is stated in 
al-Mughni that all the Sunni Jurists hold that a vow^ in 
the name of Allah or one of his attributes whereby the 
husband makes it unlawful for himself to be intimate with 
- - (4) his wife constitutes an Ila". 
But there is a difference of opinion whether a vow 
of other classes to abstain from intimacy will constitutes 
an Ila'. The correct view is that what so-ever be the vow 
by which intimacy is made unlawful, and Ila' shall be 
effected provided the vow incures some hardship- The above 
opinion has been expressed by Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam 
Malik, Shafi'i and all Imams of Hijiaz and'Iraq. 
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(iii) Religious Sanctioni'- The Muslim Law of Ila' is 
founded on the followinij verses of the Qur'an: 
"For those who swear that they will not go in to 
their wives should wait four months; then if they go back, 
Allah is surely Forgiving, Merciful." 
And if they resolve on a divorce, Allah is surely 
Hearing, Knowing." 
(iv) Applicability;- Ila' is very uncommon, but is still 
extant and enforceable in Pakistan and India. It was 
clearly mentioned in 2 of the Muslimpersonal law (Shari'ah) 
Application Act, 1937, as applicable to Muslims. Clause ix 
of section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 
1939, lays down that a wife can seek the dissolution of 
her marriage an any ground which is recognised as valid 
for the dissolution of a marriage under Muslim Law. A 
remark in Sayeeda Khanam Vs. Mohammad Sami also supports 
this view. 
(v) Essentials;- The essentials of Ila relate to the 
following subject: 
(a) Husband, (b) wife, (c) vow, (d) cancellation, and 
(e) Effect. 
(a) Husband:- The person competent to pronounce an Ila is 
one who is competent to repudiate the marriage, that is, 
{8) he should be adult and sane. 
(b) Wife:- The woman in respect of whom an Ila vow can be 
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madePhouldbe the wife of the person making the vow at the 
- - . (9) - -
time when Ila' is to take effect. But an Ila' can be 
made in respect of a woman not yet the wife of the speaker 
provided it is to take effect in future at a time when the 
marriage has actually taken place and f'he becomes his 
wife. Thus a man may say to a woman, ByAlla)i,i shall 
have no sexual intercourse with you when I marry you," 
then ila' shall be effected if he marries her because his 
vow makes Ila' applicable when the woman acquires the 
status of being his wife. But if Ila' is made in 
respect of a woman other than the wife without reference 
to her status at the time when ila' is to take effect then 
the ila' shall be ineffective. ^ "^ ^^  "By ;\llah'i will never 
have sexual intercourse with you," and he after\i?ards 
- _ , (13) 
marries her then Ila' shall not be established. Here 
there is no reference to her status at the time when Ila' 
is to take effect. There is a tradition to the effect that 
the Prophet (peace be on him) has stated that there is no 
vow for the son of Adam in what he does not own, and 
(14) 
no divorce in what he does not own. 
(c) Vow;- The vow must be for four month or for a longer 
period or for an indefinite time. But if it relates to 
a period less than four months then the vow does not 
constitute Ila'. 
This is so even though the accumulated period of two or 
more consecutive Ila' vows may amount to four months or a 
-:177:-
(17) longer period of txme. Thus if a man makes a vow, 
saying to his wife,"By God, I will not have sexual 
connection with you for two months, nor for two months 
after that Ila' is established. But if a man swears that 
he will not have sexual connection with his wife for two 
months," and then remains silent for a day, and the next 
day again swears that he will not have sexsual connection 
with her for two months after the other two month, Ila' is 
not established because the second vow is distinct and 
separate from the former.*"* 
A husband shall not be held to have pronounced 
ila* except when he takes an oath against having sexual 
intercourse with his wife. It the husbands oath refers to 
something else than sexual intercourse then he shall not 
be held to have made Ila'. Thus if a man says to his wife, 
"By God, my skin shall not touch thy skin," he shall not 
be deemed to have made an Ila' because the vow refers to a 
breach of something other than sexual intercourse and 
touching of their skin is posible without there being 
(19) intimacy between them. It is also a necessary 
condition of Ila' that it should not be possible for the 
husband to violate the vow, that is, to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife, without being guilty of the 
breach of his vow. Thus if husband being in Lahore and his 
wife being in Delhi swears that he will not go to Delhi 
then Ila' is not established because there is no reference 
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to intimacy while he can still be intimate with his wife 
without incurring any penalty as by sending for her at 
Lahore and being intimate with her there. 
(d) Concellation of;- The only one way to render the vow 
ineffective is by having sexual intercourse with the wife 
within the period of four months from the time oftakeingthe 
(21) 
vow. If husband should be intimate with his wife 
during the prescribed period of four months then he shall 
be forsworn in his vow and the Hi* would cease after 
(22) 
cohabitation. An expiation shall however, be incumbent 
upon the husband as a penalty for the breach of his 
(23) 
vow. The vow cannot be cancelled by speech but only by 
conduct that is, by having sexual intercourse with the 
wife except under certain special corcumstances. Thus, 
if during the time in which an Ila' can be revoked there 
should be any natural or accidental impediment to sexual 
intercourse on the part or either the man or the woman, 
such a serious illness or wife's tender age, or being a-1 
such a distance from one another as does not admit of 
their meeting during the term of the ila' then in such a 
case it shall be lawful for the man to receive his ila' by 
speech,as, for example, by saying "I have returned to my 
- _ (25) 
wife," upon upon which the Ila' drops. But this holds 
good only so long as the inpediment lasts. If it should 
become possible to have sexual intercourse before the 
expiration of four months then his right of return by 
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speech would be cancelled and another cancellation must be 
( 2.f>) ~ — 
made by intercourse. If Ila' has been constituted by a 
vow in the name of Allah then expiation shall be incumbent 
for the breach of the vow. But it shall not be incumbent 
(27) 
m other cases. 
Expiation;- If the husband has intercourse during the 
period of Ila' he will violate his vow. He should 
therfore, make the expiation for the intringment of his 
(28) 
vow. It consists of manumission of a slaves or 
clothing or feeding ten poor persons. If he has not the 
ability to do either of them, he should keep fast for 
three days consecutively. This expiation is based on the 
(29) Qur'arnic verse Vs89. If he has mentioned any 
particular penalty in his vow, then the expiation is the 
performance of the same. Thus, for instance, if he had 
stated that on breach of his vow, that is, on 
cohabitation, he shall perform Hajj, or shall fast or will 
give something in charity, then he shall have to discharge 
the Ila' by performing the specified expiation. The 
husband's declaration that he has made the expiation shall 
be considered sufficent without any proof of the same. 
"Nature of Divorce by Ila'";-
Under the Imam Hanafi law, the divorce that is effected by 
- - . (31) 
Ila' amounts to an irrevocable divorce. But according 
to Imam Malik and Shafi'i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal it would 
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(32) 
amount only to a Raj'i or revocable divorce. A divorce 
by the Qazi shall also amount to one revocable divorce. 
According to Ahmad bin Hanbal, as certain reports say, it 
(32) 
would amount only to a Raj'i or revocable divorce. A 
divorce by the Qazi shall also amount to one revocable 
divorce. According to Ahmad bin Hanbal, as certain reports 
(33) 
say it would amount to an irrevocable divorce. 
Shi'ah Law;- The Shi'ah law can be discussed -under three 
main heads namely. 
(a) The husband pronouncing Ila' called muti, 
(b) The wife, and (c) The Vow. 
(a) Husband;- The husband who takes an Ila' vow should be 
major, sane and should possess understanding. He should be 
acting under his free will and should pronounce the vow 
- - (34) 
with an inte ntion to exercise Ila'. 
(b) The wife;- The woman must be the lawfully married wife 
of the person taking the vow at the time of the Ila. There 
can be no Ila' in respect of a woman married in mut'ah 
form, that is by a temporary marriage. Further, the 
(35) 
marriage must have been consumated. 
(c) The Vow;- The vow of Ila' must be in the name of Allah 
and cannot be made merely by a declaration. It cannot be 
( ^ f i ) 
made for four months but the period should exceed it. 
It must absolute and either for an indefinite period or 
(37) for a period exceeding four months. The vow cannot be 
made to depend on a condition or to take effect at a 
future time. 
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If a man who is ill takes an Ila' vow with the intention 
to avoid cohabitation with his wife during the period of 
his or her illness then it shall not amount to Ila'. It is 
( 38 ) 
not necessary that the vow should be taken in Arabic. 
Concellation Under Shi'al Lawt-
Under Shi'ah Law if the vow relates to a definite 
period then it abates on the expiry of the specified 
period when the husband can approach his wife without 
inc^urring any penalty. The vow cannot be cancelled by 
(39) 
speech but can be cancelled only by cohabitation. If a 
man is temporarily unfit for cohabitation then he can 
concel Ila' by speech, but he should declare that he will 
cancel the Ila' by cohabitation when he is able to do 
so.(40) 
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(34) Shami/op.cit, II, pp. 59,92. 
(35) Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyah,op.cit, II, p.127 
(36) Ibid; p. 126. 
(37) Al-Mughni,op.cit, VII,p.349 (38) Ibid. 
(39) Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyah, op.cit; II, p.126. 
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CMAPTER-IV 
UNIT-A 
EFFECTIVE DIVORCE UNDER HINDUISM OR (HINDU LAW) 
Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act and section 34(2) 
of the special Marriage Act enjoin upon the court dealing 
with matrimonial proceedings to make endeavours to effect 
reconciliation between the parties in consonance with the 
nature and circumstance of the case. Despite the mandatory 
provisions, in practice it is done only perfunctorily, the 
reasons being lack of time at the disposal of the court 
and non-existence of proper machinery to assist the court. 
To overcome the procedural difficulties which obstruct the 
court in carrying out the objectives of attempting 
reconciliation between the spouses during the trial, the 
law commission has proposed an additional clause in 
section 23 of Hindu Marriage Act. The suggested clauses 
reads: 
For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing 
about such reconciliation, the court may if the parties so 
desire or if the court think it just and proper so to do, 
adjourn the proceeding for a reasonable period not 
exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person 
named by parties in this behalf or to any person nominated 
by the court if the parties fail to name any person, with 
direction to report the court as to whether the 
reconciliation can be and has been effected, and the court 
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shall, in disposing of the proceeding have due regard to 
the report. 
The court ought to be empowered with wide 
discretionory power while dealing with matrimonial cases. 
In C.V.C and S.V.S opportunities were given to the 
parties to make an attempt at reconcilation and the case 
were also adjourned for the purpose, but the court had no 
power to issue an injuction with regard to any particular 
course to be followed. The problem become more intricated 
where one of the spouses is keen on having conciliation 
and the other is nonehlevnt. The peremtory duty of the 
court loosing its significance and it cannot be performed 
realistically unless a series attempt has been made by the 
court to ascertain whether reconciliation can be effected-
consequently in England for the effective implementation 
of the provision, a well devised machinary was attached to 
(15) the court . According to this machinary, cases where 
there is a posibility of reconciliation are refered by the 
court and the welfare officer has direction to refer the 
case to a probation officer or to a qualified marriage 
consellor recommended by the branch of appropriate 
orgainsation concerned with marriage guidance or to some 
obher oppropriate person or body indicated by the special 
circumstances of the case. 
A comprehensive arrangement has been designed 
under section 3 of the Divorce Reform Act, 1969 (and 
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carried on to section 6 of the Matrimonial Cases Act, 
1973) to promote reconciliation between spouses. A 
Solicitor is required to certify that he has not only 
discussed with the parties about the chances of 
reconciliation but has provided them with the addresses of 
qualified person. And the court is empowered to 
adjourn the case at any stage of the proceedings to 
consider the posibility of conciliation between the 
(17) 
parties. Similiarly, parties are encouraged to attempt 
reconciliation in certain circumstances by living together 
for a limited period without jeopardising to right the 
petition for divorce in case the attempt at reconciliation 
. -.,.,, (18) IS faila. 
Like wise, most of the states in the U.S.A. have 
provisions for statutory and voluntary conciliation 
services attached with the court. The conciliation 
conselling has become an intergd and indisposable part of 
divorce of laws. It provides safe guards against easy 
divorces and preserve the stability of marriage. 
However, the law commission's recommendations with 
regard to the ad jour nment of the matrimonial case for 
fifteen days and reference of the matter for the purpose 
of conciliation to the person either nominated by the 
court or suggested by the parties will not help to 
achieve the desired purpose of conciliation between the 
parties. Fifteen days time for identify the dfelicate 
problem of Duputed marriage is very short and one man's 
arbitration is to6 sufficient to resolve the acute 
differences clearing a part of the spouses. Who are mostly in 
need of sympathetic and patient hearing to aid their 
grievensesagainst each other. Moreover, with respect to 
the choice of an arbitrator, it is very difficult to exput 
two erring parties to choose the same person. 
In view of the proposed suggestion of the law 
commission relating to section 23 of the Hindu Marriage 
act, it is suggested that the services of conciliation 
bureaus are required to check the inflation, if any, in 
the divorce rate after the libralization of ground of 
divorce. After the filling of petition, the case should be 
refered by the court to well constituted conciliatary 
statutary board attached to the court. The proceeding of 
the case be commenced after the recipt of the report of 
the conciliatory board. The report should be treated as a 
secret document except where its disclosure is the 
necessory in the interest of the parties. The informal 
atmosphere of conciliatary counselling help to bring the 
parties together in finding out amicable solution of their 
problem by easing of tensions and reduction of 
hostilities, step should be taken to encourage the setting 
up of voluntary and statutary conciliatary agencies to 
better the union by harnonizing the logs of discordant 
marital machinery. 
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In Western Countries also during the past decade a 
number of modification have been introduced to make 
the divorce law adjustable to the current need of the 
society. Prior to the passing of the Divorce Refrain 
Act,1969 in England like other Countries, the concept of 
matrimonial offence was the basis of divorce. The Divorce 
Reform Act, 1969 aimed at adopting a realistic view of 
what conses married people seek divorce by dispening with 
the time warm concept of matrimonial offence. In the 
Divorce Reform act, the various of divorce dealing with 
matrimonial offences were replaced by sale non-fault 
ground of irretrievable break down of marriage. 
Nevertheless, that the marriage has irretrivably broken 
down five guidelines. The party seeking divorce has-to 
establishing one or more of the following five 
guideliness. 
(a) That the respondent has committed adultery and 
petitioner finds it utolerable to live with the 
respondent 
(b) that the respondent has behave in such a way that the 
petitioner cannot responsibly be expected to live with 
the respondent, 
(c) that the respondent has deserted for a continous 
period of at least two year injmediately preceeding the 
presentation of petition 
(d) that the parties to the marriage have lived a part for 
a continuous period of at least two year immidiately 
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preceding the presentation of the petition and the 
respondent consents to a divorce being granted; 
(e) that the parties to the marriage lived apart for a 
continous period of at least five years immediately 
. . (19) preceding the presentation of the petition. 
The incorporation of irrtrievable breakdown a 
marriage as the grant for the divorce in the divorce law 
is based on the fundamental assumption, that the aim of a 
good divorce law are to strengthein the solidarity of 
marriage and when "regrttably a marriage has irretrievably 
broken down, to enable the empty legal shall to be 
destroyed with the maximum fairness and the minimum 
bitterness, distress and humiliation. 
In both the Hindu marriage act or the Special 
Marriage Act, to some extent the irretrevable breakdown of 
marriage as a ground for divorce and partial non-fault 
(21) element is precepible . 
Under the Special Marriage Act, mutual consent of 
the spouses as one of the ground for divorce is an 
evidence of the fact that marriage has irretrievably 
broken down. Similarly the amended section 13(lA) of the 
Hindu Marriage Act. Vovches for the introduction of 
non-fault element in that act under section 13(A) either 
party to proceeding is given a right to ask for a decree 
of divorce if there has been no resomption of cohabitation 
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for a period of two year or more after the passing of 
divorce of restitution of the conjugal rights are judical 
seperation, irrespective of the fact that in whot^ se favour 
the intial decree was passed. 
The traditional concept of granting divorce only 
to the innocent party against a matrimonial wrong commited 
by the other is giving way to the rational view that when 
the breakdown of marriage has reached the saturation point 
and it is no longer possible to tie down together two warring 
partners, the remedy dissolution of marriage be made 
available to either party to marriage without declaring 
any one of them to be responsible for the breakdown. 
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CHAPTER-IV 
UNIT-(A) 
REFERENCES 
(1) Supra note 8 at 82-83. 
(2) (1967) 1 All E.R. 928. 
(3) (1976) 3 All E.R. 139. 
(4) See Practice Direction, (1967) 1 All E.R. 894. 
(5) See also clause iv of S.3 of the Divorce Reform Act, 
1969. 
(6) Clause (2) of S.3 of the Divorce Reform Act (now S.6 
of Matrimonial Causes Act 1973) empowers the Court 
to adjourn the proceeding for such period as it 
deems fit to enable the parties to effect 
reconciliation. 
(7) A"tt(^ mpts at reconciliation are encouraged by allowing 
the parties to live together enable the parties to 
effect with prejudicing the right to Divorce by 
clause (3) of Section.3 of the Divorce Reform Act. 
(3) where the parties to the marriage have lived 
with each other for any period or periods after 
it become known to the petitioner that the 
respondent had, since the celebration of 
Marriage, committed adulery then,-
(a) if tne lenth of that period or those period 
periods together was six months or less, their 
living with each other during that period or 
those periods shall be dis regarded in 
determing for the purposes of S. 2(1) (a) of 
this Act whether, the petitioner finds it 
intolerable to live with the respondent, 
(i) if the length of that period or of those 
periods together exceeded six months, the 
petitioner shall not be entitled to rely on 
that adultery for the purposes of said 
S.2(l)(a). 
(4) Where the petioner alleges that the respondent 
has behaved in such a way that the petitioner 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with him 
but the parties to the marriage have lived with 
each other for a period or periods after the 
date of the occurrence of the final incident 
relied on by the relived on by the petitioner 
and held by the court to support his 
allegations that fact shall be disregarded in 
determing for the purpases of Section 2(1)(b) 
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of this Act (1974) whether the petitioner 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the 
respondent if the length of that period or of 
those periods together was six months or less. 
These provisions are now incorporated in S.2 of 
the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. 
(8) These guidelines are now enumerated under S.l of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act/ 1973. 
(9) Justic V.S. Deshpande; Divorce under the Hindu 
Marriage Act, A.I.R. 1971. (Journal) 113 at 114. 
(10) Cmnd. Paper 3123 H.M.S.O (1966) Para 15 (ii) at 10. 
CHAPTER-IV 
UNIT-B 
EFFECTIVE DIVORCE UNDER ISLAM(MUSLIM LAW) 
(1) As stated before, the legal rights and obligations of 
the parties against each other in a Muslim Marriage are 
governed by the law of contracts. A husband has got the 
right to terminate the marriage by divorce. The wife can 
also exercise this power under certain conditions. It is, 
therefore, necessary, as in other civil contracts, that 
they must possess the capacity to act in the matter. 
The Muslim Jurists classify the circumstances 
which affect the capacity or incapacity of a person to act 
into two c ategories> namely^ Samawi and Maksubah. The 
former means what may be Cited an act of God, that is, 
circumstances created or brought about by one himself. 
Some instances of the conditions belogning ro the former 
category are linnarcy, sleep, fainting, fit etc. Such 
conditions as ignorance of law or facts that the voluntary 
drunkenness, mistake etc. are instances of the second 
category. A person can generally her, no hand in 
bringing about the condition of the former class, but the 
bringing about of circumstancecs of the latter class is 
attributed to him or her. Hence a divorce pronounced under 
the former condition is not considered effective while a 
divorce pronounced in the latter condition is considered 
effective. 
(II) The tradition given below deal with a man's capacity 
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to exercise the power of divorce:-
(1) A'ishah^ reported, "I heard the Holy Prophet (peace be on 
him) say: There is no divorce and no emancipation by 
(2) force, 
R Holy 
(2) All reported that Prophet (peace be on him) said: 'Pen 
has been lifted from the three the sleeping man till he is 
awake" a boy till he attains maturity; and an insane (3) person till he recovers his sensess. 
R Holy 
(3) Abu Hurayrah reported that the Prophet (peace be on 
him) said:"Every divorce is lawful except the divorce of 
(4) 
the lunatic and of one who has demanf^ ed. 
(4) Abu Hurayrah has also reported that the Trophet (peace 
be on him) said: There are three things of which the 
serious is serious and the frivolous is serious, namely, 
marriage, divorce and raja a" 
(III) Under Muslim Law two condition must be satisfied be-
fore a person can lawfully dissolve a marriage. He or she 
must be major and should possess under--standing ^•'•^^ if one 
of these conditions is not fulfilled, he or she shall not be 
compe-tent to dissolve a marriage. In case of divorce by 
the husband, intention is not considered a necessary 
condition for valid pronouncement by the Sunnis, if the 
husband uses the word Talaq. If however, the pronouncement 
of divorce is ambliguous them it will be necessary to 
ascertain the husband's intention. But there is a 
difference of opinion amongst the Sunni Jurists in respect 
of several matters as has been discussed at relevant 
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places in this thor.is. Some of them are such as involve 
hardship to the parties or at least to one of them. The 
provisions of the Pakistan Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 
1961, provide against the undesirable aspects of divorce 
given in certain special circumstances. Thus Section 7 (1) 
of the ordinance makes it incumbent on a husband who 
divorces his wife to give information of his action to the 
chairman of the Union Council of his ward and to send a 
copy of it to his wife. It reads as follows, "Any man who 
wishes to divorce his wife shall, as soon as may be after 
the pronouncement of talaq in anyform whatsover> give the 
chairman notice in writing of his having done so, and 
(3) 
shall supply a copy thereof to the wife." Subsection 
states, "Save as provided in sub-Section , a talaq^ 
unless revoked earleir, expressly or otherwise, shall not 
be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the 
day on which notice under sub-section is delivered to 
the chairman." 
(IV) As has been stated in the beginning of this 
chapter, the Prophet (peace be on him) has not sanctioned 
the validity of divorce by force. But in course of time 
the Hanafi Jurists have held that a divorce under 
(7) 
compulsion is valid. 
Under the Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali iav;s choice 
is an essential condition for pronouncing the word Talaq a (divorce).A 
marriage, therefore, cannot be dissolved by a divorce 
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/ o \ 
pronounced under coercion. 
Under Shi' i Law majority, under-standing, intention and 
free will are essential conditions for the valid 
pronouncement of a divorce by person. A divorce shall not 
be deemed valid if even one of these four conditions is 
(9) 
not fulfilled. Hence, a divorce under the influence of 
drink or sleep as under compulsion or when pronounced 
without under standing the meaning of the words 
pronounced, or under fraud and the like will be absolutely 
ineffective. In view of this basic principle, of law, it 
has not been considered necessary to discuss the Shi'i Law 
under the various Sunni rules. 
(V) A divorce is considered to be the sole act and right 
of the husband and generally speaking the wife has no hand 
in a divorce by the husband. It c:in be pronounced even 
against her wishes and so the wife's capacity is of no 
consequence. It is not, therefore, necessary that she 
should be major or should possess understanding . 
Ameer Ali has stated, "Both School insist that 
the formula or sighn , by which the talaq is pronounced, 
should in every case be under stood by the wife. It would 
seem to follow, therefore, that when she is of such tender 
age as to be unable to comprehend the legal consequences 
following from the act of repudition, or does not possess 
discration (rushd), a valid talaq cannot be effected 
against her. The Shi'ah Nail-ul-Maram requires akl(sound 
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understanding) on both sides for the effectuation of 
proper repudition." It is submitted that as far as the 
Sunnis are concerned, this view does not apply to them and 
there is no such provision under the Sunni law. But the 
point of view expressed by Ameer Ali is a sound one and it 
should have been the duty of our law-givers to give due 
consideration to it. It is whenever, no longer necessary 
to do so as the child marriage restraint act prohibits the 
marriage of a girl below fourteen years of age. The 
Muslim family laws ordinance, 1961, in force in Pakistan, 
has increased the age to sixteen years. 
(VI) The question of capacity is a very important one and 
some important aspects relating to it are there fore, 
discussed below:-
(a) Majority;- Majority is a necessary condition under 
Muslim law in respect of a man's capacity to divorce his 
wife. A minor is not compe-tent to exercise that power 
(12) 
even if he may be possessed of understanding. Hence; a 
divorce by him would be ineffectual even when he confirms 
it on attaining if therefore, on attaining majority he 
wants to persist in the divorce, given by him when he was 
(14) 
a minor, he must give a fresh divorce to his wife. A 
divorce by a boy or a minor is not considered valid for 
two reasons. Firstly, because the Prophet (peace be on 
him) has said; Every divorce is lawful except that of a 
boy, that is, a minor or lunatic. Secondly, because a 
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man's capacity to act depends on his possession of a sound 
judgment. Which is presumed lacking in the case of minor. 
The guardian of a minor also cannot divorce a minor's wife 
on his behalf. If does so, the divorce will be 
ineffective and the invalidity cannot be cured even if the 
. . (17) 
minor assents to it an attaining majorety. Majority, 
age of: Majority of a boy or a girl with regard to his or 
her capacity in the matter of dissolution of marriage 
shall be determined according to the age fixed under the 
Muslim Law and not according to the Majority Act. 
Shi' i Law:- Shi' i law is the same as the Sunni Law with 
regard to the condition of puberty or majority. But under 
that law the guardian of a minor can divorce the minor's 
wife on his behalf if the minor is deficient in 
understanding and the divorce is in the interest of the 
(19) 
minor. 
(b) Understanding:- It has been seen above that it is an 
essential condition of divorce that the husband should 
possess under standing. If he is divoid of it as when he 
is insane then he not held responsible for his acts and so 
a divorce pronounced by him shall be ineffective. Want 
of understanding how ever, means complete loss of 
intellect so that the person cannot understand the 
nature of his acts. But the mere fact that he cannot fully 
appreciate the consequences of his acts is not sufficient 
(21) to bring a person with him the exception. 
The effect of understanding on the dissolution of marriage 
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can be connirlorod from three aspects, namely/ when the 
husband is (i) Completely devoid of understanding or 
(ii) is suffering from a temporary loss of understanding 
or (iii) when he possesses a weak intellect 
(I) Lunatic;- A divorce by a lunatic is not effective. Two 
reasons are given for this rule. The first is that the 
Prophet (peace be on him) has said, Every divorce is 
(22) lawful except that of a boy or a lunatic." The second 
is that a man's competency to divorce depends on his 
possession of a sound judgment which is wanting in the 
^ -> 4-- (28) case of lunatic. 
Idiot; The word "Lunatic" is used here in a general sense 
and includes an "Idiot." 
(II) Temporary loss; By want so less of understanding is 
not meant only a permanent loss of that faculty but even a 
temporary condition of insanity can bring a case within the 
exception to the general rule that every person can 
divorce his wife. This exception, shall held good only 
(24) during the period the condition lasts. A divorce by 
person having lost his understanding for the time being 
iding 
(25) 
some . , . . ^ 
due to cause m Muslim Law possession of under-standing 
is an essential condition for competency to divorce. 
This rule holds good both when the husband is a lunatic or 
has temporarily lost his understanding. 
Lucid interval; A divorce given to fits of lunacy shall be 
considered a lunatic for the purpose of this rule during 
the time when a fit is on 
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But he shall be considered to be same when he is free of a 
fit so that a divorce pronounced during the period of 
(22) lumcy shall be effective. Hence, if a person, while 
in a lunatic interval, pronounces a conditional divorce to 
be effective on the happening of a certain event and he 
then becomes insane the divorce would become effective 
under the Sunni Law on a happening of that event whatever 
be his condition at the time of the happening of the 
^ (28) 
event. 
(iii) Person of weak understanding;- The mere fact that a 
person cannot fully appreciate the consequences of his 
acts is not sufficient to bring a case within the 
exception and divorce pronounced by a person of weak 
(29) intellect is not invalid but is binding on him. Such a 
person is not completely devoid of understanding and so 
his case differs from that of a lunatic. If a person is a 
weak intellect then it is to be seen if the majority of 
his acts are normal or not. In the former case he shall be 
considered to be a normal man and his acts to be binding 
on him, but in the latter use he shall be considered to be 
insance and so not bound by his acts. The result is that a 
divorce pronounced in the former case shall be binding on 
him but not in the latter case. 
(c) Divorce under influence of sleep;- It has already 
been seen that sleep is a condition which is not brought 
about by man himself. He is, therefore, not held 
reponsible for an act done by him while under the 
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influence of that condition because the act is done 
without any volition on his part. A divorce uttered by a 
person under the influence of sleep shall not be 
(31) effective. A person cannot be a aware of the words 
uttered by him in his sleep and they are not the result of 
(32) 
volition. This rule of law is based on the tradition 
that the Prophet (peace be on him) has stated that three 
classes of persons are not responsible for their acts, 
namely, a minor till he attains puberty, a lunatic till 
his recovery and a person who asleep till he wakes 
(33) A divorce would be ineffective even if he says, on 
up. •' 
" " (35) 
waking up to his wife. I divorce you in my sleep. 
(d) Divorce under the Influence of drink;- If a person 
gets intoxicated by drinking some fermented lequid the 
question arises whether a divorce pronounced by him while 
in that condition would be effective or not. A general 
rule of law is that if a person gets drunk by the use of 
any liguor, prohibited by Muslim law, then any act done by 
him, while under the influence of that drink shall not be 
excused but shall be held to be effective. Thus, if he 
divorces his wife while drunk, or sells something, enters 
into an agreement, borrows or lends money, all these acts 
shall be held valid and binding on him. This rule is based 
on the ground that as the cessation of his reason is due 
to the committal of a sinful act, namely, drinking of an 
intoxcicant liquar, it shall be presumed that he is still 
possessed of his reason. TheQadi's order shall be held 
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effective on the above ground. Al-Radd al-Muhtar has 
stated another general rule of law in respect of the 
effect of pronouncement of divorce while under the 
influence of drink. It is laid down that what is to be 
seen in such a case is whether the drink has assumed a 
form the use of which is forbidden by Muslim law. If it 
has reached that stage then a divorce pronounced under its 
influence is effective. But if it has not reached that 
degree then a divorce pronounced under its in fluence 
(37) 
shall not be effected. The underlying idea is that a 
drink that has undergone a certain amount of for-raentation 
but has not yet be come intoxicating would not come within 
the prohibition. If a person drink such a liquor and 
happens to get intoxicated and divorces his wife under the 
influence of the jntoxication then the pronouncement of 
divorce shall not be given effect to. If the liquar has, 
however, reached a high degree at intoxication, so much so 
that its use is not permitted by Muslim Law, and should a 
person drink it and then get intoxicated and should a 
person drink it and then get intoxicated and should he 
divorce his wife while in that condition, then the 
pronouncement of the divorce shall be given effect to. It 
must be noted here that in the first instance he was not 
guilty of the breach of any provision of Muslim law while 
in the other case he does commit a branch of provision of 
Muslim Law. Hence, a divorce pronounced under the 
influence of grape-juice, if it has not become wine, shall 
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not be effected. But a divorce shall be effected if the 
juice has became wine. It may be noted here that the basic 
principle is that a divorce pronounced when a man is not 
possessed of understanding is not held to effective. Thus, 
a divorce given by a husband while suffering from insanity 
is absolutely ineffective. But a divorce given while a 
person is devoid of understanding under the influence of 
drink is held to be effective simply by way of punishment 
for the breach of the law restraining the use of strong 
liquors in order to discourage its use. The matter may be 
considered from two aspects: 
(i) When a person gets intoxicated involunatarily and 
(ii) When he gets drunk voluntarily. 
Involuntary Drinking;- If a person is made drunk against 
his will as takes liquore from necessity as under medical 
advice and then gets in-toxicated and repudiates his 
wife while under its influence then the divorce shall not 
be effective. This rule is based on the principle that his 
act was not voluntary and he cannot be held reponsible for 
drinking in such a case. If follows that the pronouncement 
(38) 
of the divorce by him too would not be effective. Some 
jurists hold other -wise but the former opinion is 
(39) 
generally accepted as correct and is more reasonable. 
Voluntray Drinking;- Hanafi view There is a difference of 
opinion about the effect of the pronouncement of divorce 
when the husband is in a state of inebreity from voluntray 
drinking. Some jurists are of the opinion that the matter 
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should be considered with regard to two distinct stages of 
int-oxication. If the husband pronounce a divorce when 
slightly intoxicated so that he can realize the effect of 
his acts then it would be effected. But if he 
pronounce if while dead drunk so that he cannot 
distinguish between right and wrong, then the divorce 
(41) 
whould not be effected. it as stated m al-Hidayah and 
other books that if a person were to drink wine or some 
other fermented liquor in such a large quantity as to 
produce delirium or inflammation of then brain, there by 
suspending his reason and while in the condition he 
(42) pronounces a divorce then it shall not take effect. 
•p 
Ufrnan bin Affan holds that the pronouncement of divorce by 
a person under the influence of drink is not 
(43) effective. Opinions differ amongst the Hanafi Jurists 
about the degree of intoxication which would absolve a 
person from responsibility for his acts while in that 
condition. According to Abu Hanifah the person should be 
drunk to such a degree as to loss all understanding so 
much as to be able to differentiate between the sky and 
(44) the earth Abu Yusuf and Mohammad are less ixacting in 
the matter. They consider that a person shall not be held 
responsible for his acts if he is drunk so much as to 
bring about a suspension of his reason so that he is not 
(45 ) 
able to have control over his speech as in a delirium. 
According to al-Bahr al-Raiq the rule laid down by 
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Imam Muhanmad and Abu Yusuf is to be follov/ed^  ' Ibn al-Humam 
holds that the opinoin of Abu Hanifah shall be applicable 
for awarding punishment while the opinion of the latter 
(47) 
will hold good in cases of divorce. He explains m 
al-Tahir that the drink referred to by Abu Hanifah is the 
drink the use of which will make the person liable to 
punishment while the drink the refered to by Imam Muhanmad and 
Abu YUsuf is the drink the use of which will not subject 
the person to punishment but to other liabilities and 
means only the drink under the influence of which the 
person shall lose control of his speech and may talk 
wildly. Of course it is not necessary that the whole 
speech should be meaning less or irrational. In his 
commentary of al-Tahrir, Ibn Amir al-Hajj explains that 
what Ibn al-Humam meant is that the greater portion of the 
speech should be meaningless and only a small portion 
should be rational. If on the other hand, the greater 
portion of the speech should be rational and only a small 
portion wild and meaningless, he shall be considered to be 
possessed of under standing. A pronouncement of divorce by 
him shall, therefore, be effective. Their reasoning is 
that the reality of intention is connected with the 
exercise of reason which is suspended during such 
intoxication and so divorce pronounced under such a 
(49) 
condition would be ineffective. Tahawi and Kerhki are 
of the opinion that a divorce given while a man is drunk 
is wholly ineffective. It is stated in the Tatar Kaaniyah 
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that this is the generally accepted view. But Al-Radd 
al-Muhter opposes this view regarding voluntary 
drinking. It states that it shall be presumed that the 
speaker is still possessed of reason and so his 
pronouncement of divorce shall take effect in order to 
deter him from drinking liquor which is forbidden. It is 
clear from line of reasoning that the divorce is held 
valid to discourage drinking rather than on account of his 
capacity to pronounce a valid divorce while in that 
condition. 
The majority of Hanafi jurists follow the rule 
stated by Abu Yusuf and Muhammad. It is also the view of 
the other three Imams, namely, Malik, Shafii and Ibn 
Hanbal. It finds fult support in a dictum of 'Ali that a 
drankard is one who begins to talk irrationally and 
wildly. It is the view which is generally accepted as 
correct. But the Fatawa al-Alamgiriyah makes no 
distinc-tion between the stages when a husband is only 
slightly drunk and when he is drunk to such an extent as 
to lose his understanding and the divorce pronounced by a 
person under the influence of wine or other fermented 
(52) liquor IS held to be effective. It is stated in 
Al-Bahr al-Ra'iq that a divorce given under the influence 
of drink shall be effected irrespective of the fact 
wheather the drink was taken voluntarily or under 
(53) 
compulsion. A different view has, however, been 
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expressed in the Fatawa Qadi Khan where it is stated that 
the divorce given under the influence of drink, taken 
under compulRion or from any necessity shall not be 
(54) 
effected. The Tuhfah supported by fath al-Qadir also 
(55) preferred the opinion stated m Tuhfah al-Fugaha given 
in al-Muhit. 
Maliki law;- The Malikis do not consider a divorce 
pronounced under the influence of drink to be effective if 
the husband is drunk to such an extent as not to 
distinguish between rihgt and wrong. 
Hanbali Law;- Ahmad b. Hanbal at one time held the same 
opinion as expressed by Malik and considered that a 
divorce by a husband when he is drunk to such an extent as 
not to understand what he is talking is not 
(57) 
effective. He expressed a different opinion at other 
times, but finally he left the matter open on the basiS 
that the matter was not clear as there was a difference of 
opinion on this point amongst the companions them-selves, 
and that every case has to be decided on its marits. His 
diciples too are not agreed in this matter. Thus Abu-Bakr 
al-Khilal, a very well known Hanbali jurist, helds a 
divorce, pronounced under such a condition, to be 
effective while Abu Bakr Abd al-'Aziz, an equally famous 
Hanbali jurist hold otherwise. 
Shafi'i Law;- Shafi's expressed different view at 
different times. At first he held that a divorce 
-:209:-
pronounced when one has temporarily lost one's reason 
under the influence of liquor is not valid and is 
(59) 
ineffective. He based this view on the ground that the 
drink might have produced delirium or inflammation of the 
brain to such an extent as to make him devoid of reasoning 
faculties. He justifies this opinion on the ground that 
the divorce pronounced by a minor is not effective because 
he does not possess understanding and the same rule shall 
apply here. His second ground is that divorce under the 
influence of bhang(hemp) is not effective and there is no 
difference in the use of bhang and of a fermented liquor 
as both produce the same result, namely, temporary loss of 
reason. The third reason is That apostasy under the 
influence of drink is not permitted and the same rule 
shall apply here. The Hanafis have explained that Allah 
has permitted divorce and there is no exception in the 
case of a divorce given under the influence of drink. In 
case a divorce by a minor or a lunatic, it is not 
effective for want of understanding. They have not 
violated any rule of Muslim law, but in case of drinking 
the husband has been guilty of an offence and so his 
divorce shall be held effective by way of punishment. The 
use of bhang is not an offence and so it has no 
application here. The case of apostasy is also 
inapplicable because these an attempt is made to save him 
from renunciation of Islam while here the husband has to 
be punished to discourage drinking. Without entering 
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into the merits of statements, it may be stated that 
Shafi'i subsequently changed his opinion and held divorce 
given under the influence of wine to be effective If a 
drink then fermentation acts in after some time. If a person 
consumes it in that condition or when it has fully become an 
intoxicant, gets drunk and pronounces a divorce then there 
is a difference of opinion about the metter. Muhammad 
al-Shaybavi holds that divorce in such a case shall be 
effected, while Imam Abu Yusuf has expressed the view that 
it shall not be effected . Fatawa Qadi Khan has followed 
the latter view while al-Bahr-al-Ra'iq has adopted the 
former view . Al-Bazzaziyah has stated, "in over times 
it is necessary to penalise the consumption of such drink 
and so divorce should be held to be effected" . Influence 
of Bhang (Hemp). The divorce of person in toxicated with 
Bhang (Hemp) is held to be ineffective by various Muslim 
Jurists as also in the Fatawa Qadi Khan and al-Tahrir. It is 
stated in al-Bahr al-Ra'iq that a divorce given by a husband 
while he is under the influence of Bhang.(Hemp) shall not be 
effected. The author, however, suggests that it would be 
proper to differentiate between the two cases, namely: (a) 
when it is taken for pleasure and (b) when it is taken as 
medicine 
A divorce shall be effected if bhang or opium is 
taken for pleasure, but it shall not be effected it either 
is taken by way of medicine . It is stated in Al-Radd 
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al-Muhtar referring to al- jawahir that in these times a 
divorce given by a husband while in a state of 
intoxication of bho'nij, (hemp) or opium shall be held 
effective in order to discourage the use of these 
intoxication. Fatawa, Alamgiriyah also holds it to be 
effected on account of the frequency of this act among 
people and on this is the fatv/a (dictum) in our 
times." Ameer Ali remarks,"Just be-fore this rule the 
contrary was stated from the Tahzib, Showing clearly the 
change in the inter.pretation and application of the law 
according to the change of times and social condition. 
This conception of the law is last sight of in the British 
Indian Courts. A differeat view has been expressed in 
al-Muta-nah Marramah al-Khazanah where it is given that a 
divorce pronounced under the influence of bhang (hemp) 
shall not be effected. . This view is based on the reasoning 
that a divorce pronounced when a man is not possessed of 
understanding is not held to be effective. Thus a divorce 
given by a husband while suffering from insanity is 
absolutely ineffective. But adivokee given while a person 
is devoid of understanding under the inefluence of drink 
is held to be effective simply by way of punishment for 
the breach of the law restraining the use of strong liquor 
in order to discourage their use. This view is based on 
the reasoning that a person loses his understanding under 
the influence of bhang but the use of drink or fermented 
liquor does not necessarily produce this effective. 
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By Agent When Drunk;- There is a difference of opinion a 
about the effect of a divorce pronounced by an agent, 
appointed to pronounce a divorce on behalf of the husband 
againts his wife when the agent is drunk. It is given in 
Al-Fatawa at-Hindiyah from Tatarkhaniah have some jurists 
hold it to be ineffective while many others hold it t6 be 
(11) 
effective. The compilers of 'Alamgiliyah have not 
expressed any opinion of their own. It is stated in Ashbah 
that such a divorce would not be given effective to while 
Bazaziah makes a distinction between divorce given by the 
agent for consideration or without it. It shall not be 
effective in the former case but shall be effective in the 
(72) latter use. This view seems to be based on the 
reasoning that in the former case he has to judge the 
propriety of the consideration which being intoxicated, he 
may not be able to do. But he has not to make any such 
decision in the case of divorce by the husband. This view 
leads to the result that a divorce by the agent will be 
effective if his a-athority is unconditional but will not 
be effective if it is subject to certain conditions. But 
if the agent has to pronounce the divorce under certain 
conditions then he may not be able to judge about the 
effectiveness of the conditions, that is if they have been 
fulfilled and so a divorce by him while drunk should not 
be held effective. 
Shi'i Law;- Shi'i Law a divorce given by an agent under 
the influence of drink will not be held valid for want of 
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intention. 
There is "great difference of opinion about the 
effectiveness of a talaq (divorce) pronounced under 
compulsion not only amongst the various schools of Muslim 
law but also amongst the Sunni jurists themsolven. Abu 
Hanifah, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad held a divorce given under 
compulsion to be effective. They jurists this opinion on 
two grounds, first, that divorce is the result of 
necessity. In the case of a person not under compulsion it 
is the necessity to separate from a wife who may be odious 
or disagreeable to him, while in the case of compulsion 
the necessity is to save himself from the apprehension of 
that with which he is threatened. Hence, according to them 
theJ^ e is no difference between the two cases and so a 
divorce under compulsion is effecte. The second ground 
advanced is that the husband who is coerced into 
pronunceing a divorce cannot be held to have no option for 
he does possess a choice. He has a choice between two 
evils, one, the thing with which he is threatened and the 
other the divorce under compulsion and viewing both he 
(73) 
makes a choice and this proves that he has an option. 
Hence, according to them, there is no differece on 
principle between a divorce pronounced of free will and 
one given under compulsion and so the latter is a as 
effective as the former. They further rely on a tradition 
that a person approached the Prophat (peace be on him) and 
stated that he was sleeping when his wife sat on his chest 
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and treatened to cut his throat he pronouunced the divorce 
three v/hich he did for fear of his life. The Prophet 
(peace be on him) said that a divorce had been effected 
and the husband could not revokeitf ' Compulsion has been 
defined by Hanafi jurists to mean the act as speech of a 
person that affects another person so much as to force him 
to do the act demand of him against his will. The threat 
(75) 
may be caused by speech or conduct. It usurps the free 
will of the person threatened but not his capacity to do 
the act demanded of him. The essentials of a threat are: 
(a) The person who threatened should be in a position to 
carry it out. 
(b) The person thratened should be under the conviction 
that the Threat would be carried out unless he complies 
with the demand. 
(c) The threat should relate to something serious such as 
loss of life, limb, grievous hurt or blows or blows or 
imprisoment either of himself or of a person closely 
related to him. But if the threat is directed against a 
person who is not closely related to the husband and the 
latter repudiates his wife in order to avert the danger 
from the said stranger then the repudiation shall take 
effect. " « * 
(d) The person threatened would not do the act in absence 
(77) 
of the threat . 
(e) The husband be not in a position to save himself from 
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the threatened act. 
The other sects of Siinni jurists, namely. Imam Malik, 
Shafi'i and Ahmad b. Hanbal rely upon a precept of the 
Prophet (peace be on him) that God will not held a person 
responsible for acts and OFaissions done through 
(78 ) forgetfulness under compulsion. Aishah, the wife of 
the Prophet (peace be on him) has also reported. " I heard 
the Messenger of Allah say. There is no divorce and no 
(79) 
emancipation by force. There are serevel other 
traditions of the same effect. Thus, it reported by Ibn 
'Abbas that the Prophet (peace be on him) said that Allah 
forgives a person for an act done by him under 
compulsion. Abu pharr al-Ghifari and Abu Hurayrah have 
reported that the Prophet (peace be on him) said that 
Allah for- gives the acts and deels done by a Muslim by 
(81) 
mistake or through forgetfulness or under compulsion. 
The tradition relied upon by Abu Hanifah and others in 
this connection relates to a particular incident and does 
not lay down a general rule of law. The Prophet's interest 
in the well-being of women is well known and he must have 
concluded that is must have been a very unhappy marriage 
or that the husband must have been very cruel to his wife 
that forced her to take such a serious step to again her 
freedom and so he must have declared that particular 
marriage to have been dissolved under the peculiar 
circumstances of the case. The tradition relied upon by 
the order group of jurists lay down a general rule of law 
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and must be followed in preference to the other tradition 
relating to a particular incident, moreover, the opinion 
that such a divorce is effective is opposed to public 
policy, equity and good conscience. It has been laid down 
by Sulaiman, J. (as he then was) that where there are two 
opinions on a point of Muslim law, the rule of equity, 
justice and good conscience should be that guiding 
(82) principle. This principle of law applies with equal 
force to the use of a divorce under compulsion. The courts 
have generally applied the rule laid down by Abu Hanifah 
and others to the Hanafis and have held that the 
pronouncement of a divorce is effective at through it has 
been given under coercion. Thus it was held in an early 
case the according to Muhammadan Law, as laid down in 
Al-Hidayah the divorce of one acting upon compulsion from 
(83) 
threats is effective. The privy concil has expressed 
the same view. The Calcutta High Court has also taken 
the same view and has stated that according to the Hanafi 
school of Law a pronouncement of divorce is effectual 
(85) 
although it has been made under compulsion. The matter 
again came up for decision before the Allahabad High Court 
in 1945. Sulaiman J. pointed out that the Hanafi jurists 
are not unanimous in holding such a divorce to be 
effective and such a divorce is against public policy. 
It is time that the court should reconsider the matter as 
there is no reasonable ground for accepting the validity 
of such a divorce. 
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As stated before, when there is a difference of 
opinion amongst the Sunni jurists, it is open to a Qadi, 
if he is possessed of certain qualifications, to adopt any 
one of the opinions which he considers proper in a 
particular case. The courts now held the same position as 
held by the qa(^is in former times and can therefore, take 
(87) 
advantage of this rule to decide a case. 
Shafi'i Law;- Under the Shafi'i Law, a divorce extared by 
I 88 ) 
violence is absolutely ineffective. Shafi'i maintains 
that divorce given under compulsion is not effective 
because the husband who has been compelled to do has no 
optain, and no normal act of law is worthy of 
{89) 
consideration unless it is purely optional. Ameer Ali 
has suggested an intersting proposition regarding the 
pronouncement of divorce under compulsion by a Hanafi. He 
says,"Supposing a Hanafi, under the influence of threats 
and strong coercion, pronounce a talaq agains his wife, 
and on recovering his freedom of action disavous the 
validity of his act and places himself under the Shafi'i 
rules to escape from the result of the tala^j ., there can 
be little doubt that he would be justified in doing so, 
and the repudiation he had pronounced would be 
invalidated."^^°^ 
Maliki and Hanbali laws. Both Imam Malik and Ahmad bin 
hanbal hold the same opinion that as expressed by Shafi'i 
and are of the opinion that a divorce under compulsion is 
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.(91) 
ineffective. Imam Malik, however, further adds that the 
husband should not have actually intended to divorce his 
wife while pronouncing the divorce under compulsion. This 
intention can refer only to his mental attitude over which 
there can be no compuslsion and so shall result in a 
divorce if he so intended. 
Acknowledgement under Compulsion;-
The jurists are unaimous in that an 
acknowledgement obtained under compulsion to the effect 
(92) that a person had divorced his wife is not effective. 
This is based on the ground that in fact he has not 
divorced his wife but merely makes an incorrect statement 
to the effect, hence there having been no divorce, the 
wife would not be repudiated. The courts have also 
(93) followed this rule of the Muslim Law. This rule seems 
to be based on the reasoning that the oath no doubt, was 
taken under compulsion, but there was no compulsion when 
the act was done or the omission made. 
There is a curious historical background to the 
practice of a conditional divorce under compulsion it is 
stated that the Abbasid Caliph discovered that people were 
not sincere in their oaths of allegiance to them and they, 
therefore, introduced a clause in the oath or"<Lf I violate 
my oath then my wife shall stand divorced." This put the 
people in a very difficult position. There were many 
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people who did not like the caliphs and took the oath 
merely under the fear of punishment without any intention 
of being loyal to the caliphs. They felt very uneasy when 
the new clause was added to the oath because they were not 
honstly loyal to the caliphs and they feared that their 
wives would be automatically divorced on that ground. The 
matter of conditional divorce under compulsion was Malik 
who gave his futv/a that a divorce under compulsion can 
also not be effective. This dictum led to the conclusion 
that a person could safely take the oath of and his wife 
vrould not be divorced on his feving no real intention of 
being loyal to the caliph or on violating his oath of 
allegiance since it was under compulsion that he had taken 
that oath. The Governor of Madinah asked Malik to withdraw 
his futwa and he was even flogged but the Imam refused to 
(95) 
change his opinion. ' 
Appointment of an Agent Under Compulsion;-
The apointment of an agent under compulsion by a 
person for divorcing his wife is considered to be valid 
and a divorce pronounced by the agent to be effective."«' 
Divorce Written Under Compulsion;- A divorce written 
under compulsion is not considered effective by all the 
(97) 
Imams including Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad. 
According to them writing takes the place of speech only 
under necessity. Here there was no necessity to writehence 
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no divorce shall be effected. 
Divorce Under Undue Influence;- There is not much 
difference between compulsion and undue influence if it is 
exerted to such an extent as to divest the person of the 
exercise of his free will and in that are the same rule 
shall apply as to a divorce given under compulsion. But 
whether undue influence has been exercised is a question 
of fact to be determined in each case. An adult connot be 
presumed to be acting under the influence of his 
relations, without whom he is living in the absence of any 
evidence to that effect. Hence/ in the absence of proof to 
the contrary divorce given by him shall be considered 
effective. 
Divorce in Jest or Given Non-seriously;- It is considered 
by Sunni Jurists that the pronouncement of divorce is a 
serious thing and not a fit subject for Jest. It has, 
therefore, been laid down that a divorce pronounced in 
Jest would take effect even against the wishes of the 
(99) 
wishes of the husband and even when he never meant it. 
The authority for this rule is a precept of the Prophat 
(peace be on him) in which he stated, "There are three 
things inwhich it makes no difference whether a man is in 
earnest or in jest namely, marriage, divorce and 
raj'aa." It means that effect would be given to a 
man's words even when spoken inadvertently or as a joke. 
It is obvious that these are serious matters and a person 
-:221:-
cannot be allowed to undo the effect of his words by 
saying that he was not in earnest but had uttered the 
words by way of joke. The Privy'Council has followed this 
rule of law and has held that a talaq pronounced in jest 
is valid and effective. But a different view has been 
expressed in al-Fatawa al-Bazzaziah and Qiniyah and such a 
divorced has not been considered effective if the 
pronouncement refers to a past act. But if the 
pronouncement refers to the present time, the divorce 
shall be effected. 
(viii) A divorce pronounced by the husband as a result of 
fraud is deemed by the Sunnis to be binding on him. This 
rule is a necessary corellary of the law that intention does 
not from as essential condition of divorce under the Sunni 
law. This rule is justified on the ground that though the 
husband acted under fraud in pronouncing the divorce yet 
the decision to divorce was taken by him voluntarily and 
deliberatily and need not have been taken had not the man 
considered some atternative such a getting some adventage 
as higher and more important than the divorce. If he was 
deceived by a false promise of some meterial gain or by 
offer of some compensation he neverthless allowed him-self 
to be influenced by such offer which he obviously put 
above the consideration of a broken marriage. The husband 
has no escape from the effect there of except by the way 
provided by the book, that is raj'ah if possible in the 
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circumstances. 
But there can also be cases in which the fraud is 
of such a nature that the man under the instigation of 
some mischief maker or an interested party, pronounced 
the divorce without understanding the significance of the 
words on knowing that he was there by divorcing his wife. 
Thus, there is an example given in al-Radd al-Muhtar" if 
some one teaches an illiterate person to pronounce 'Talaq' 
and he speaks it while addressing his wife, a divorce 
would be effected in law according to some jurists but 
others hold otherwise and have stated that not divorce 
would be effected so as to save people from loss under 
^ ^ ,,(103) fraud." 
Here again the Hanafis insist that intention does 
not from an essential condition of divroce, since no one 
save God can know the secrets of a man's heart and his 
words and actions can be the only indication of his 
intention. However, this argument is not very convincing, 
as the establishment of the fact that a fraud had been 
committed on the husband coupled with the husband's 
statement an oath that he had no intention of divorcing 
his wife and would not have pronounced the divorce in the 
absence of the fraud ought to be deemed sufficient by the 
court to hold the divorce ineffective. The courts should 
not allow the wrongdoing party, that is, the party who has 
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actually committed the fraud or was privy to the same, to 
take advantage of his fraud. 
A good deal of light it thrown on the matter by 
Ibn Nujayam in al-Qiniyah. It is state there in on page 
181 of the lude now edition on the strength of al-Ashbah 
wan Nazair that if a person admists that he had divorced 
his wife relying on the futwa of a Mufti, but it 
transpires subsequently that the fatwa was incorrect and 
the or pronouncement of the husband had not amounted to 
divorce then no divorce would be effected. 
(ix) Hanafi law. Under Hanafi Law, a divorce would be 
effected even when the husband pronounces it in ignorance 
of the meaning of the words he utters. 
Hanbli law;- According to Ahmad b. Hanbal, if a husband 
pronounces a divorce without understanding the meaning of 
the words the divorce shall not be effected. 
Shafi'i Law;- Shafi'i does not recognize the validity of a 
divorce given in words the meaning of which the husband 
does not know. 
Dumb Person;- The Hanafis hold that a divorce by a dumb 
man expressed by sings in effective when his defect is of 
long standing and his signs have be- come well-understood 
because sings of dumb persons are recognised in practice 
therefore (107) 
and admitted to stand in place of speech It is 
-:224:-
stated in Al-Radd al-Muhtar and Al-Fat\;a al-Alamgiriyah 
that in case the dumb person is literate, his repuoliation 
would be effected by writting only and not sings. 
This, as matter of fact, is the doctrine of Shafi'i but 
the Hanafis have adopted it and is now considered to be 
the established law. Divorce by a husband who is 
capable of speaking cannot be effected by sings. 
Shafi'i Law;- Shafi'i considers a divorce given by dumb 
person by signs to be valid. But such divorce by a person 
capable of speech is held invalid and ineffectible. 
Maliki Law;- If the signs of a dumb person are well 
understood, a divorce by him by signs shall be 
^^ 4.- (Ill) effective. 
Hanbali Law;- T'he Hanbali law holds a divorce given by a 
dumb person by signs to be effective provided his signs 
are well understood. If they are such that some people 
under stand them while others do not it shall amount to a 
Kinayah (ambiguous)divorce. In such a case he shall be 
asked if he really intended to pronounce divorce. 
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CHAPTRR-V 
HINDU AND MUSLIM LAW ON DIVORCE AND THE CONCERNED ACTS, 
CAUSES OF THE INDEPENDANT INDIA. 
An Act further to amend the Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. 
(Received the assent of the President on 27th May, 1976) 
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-seventh 
year of the Republic of India as follows: 
UNIT-A 
PRELIMINARY 
5.1. Short Title: This Act may be called Marriage Laws 
(Amendment) Act, 1976. 
UNIT-B 
AMENDMENTS TO THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 
5.2. Amendment of Section 5: In the Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955 (hereinafter refrrred to as the Hindu Marriage Act), 
in section 5, for clause 
(ii), the following clause shall be substituted, namely: 
"(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party-
(a) is incapable of giving valid consent to it in 
consequence of unsoundness of mind; or 
(b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been 
suffering from mental disorder of such an extent as 
to be unfit for marriage and the prcreation of 
children; or 
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(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity 
or epilepsy;". 
3. Amendment of section 9: In section 9 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act/-
(a) in sub-section (1), the brackets and figure 
"(1)"shall be omitted and to that sub-section as so 
amended, the following Explanation shall be added, namely: 
"Explanation.-Where a question arises whether there has 
been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, 
the burden of proving realsonable excuse shall be on the 
person who has withdrawn from the society.", 
(b) sub-section(2) shall be omitted. 
4. Amendment of section 10: In section 10 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, for sub-section (1) and the Explanation 
thereunder, the following sub-section shall be 
substituted, namely:-
"(1) Either Party to a marriage, whether solemnized 
before or after the commencement of this Act may present a 
petition praying for a decree for judicial separation on 
any of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 
13, and in the case of a wife also on any of the grounds 
specified in sub-section (2) thereof, as grounds on which 
a petition for divorce might have been presented." 
5. Amendment of section 11: In section 11 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, after the words "presented by either party 
thereto", the words "against the other party" shall be inserted. 
2 3 1 : -
6. Amendment of secticxi 12: In secticai 12 of the Hindu Marriage 
Act , -
(a ) i n s u b - s e c t i o n ( 1 ) / -
(i) for clause (a), the following clause shall be 
substituted, namely:-
"(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing 
to the impootence of the respondent; or"; 
(ii) in clause (c), for the words "or fraud", the words 
"or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any 
material fact or circumstance concerning the respondednt" 
shall be substituted; 
(b) in sub-section (2), in clause (b), in sub-clause 
(ii), for the words "the grounds for a decree" the words 
"the grounds for a decree" the words "the said ground" 
shall be substituted. 
7. Amendment of section 13: In section 13 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act,-
(a) in sub-section (1),-
(i) for clause (i), the follwing clauses shall be 
substituted, namely:-
"(ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, 
treated the petitioner with cruelty; or 
(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous 
period of not less than two years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition; or"; 
(ii) for clause(iii), the following shall substituted, 
namely:-
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"(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been 
suffering continuously or intermittently from mental 
disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the 
petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the 
repondent. 
Explanation,-In this clause,-
(a) the expression "mental disorder" means mental 
illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, 
psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability 
of mind and includes schizophrenia; 
(b) the expression "psychopathic disorder" means a 
persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not 
including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in 
abnormaolly aggressive or seriously irresponsible cnduct 
on the part of the other party, and whether or not it 
requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or"; 
(iii) in clauses (iv) and (v), the words, "for a period 
of not less than three years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition", shall be omitted; 
(iv) after clause (vii), the following Explanation 
shall be inserted, namely:-
Explanation-In this sub-section, the expression 
"desertion" means the desertion of the petitioner by the 
other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and 
without the consent or against the wish of such pary, and 
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includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other 
party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and 
cognate expressions shall be construced accordingly.", 
(b) in sub-section (lA), for the words "two years", in 
the two places where they occur, the words "one year" 
shall be substituted; 
(c) in sub-section (2),-
(i) in clause (ii),for the word "bestiality",the word 
"bestiality; or" shall be substituted; 
(ii) after clause (ii) as so amended, the following 
clauses shall be inserted, namely:-
"(iii) that in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, or in a proceeding 
under section 125 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
(or in under the corresponding section 488 of the Code of 
Criminal procedure, 1898, a decree or order, as the case 
may be, has been passed against the husband awarding 
maintenace to the wife notwithstanding that she was living 
apart and that since the passing of such decree or order,1 
cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for 
onw year or upwards; or 
(iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was 
solemnized before she attained the age of fifteen years 
and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining that 
age but before attaining the age of eighteen years. 
Explanation-This clause applies v^ether the marriage was solannized 
befexE ac after the (juniaDaiHit cf tiie ^te^:i^e laws (AiaditaiL) Pet, 1576.". 
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8. Insertion of new sections 13A and 13B: After 
section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act as so amended, the 
following sections shall be inserted, namely:-
"13A. Alternate relief in divorce proceedings: In any 
proceeding under this Act, on a petition for dissolution 
of marriage by a decree of divorce, except in so far as 
the petition is founded on the grounds mentioned in 
clauses (ii),(vi) and (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 
13, the court may, if it considers it just so to do having 
regard to the circumstances of the case, pass instead a 
decreefor judicial separation. 
Divorce by mutual consent: (1) Subject to the provisions 
of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a 
decree of divorce may be presented to the district court 
by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such 
marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement 
of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, on the ground 
that they have been living separately for a period of one 
year or more, that they have not been able to live 
together and that they have mutually agreed that the 
marriage should be dissolved. 
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier 
than six months after the date of the presentation of the 
petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than 
eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is 
not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on being 
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satisfied, after hhearing the parties and after making 
such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been 
solemnized and that the averments in the petition are 
true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to 
be disolved with effect from the date of the decree.". 
9. Amendment of section 14:In section 14 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act,-
(i) in sub-section(l),-
(a) for the words "unless at the date of presentation 
of the petition three years have elapsed", the words 
"unless at the date of the presentation of the petition 
one year has elapsed" shall be substituted; 
(b) in the proviso,-
(1) for the words "before three years have elapsed", 
the words "before one year has elapsed" shall be 
substituted; 
(2) for the words "expiry of three years," the words 
"expiry of one year" shall be substituted; 
(3) for the words "expiration of the said three years", 
the words "expiration of the said one year" shall be 
substituted; 
(ii) in sub-section(2),-
(a) for the words "expiration of three years", the 
words "expiration of one year" shall be substituted; 
(b) for the words "said three year", the words "said 
one year" shall be substituted. 
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10. Amendment of section 15: In section 15 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, the proviso shall be omitted. 
11. Substitution of new section for section 16: For 
section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the following 
section shall be substituted namely:-
"16. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable 
marriages (1) Notwithstanding that a marriage is null and 
void under section 11, any child of such marriage who 
would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, 
shall be legitimate, whether such shild is born before or 
after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) 
Act, 1976, and whether or not a decree of nullity is 
granted in respect of that marriage under this Act and 
whether or not the marriage is held to be void otherwise 
than on a petition under this Act. 
(2) Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of 
a voidable marriage under section 12, any child begotten 
or conceived before the decree is made, who would have 
been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage 
if at the date of the decree it had been dissolved instead 
of being annulled, shall be deemed to be their legitimate 
child notwithstanding the decree of nullity. 
(3) Nothin contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section 
(2) shall be construed as conferring upon any child of 
marriage which is null and void or which is annulled by a 
decree of nullity under section 12, any rights in or to 
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the property of any person, other than the parents, in any 
case where, but for the passing of this Act, such child 
would have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any 
such rights by reason of his not being the legitimate 
child of his parents." 
"19. Court to which petition shall be presented:Every 
petition under this Act shall be presented to the district 
court within the local limits of whose ordinary original 
civil jurisdiction-
(i) the marriage was solemnized, or 
(ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of 
the petition, resides, or 
(iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, 
or 
(iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the 
presentation of the petition, in a case where the 
respondent is, at that time, residing outside the 
territories to which this Act extends, or has not been 
heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or 
more by those persons who would naturally have heard of 
him if he were alive.". 
13. Amendment of section 20: In section 20 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act, in sub-section (1), for the words "and 
shall also state", the words and figures "and,-except in a 
petition under section 11, shall also state" shall be 
substituted. 
14. Insertion of new sections 2lA, 21B and 21C: After 
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section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the following 
sections shall be inserted, namely:-
"2lA. Power to transfer petitions in certain cases:(1) 
where-
(a) a petition under this Act has been presented to a 
district court having jurisdiction by a party to a 
marriage praying for a decree for judicial separation 
under section 10 or for a decree of divorce under section 
13, and 
(b) another petition under this Act has been presented 
thereafter by the other party to the marriage praying for 
a decree for judicial separation under section 10 or for 
decree of divorce under section 13 on any ground, whether 
in the same district court or in a different district 
court, in the same State or in a different State, 
the petitions shall be dealt with as specified in 
sub-section (2). 
(2) In a case where sub-section (1) applies,-
(a) if the petitions are presented to the same district 
court, both the petitions shall be tried and heard 
together by that district court; 
(b) if the petitions are presented to different 
district courts, the petition presented later shall be 
transferred to the district court in which the earlier 
petition was presented and both the prtitions shall be 
heard and disposed of together by the district court in 
which the earlier petition was presented. 
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(3) In a case where clause (b) of sub-section (2) 
applies, the court or the Government, as the case may be, 
competent under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to 
transfer any suit or proceeding from the district court in 
which the later petition has been presented to the 
district court in which the earlier petition is pending, 
shall exercise its powers to transfer such later petition 
as if it had been empowered so to do under the said Code. 
21B. Special provision relating to trial and disposal 
of petitions under the Act: (1) The trial of a petition 
under this Act shall, so far as is practicable 
consistently with the interests of justice in respect of 
the trial be continued from day to day until its 
conclusion unless the court finds the adjournment of the 
trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons 
to be recorded. 
(2) Every appeal under this Act shall be heard as 
expeditiously as possible, and endeavour shall be made to 
conclude the hearing within three months from the date of 
service of notice of appeal on the respondent. 
(15) Rmendinent • of sectioTi '23: In section 23 of : the 
Hindu Marriage Act,-
(a) in sub-section (1),-
(i) in clause (a), after the words "the petitioner" the 
brackets, words, letters and figures "[except in cases 
where the relief is sought by him on the ground specified 
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in sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of 
clause (ii) of section 5]" shall be inserted; 
(ii) in clause (b), the words, brackets, letter and 
figures "in clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 10, 
or" shall be omitted; 
(iii) after clause (b), the following clause shall be 
inserted, namely:-
"(bb) when a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual 
consent, such consent has not been obtained by force, 
fraud or undue influence, and".; 
(iv) in clause (c), for the words "the petition", the 
words, brackets and figures "the petition (not being a 
petition presented under section 11)" shall be substituted 
(b) to sub-section (2), the following proviso shall be 
addedat the end, namely:-
"Provided that nothing contaied in this sub-section 
shall apply to any proceeding wherei relief is sought on 
any of the grounds pecified in clause(ii), clause(iii), 
clause (iv), clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of 
sub-section (1) of section 13."; 
(c) after sub-section (2) as so amended, the following 
sub-sections shall be inserted, namely:-
"(3) Por the purpose of aiding the court in bringing 
about such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties 
so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to 
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do, adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period not 
exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person 
named by the parties in this behalf or , to any person 
nominated by the court if the parties fail to name any 
person with directions to report to the court as to 
whether reconciliation can be and has been, effected and 
the court shall in disposing of the proceeding have due 
regard to the report. 
(4) In every case where a marriage is dissoved by a 
decree of divorce, the court passing the decree shall give 
a copy thereof free of cost to each of the parties.". 
16. Insertion of new section 23A: After section 23 of 
the Hindu Marriage Act, the following section shall be 
inserted, namely:-
"23A. Relief for respondent in divorce and other 
proceedings; In any Proceeding for divorce or judicial 
separation or restitution of conjugal rights, the 
respondent may not only oppose the relief sought on the 
ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion, but 
also make a counter-claim for any relief under this Act on 
that ground; and if the petitioner's adultery, cruelty or 
desertion is proved, the court may give to the respondent 
any relief under this Act to which he or she would have 
been entitled if he or she had presented a petition 
seeking such relief on that groung." 
17. Amendment of section 25: In section 25 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act,-
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(a) in sub-section (1),-
(i) the words, "while the applicantremains unmarried," 
shall be omitted; 
(ii) for the words "and the conduct of the parties," 
the words, "the conduct of the parties and other 
circumstances of the case" shall be substituted; 
(b) in sub-section (3), for the words "it shall 
rescind the order", the words "it may at the instance of 
the other party vary, modify or rescind any such order in 
such manner as the court may deem just" shall be 
substituted. 
19. Substitution of new sections for section 28: For 
section 28 of the Hindu marriage Act, the following 
sections shall be substituted, namely:-
"28. Appeals from decrees and orders: (1) All decrees 
made by the court in any proceeding under this Act shall, 
subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be 
appealable as decrees of the court made in the exercise of 
its original civil jurisdiction, and every such appeal 
shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie 
from the decisions of the court given in the exercise of 
its original civil jurisdiction. 
(2) Orders made by the court in any proceeding under 
this Act under section 25 or section 26 shall, subject to 
the provisions of su-section (3), be appealable if they 
are not interim orders, and every such appeal shall lie to 
the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the 
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decisions of the court given in exercise of its original 
civil jurisdiction. 
(3) There shall be no appeal under this section on the 
subject of costs only. 
(4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred 
within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree 
or order. 
28A. Enforcement of decrees and order: All decrees and 
orders made by the court in any proceeding under this Act 
shall be enforce in the like manner as the decrees and 
orders of the court made in the exercise of its original 
civil jurisdiction for the time being are enforced;". 
UNIT-C 
AMENDMENTS TO THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954 
20. Amendment of section 2: In section 2 of the 
Special Marriage Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Special Marriage Act), for clause (e), the following 
clause shall be substituted, namely:-
'(e) "district court" means, in any area for which 
there is a city civil court, that court, and in any other 
area, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, 
and includes any other civil court which may be specified 
by the State Government by notification in the Official 
Gazette as having jurisdiction in respect of the matters 
dealt with in this Act;". 
21. Amendment of section 4: In section 4 of the 
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Special Marriage Act, for clause (b), the following clause 
shall be substituted, namely:-
"(b) neither party-
(i) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in 
consequence of unsoundness of mind; or 
(ii) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been 
suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such 
an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation 
of children; or 
(iii) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity 
or epilepsy;". 
22. Insertion of new section 2lA: In Chapter IV of the 
Special Marriage Act, after section 21, the following 
section shall be inserted, namely:-
"2lA. Special provision in certain cases: Where the 
marriage is solemnized under this Act of any person who 
professes the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion 
with a person who professes the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or 
Jaina religion, section 19 and section 21 shall not apply 
and so much of section 20 as reates a disability shall 
also not apply.". 
23. Amendment of section 22: To section 22 of the 
Special Marriage Act, the following Explanation shall be 
added at the end, namely:-
"Explanation-Where a question arises whether there has 
been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, 
the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the 
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person who has withdrawn from the society.". 
24. Amendment of section 23: In section 23 of the 
Special Marriage Act, in sub-section (1), in clause (a), 
after the word, brackets and figure "sub-section (1)", the 
words, brackets, figure and letter "and sub-section (lA)" 
shall be inserted. 
25. Amendment of section 24: In section 24 of the 
Special Marriage Act, in sub-section (1), for the words 
"and may be so declared", the words "and may, on petition 
presented by either party thereto against the other party, 
be so declared shall be substitued. 
26. Substitution of new section for section 26: For 
section 26 of the Special Marriage Act, the following 
section shall be substituted, namely:-
"26. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable 
marriages: (1) Notwithstanding that a marriage is null and 
void under section 24, any child of such marriage who 
would have been legitimate if the marriage had been validm 
shall be legitimate, whether wuch child is born before or 
after the commencement of the Marriage Law (Amendment) 
Act, 1976, and whether or not a decree of nullity is 
granted in respect of that marriage under this Act and 
whether or not the marriage is held to be void otherwise 
than on a petition under this Act. 
(2) Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of 
a voidable marriage under section 25, any child begotten 
or conceived before the decree is made, who would have 
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been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage 
if a the date of decree it has been dissolved ins ead of 
being annulled, shall be deemed to be their legitimate 
child notwithstanding the decree of nullity. 
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or 
sub-section (2) shall be cons rued as conferring upon any 
child of a marriage which is null and void or which is 
annulled by a decree of nullity under section 25, any 
righ s in or to the property of any person, othr than the 
parents, in any case where, but for the passing of this 
Act, such child would have been incapable of pssessing or 
acquiring any such rights by reason of his not being the 
legitimate child of his parents.". 
27. Amendment of section 27: In section 27 of the 
Marriage Act, in sub-section (1),-
(a) for clauses (a) and (b), the following clauses 
shall be substituted, namely;:-
"(a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had 
voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than 
his or her spouse; or 
(b) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of 
not less than two years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition; or"; 
(b) in clause (c),l the proviso shall be mitted; 
(c) for clauses (e) and (f), the following clauses 
shall be substituted, namely:-
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'(e) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been 
suffering continuously or intermittently frm mental 
disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the 
petitioner dannot reasonably be expected to live with 
respondent. 
Explanation.—In this clause,-
(a) the expression "mental disorder" means mental 
illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, 
psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability 
of mind and includes schizophrenia; 
(b) the expression "psychopathic disorder" means a 
persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not 
including sub-normality of intelligence) which resul s in 
abnormally aggressive or serioulsy irresponsible conduct 
on the part of the respondent, and whether or not it 
requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or 
(f) has been suffering from venereal disease in a 
communicable form; or; 
(d) in clause (g), the word "for a period of not less 
than three years immediately preceding the presentation of 
the petition" shall be omitted; 
(e) after clause (h), the following Explanation shall 
be inserted, namely:-
'Explanation-In this sub-section, the expression 
"desertion" means desertion of the petitioner by the other 
party t the marriage without reasonable cause and without 
the consent or against the wish of such party, and 
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includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other 
party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and 
cognate expressions shall be construed accordinly," 
(f) the words "and by the wife on the ground that her 
husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been 
guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality" occurring at the end 
shall be omitted; 
(g) after sub-section (1), the following sub-section 
whall be inserted, namely:-
"(lA) A wife may also present a petition for divorce to 
the district court on the ground,-
(i) that her husband has, since the solemnization of 
the marriage, ben guilty of rape sodomy or bestiality; 
(ii) that in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu 
Adoptions and • Maintenance Act, 1956, or in a proceeding 
under section 125 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 
(or under the corresponding section 488 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898, a decree or order, as the case, 
as the case may be, has been passed against the husband 
awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she 
was living apart and that since the passing of such decree 
or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been 
resumed for one year or upwards.". 
28. Insertion of new section 27A: After section 27 of 
the Special Marriage Act as so amended, the following 
section shall be inserted, namely:-
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"27. Alternate relief in divorce proceeding: In any 
proceeding under this Act, on a petition for dissolution 
of marriage by a decree of divorce, except in so far as 
the petition is founded on the ground mentioned in clause 
(h) of sub-section (1) of section 27, the court may, if it 
considers it just s to do having regard to the 
circumstances of the case, pass instead a decree for 
judicial separation.". 
29. Amendment of section 28: In section 28 of the 
Special Marriage Act, in sub-section (2) for the words, 
brackets and figure "On the motion of both the parties 
made not earlier than one year after the date of the 
presentation of the petition referred t in sub-section(l) 
and not later than two years", the words, brackets and 
figure "On the motion of both the parties made not earlier 
than six months after the date of the presentation of the 
petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than 
eighteen months" shall be substituted. 
30. Amendment of section 29: In section 29 of the 
Special Marriage Act,-
(i) in sub-section (1) 
(a) for the words "unless at the date of the 
presentation of the petition three years have passed", the 
words "unless at the date of the presentation of the 
petition one year has passed" shall be substituted; 
(b) in the proviso,-
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(1) for the words "before three years have passed", 
the words "before one year has passed" shall be 
substituted; 
(2) for the words "expiry of three years", the words 
"expiry of one year" shall be substituted; 
(3) for the words "expiration of the said three years 
"expiration of the said one year" shall be substituted; 
(ii) in sub-section (2),-
(a) for the words "expiration of three years", the 
words "expiration of one year" shall be substituted; 
(b) for the words "said three years", the words "said 
one year" shall be substituted. 
31. Amendment of section 30: In section 30 of the 
Special Marriage Act, the words "and one year has elapsed 
thereafter but not sooner," shall be omitted. 
32. Amendment of section 31: For sub-section(1) of 
section 31 of the Special Marriage Act, the following 
sub-section shall be substituted, namely:-
"(1) Every petition under Chapter V or Chapter VI shall 
be presented to the district court within the local limits 
of whose original civil jurisdiction-
(i) the marriage was solemnized; or 
(ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of 
the petition resides; or 
(iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together; 
or 
(iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the 
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presentation of the petition, in a case where the 
respndent is, at that time, residing outside the 
territories to which this Act extends, or has not been 
hheard of as being alive for a period of seven years by 
those who would naturally have heard of him if he were 
alive. 
33. Substitution of new section for section 33: For 
section 33 of the Special Marriage Act, the following 
section shall be substituted, namely:-
"33. Proceedings to be in camera and may not be printed 
or published: 
(1) Every proceeding under this Act shall be conducted in 
camera and it shall not be lawful for any person to print 
or publish any matter in relation to any such proceeding 
except a judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme 
Court prited or published with the previous permission of 
the Court. 
(2) If any person prints or publishes any matter in 
contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section 
(1), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to 
one thousand rupees." 
34. Amendment of section 34: In section 34 of the 
Special Marriage Act,-
(a) in sub-section (1), in clause (b), for the words 
"where the ground of the petition is adultery, the 
petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or 
connived at or condoned the adultery," the words, brackets 
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letter and figures "where the petition is founded on the 
ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of 
section 27, the petitioner has not in any manner bee 
accessory to or connived at or condoned the act of sexual 
intercourse referred to therein" shall be substituted; 
(b) to sub-section (2), the following proviso shall be 
added at the end, namely:-
"Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section 
shall apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on 
any of the grounds specified in clase (c), clause (e), 
clause, (f), clause (g) and clause (h) of sub-section (1) 
of section 27"., 
(c) after sub-section (2) as so amended, the follwing 
sub-sections shall be inserted, namely:-
"(3) for the purpose of aiding the court in bringing 
about such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties 
so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to 
do, adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period not 
exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person 
named by the parties in this behalf or to any person 
nominated by the court if the parties fail to name any 
person, with directions to report to the court as to 
whether reconciliation can and has been, effected and the 
court shall in disposing of the proceeding have due regard 
to the report. 
(4) In every case where a marriage ins dissolved by a 
decree of divorce, the court passing the decree shall give 
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a copy thereof free of cost to each of the parties.". 
35. Substitution of new section for section 35: For 
section 35 of the Special Marriage Act, the followinng 
section shall be substituted, namely:-
"35. Relief for respondent in divorce and other 
proceedings: In any proceeding for divorce or judicial 
separation or restitution of conjugal rights, the 
respondent may not only oppose the relief sought on the 
ground of pertitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion, 
but also make a counter-claim for ay relief under this Act 
on that ground, and if the petitioner's adultery, cruelty 
or desertion is proved, the court may give to the 
repondent any relief under this Act to which he or she 
would have been entitled if he or she had presented a 
petition seekig such relief on that ground." 
36. Amendment"of section 37 of the Special Marriage 
Act ,-
(a) in sub-section (1), for the words "and the conduct 
of the parties" the words "the conduct of the parties and 
other circumstances of the case" shall be substituted; 
(b) in sub-section (3), for the words "it shall 
rescind the order", the words "it may, at the instance of 
the husband vary, modify or rescind any such order and in 
such ;manner as the court may deem just" shall be 
substitited. 
37. Substitution of new section for section 39: For 
section 39 of the Special Marriage Act, the following 
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sections shall be substituted, namely:-
"39 Appeals from decrees and ordets: (1) All decrees 
made by the court in any proceedings under Chapter V or 
Chapter VI shall/ subject to the provisions of sub-section 
(3), be appealable as decrees of the court made in the 
exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, and such 
appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily 
lie from the decisions of the court given in the exercise 
of its original civil jurisdiction. 
(2) Orders made by the court in any proceeding under 
this Act under section 37 or section 38 shall, subject to 
the provisions of sub-section (3), be appealable if they 
are not interim orders, and every such appeal shall lie to 
the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the 
decisions of the court given in the exercxise of its 
original civil jurisdiction. 
(3) There shall be no appeal under this section on the 
subject of costs only. 
(4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred 
within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree 
or order. 
39A. Enforcement of decrees and orders: All decrees and 
orders made by the court in any proceeding under Chapter V 
or Chapter VI shall be enforce in the like manner as the 
decrees and orders of the court made in the exercise of 
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its original civil jurisdiction for the time being are 
enforce.". 
38. Insertion of new sections 40A, 40B, and 40C: After 
section 40 of the Special Marriage Act, the follwing 
sections shall be inserted, namely:-
"40A. Power to transfer petition in certain cases:(1) 
where-
(a) a petition under this Act has been presented to 
the district court having jurisdiction by a party to the 
marriage praying for a decree for judicial separation 
under section 23 or for a decree of divorce under section 
27, and 
(b) another petition under this Act has been presented 
thereafter by the other party to the marriage praying for 
decree for judicial separation under section 23, or for 
decree of divorce under section 27 on any ground whether 
in the same district court or in a different district 
court, in the same State or n a different State, 
the petition shall be dealt with as specified in 
sub-section(2) 
(2) In case where sub-section (1) applies,-
(a) if the petitions are presented to the same 
district court, both the petitions shall be tried and 
heard together by that district court; 
(b) if the petitions are presented to different 
district courts the petition presented later shall be 
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transferred to the district court in which the earlier 
petition was presented and both the petitions shall be 
heard and disposed of together by the district court in 
which the earlier petition was presented. 
(3) In a case where clause (b) of sub-section (2) 
applies, the court or the Government, as the case may be, 
competent under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to 
transfer any suit or proceeding from the district court in 
which the later petition has been presented to the 
district court in which the earlier petition is pending, 
shall exercise its powers to transfer such later petition 
as if it had been empowered so to do under the said Code. 
40B. Special provision relatting to trial and disposul 
of petitions under the Act: (1) The trial of a petition 
under this Act shall, so far as is practicable 
consistently ;with the interests of justice in respect of 
the trial, be continued from day to day until its 
conclusion, unless the court finds the adjournment of the 
trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons 
to be recorded. 
(2) Every petion under this Act shall be tried as 
expeditiously as possibole and endeavour shall be made to 
conclude the trial within six months from the date of 
service of notice of the petition on the respondent. 
(3) Every appeal under this Act shall be heard as 
expeditiously as possible, and endeavour shall be made to 
conclude the hearing within three months from the date of 
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service of notice of appeal on the respondent. 
40C. Documentary evidence: Notwithstanding anything 
contained in any enactment to the contrary, no document 
shall be admissible in evidence in any proceeding at the 
trial of a petition under this Act on the ground that it 
is not duty stamped or registered. 
39. Special provision as to pending cases: (1) All 
Petitions and prceedings in causes and matters matrimonial 
which are pending in any court at the commencement of the 
Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, shall be dealt with 
and decided by such court-
(i) if it is a petition or proceeding under the Hindu 
Marriage Act, then so far as may be, as if it had been 
originally instituted therein under the Hindu Marriage 
Act, as amended by this Act; 
(ii) if it is a petition or proceeding under the 
Special Marriage Act, then so far as may be, as if it had 
been origially ins ituted therein under the Special 
Mariage Act, as amended by this Act. 
(2) In every petition or proceeding to which 
sub-section (l)applies, the court in which the petition or 
proceeding is pending shall give an opprtunity to the 
parties to amend the pleadings, in so far as such 
amendment is necessary to give effect to the provisions of 
sub-section (1), within such time as it may allow in this 
behalf and any such amendment may include an amendment for 
conversion of a petitio or proceeding for judicial 
separation into a petition or proceeding, as the case my 
be, for divorce. 
UNIT-D 
THE DIOLUTION OF MUSLIM MARRIAGES ACT, 1939 
ACT NO. VIII OF 1939 
Passed the Indian Legislature 
Received the assent of the Governor-General on 
the 17 March. 1939 
(Published in the Gazette of India dated the 25th 
March, 1939) 
An Act to consolidate and clarify the provisions 
of Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution of 
marriage by women married under Muslim law and to remove 
doubts as to the effect of the renunciation of Islam by a 
married Muslim woman on her married tie. 
The Hanafi law is very favourable to women in many 
matters but in a few cases it involves great hardship to 
women. To overcome this difficulty, the Hinafi jurist have 
evolved the rule that in case of necessity a Hanafi case 
may be decided according to the law of another set Sunnis. 
This important rule was not followed by the Anglo Indian 
Courts with the result that sometimes the Hanafi wives 
were put to great hardship. Thus a marriage cannot be 
dissolved when the husband is guilty of cruelty, desertion 
etc. The Ulema of pre-partition India felt the need for 
the reform of the enforcible law. At their instance the 
late Moulvi Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi, Advocate, M.L.A. and a 
member of the Working Committee of the Jamit 
al-Ulama-i-Hind introduced a Bill in 1938 in the 
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Legislative Assembly. It was passed with a few changes in 
1939. It proved of immense help to the Muslim women and 
has been adopted by the Government of Pakistan. Certain 
charges have to be made in it to make it more useful. 
Whereas it is epedient to consolidate and clarify 
the provisions of Muslim law relating to suits for 
dissolution of marriage b the women married under Muslim 
Law and to remove doubts as to the effect of the 
renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman on her 
marriage tie. It is hereby enacted as follows:-
The Hanafi law is generally very favourable to 
women but in a few cases it involves great handing to 
women. Thus there is no provision in it to dissolve a 
marriage when the husband treats his wife with crelty, 
deserts her or does not maintain her. The Qadi can only 
admonish or imprison him but cannot dissolve the marriage. 
This and other similar matters resulted in great hardship 
to women. To overcome such difficulties the Hanafi jurists 
evolved the rule that in case of necessity a Hanafi Qadi 
could send a case to a Malik, Shafi'i or Hanbali Qazi to 
be decided according to his own law which allows the 
dissolution of marriage or grant other relief in such 
cases. The British India Courts could not adopt this 
measure as there were no separate Courts for different 
Muslim sects nor did they themselves have recourse to this 
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procedure. The result was that many Muslim women 
eperienced great hardship. The Muslim Ulama realized this 
difficulty and at the instance of the Jamiat-al-i-Hind, 
the late Mohammad Ahmad Kazimi, a member of the Working 
Committee of the Jamiat and a member of the Legislative 
Assembly introduced a Bill in 1938 which after some 
modification was passed in 1993. It has proved of immense 
help to Muslim women and is in force in India and 
Pakistan. The Pakistan Government has made a few changes 
in it to make it more useful. 
1. Short title and etent. This Act may be called the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
2. It etends to all the provinces and the capital of 
the federation. A woman married under Muslim Law shall be 
entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of the 
marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, 
namely-of (1) that the whereabouts of the husband have not 
been known for a period of four years. 
Under the Hanafi law a missing person could be 
presumed to be dead after a minimum period of sity years 
from the time of his disappearance. The Indian Evidence 
Act, of 1872 prescribed the period of seven years when a 
person could be presumed to be dead. The Hanafi wives 
could take advantage of this provision of law. But this 
period of seven years was also found to be too long in 
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view of the changed conditions of the times. Hence 
advantage was taken of the Hanafi rule to adopt the law of 
another Sunni sect in case of hardship. 
This is the Maliki law and has been adopted in the 
Act to provide adequate relief to wives whose husbands are 
missing. This provision was suitable for ancient times 
when means of communication were difficult and a long time 
was necessary to trace a missing person. With the great 
facilities in communication now available, the period of 
four years is too long and may with advantage be reduced 
to two years. 
(ii) That the husband has neglected or has failed to 
provide for her maintenance for a period of two years; 
(ii-a) That the husband has taken an additional wife in 
the contravention of the provisions of the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinace, 1961; 
(iii) That the husband has been sentenced to 
imprisonment for a period of seven years or upwards. 
The period of seven years is too long. How can a 
young wife be deprived of the society of her husband for 
such a long wife be deprived of the society of her husband 
for such a long time. For discussion of this aspect, see 
Ila and Zihar. It seems desirable to reduce the period of 
seven years to two years as in the case of Clause ii. 
(iv) That the husband has failed to perform, without 
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reasonable cause, his marital obligation for a period of 
three years; 
There seems to be no justification to fix the 
period at three years and the period of two years may be 
substituted for it. For discussion, see Chapter 23 "Other 
Grounds". 
(v) That the husband was impotent at the time of 
marriage and continues to be so; 
(vi) That the husband has been insane for a period of 
two years or is suffering from leprosy or a virulent 
venereal disease. 
Provided that after such rnunciation, or 
conversion the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree 
for the dissolution of her marriage on any of the ground 
mentioned in section2: 
Provided further that provisions of this section 
shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some 
other faith who re-embraces her former faith. 
Opinions differed about the effect of apostasy of 
the wife. The majority of Muslim jurists expressed that 
the marriage shall be dissolved on the wife's apostasy but 
some jurists held otherwise. This sub-clause has adopted 
the latter view. 
Rights to Dower not to be affected,-Nothing 
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contained in this Act shall affect any right which a 
married v/oman may have under Muslim law to her dower or 
any part thereof on the dissolution of marriage. 
Repeal of section 5 of Act XXVI of 1937.-Section 5 
of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 
is hereby repealed. 
UNIT-E 
THE MUSLIM FAMILY LAWS ORDINANCE, 1961 
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, had 
provided great relief to Muslim wives but there was a 
great demand that some more safeguards were necessary and 
that it was also necessary that the cases under the Act be 
decided speedily. The Pakistan Government set up a Law 
Commission to go into the matter. The Commission consisted 
of seven members one of whom represented the Ulama. It 
submitted its report on 1st June, 1956. Maulana Ehtishamul 
Haq submitted a separate dissenting report. The majority 
recommended that there should be compulsory registration 
of marriages and divorce and a standard Nikahnama be 
prescribed. It also stated that child-marriages should be 
prevented by law and that pronouncement of three divorces 
at a single sitting should be considered to amount to one 
divorce only. It also recommended that the judges trying 
matrimonial cases should try to bring about a 
reconciliation between the parties. The Commission also 
said that permission to take a second wife should not be 
given unless the applicant was in a position to support 
both wives and his children in the standard of living to 
which the family was accustomed and that the husband shall 
have to pay the Meher agreed upon however high it might 
be. In the absence of specification the whole dower shall 
be payable on demand. The Commission also recommended that 
the wife could claim maintenance for the past three years. 
The Commission also suggested the establishment of 
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Matrimonial Courts which shall decide a case within three 
months. Maulana Sahib and other Ulama did not agree with 
most of the views of the Commission. Their objection may 
be summarised as under: 
"There is no priest-hood in Islam so that no 
Nikah-khwans can be appointed by the Government. 
Registration of marriages is useful but even then it 
should not be made compulsory. It may result in 
inconvenience while the presence of withnesses and 
solemnization of marriage in public adequately serve the 
purpose. 
Fixation of age at 18 years for the bridegroom and 
15 years for the bride is uncalled for. Shariat has not 
fixed such ages and none need be fixed now. To discourage 
child-marriages we must educate people. 
The pronouncement of three divorces at one time: 
The majority of Muslim jurists consider that the 
pronouncement of three divorces at one time amounts to 
three divorces. Tos remove the disadvantages following 
such practices, Muslims should be taught the proper method 
of divorce. Polygamy has been allowed by Islam and 
practised by the Holy Prophet (Peace be on him) and his 
Companions. It is not necessary to obtain the permission 
of any authority for the second, third or fourth marriage 
of a man. It is also unnecessary. 
The enactment about the payment of dower fixed how 
high it may be is unreasonable. The parties may have 
recourse to arbtration." 
The report was not given effect to until 1961 when 
certain recommendations were given effect to. This is the 
background of the Ordinance of 1961. 
UNIT-F 
DIVORCE REFORM ACT, 1969 
The Act came into force on 1st January, 1971. It 
has introduced radical changes in the English law of 
divorce. It has introduced divorce by mutual consent and 
even unilateral divorce with certain safeguards for the 
respondent. It is necessary for divorce by mutual consent 
that the parties should have lived apart for a minimum 
period of two years and the consent of a party should not 
have been obtained by misleading him or her. As regards 
unilateral divorce, it is necessary that (1) the parties 
should have lived apart for a period of five years 2(e) 
the dissolution of the marriage would not result in grave 
hardship, financial or otherwise, to the respondent. The 
Court will also take into consideration the interest of 
the children and other persons concerned. The respondent 
can also plead that it would in all circumstances be wrong 
to dissolve the marriage 4(2) (b). The court will also 
take into consideration the financial position of the 
respondent, 6(1) (b). It will also consider certain other 
matters specified in section 6(2). 
Divorce Reform Act, 1969 
An Act to amend the grounds for divorce and 
judicial separation; to facilitate reconciliation in 
matrimonial causes; and for purposes connected with the 
matters of oresaid. 
(22nd October 1969). 
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen's Most Excellent 
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Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords 
Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present 
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as 
follows:-
1.-After the commencement of this Act the sole 
ground on which a petition for divrce may be presented to 
the court by either party to a marriage shall be that the 
marriage has broken down irretrievably. 
Before the passing of the new Act, there were 
several grounds on which a divorce could be obtained. This 
Act prescribes only one ground on which a divorce can now 
be granted. But the section is so exhaustive that it 
includes every conceivable ground for separation; the only 
condition being that it should have led to the 
irretrievable breaking up of the marriage. The next 
section describes the condition on the basis of which a 
marriage may be considered to have broken down. 
SCHEDULE 1 
CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS OF THE 
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT 1965 
1. In section 3(1) after the word "petitioner" 
there shall be inserted the words "or respondent". 
2. In section 4(1) and (2) for the words "on the 
ground of adultery" there shall be substituted the words 
"in which adultery is alleged" and in section 4(1) for the 
words "on that ground" there shall be substituted the 
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words "and alleging adultery". 
3. In section 5(6) for the words from "opposes" 
to "desertion" there shall be substituted the words 
"alleges against the petitioner and proves any such fact 
as is mentioned in section 2(1) of the Divorce Reform Act 
1969". 
4. In section 15(b) for the words "on the ground 
of her husband's insanity" there shall be substituted the 
words and alleging any such fact as is mentioned in 
section 2(1)(e) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 where the 
court is satisfied on proof of such facts as may be 
prescribed by rules of court that her husband is insane" 
5. In section 16(3) for the words from the 
beginning to "insanity" there shall be substituted the 
words "where on a petition for divorce presented by a wife 
the court granted her a decree and held that the only fact 
mentioned in section 2(1) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 
on which she was entitled to rely was that mentioned in 
paragraph (e), then if the court is satisfied on proof of 
such facts as may be prescibed by rules of court that the 
husband is insane". 
6. In section 17(2) for the words from the 
beginning to "She" there shall be substituted the words 
"where on a petition for divorce presented by the husband 
he satisfies the court of any such fact as is mentioned in 
section 2(1)(a), (b) or (c) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 
and the court grants him a decree of divrce, then if it 
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appears to the court that the wife" and for the words 
"innocent party" there shall be substituted the word 
"husband". 
7. In section 20(1) (b) for the words "on the 
ground of her husband's insanity" there shall be 
substituted the words "and the court held that the only 
fact mentioned in section 2(1) of the Divorce Reform Act 
1969 on which she was entitled to rely was that mentioned 
in paragraph (e) and the court is satisfied on proof of 
such facts as may be prescribed by rules of court that the 
husband is insane". 
8. In section 26(6), as amended by the Family 
Provision Act 1966, in the definition of "court", after 
the word "court", where first occurring there shall be 
inserted the words "means the High Court and ". 
9. In Section 30(2)-
(a) in paragraph (a) for the words "on the ground 
of her husband's insanity" there shall be 
substituted the words "and the court is 
satisfied on proof of such facts as may be 
prescribed by rules of court that her husband 
is insane". 
(b) in paragraph (b) the word "divorce" and the 
words "or judicial separation" shall be 
omitted; and 
(c) after paragraph (a) there shall be inserted 
the following paragraph:-
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"(aa) a petition for divorce or judicial 
separation is presented by a husband and the 
court is satisfied on proof of such facts as may 
be prescribed by rules of court that his wife is 
insane; or". 
10. In section 34(3) for the words "on the ground 
of the husband's insanity" there shall be substituted the 
words "in favour of a wife where the court held that the 
only fact mentioned in section 2(1) of the Divorce Reform 
Act 1969 on which she was entitled to rely was that 
mentioned in paragraph (e) and the court is satisfied on 
proof of such facts as may be prescribed by rules of court 
that the husband is insane". 
11. In section 46(2) after the definition of 
"adopted" there shall be inserted the following 
definition:-
"'the court' (except in sections 26,27, 28 and 
28a) means the High Court or, where a country 
court has jurisdiction by virtue of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1967, a country court;and". 
12. In Schedule 1, in paragraph 2 after the word 
"Act" there shall be inserted the words "or of section 
2(1)(c) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969". 
CHAPTER-VI 
POINT OF SIMILARITIES 7VND DISSIMILARITIES 
(IN THEBOrm RELIGIOUS LAWS) IN THE ABOVE FIELDS 
(1) In Hindu Religion, Marriage being a sacramental 
union was an inviolable and immutable union-thus even 
death did not dissolve the marriage. Where as under the 
Hindu shastric Lav/, marriage is deemed to be a sacramental 
bond continuing up to heaven. The Dharmashastra did not 
recognised divorce. 
But Islam takes a realistic and sympathetic view 
of human affairs and therefore it attaches great 
importance to the happiness of both the spouses. In Islam 
marriage in-the ordinary course is to last till one of the 
spouses dies. But if a husband and wife can not live 
happily together so that the very objects of marriage are 
defeated and it becomes more farce, then its conntinuance 
is no longer considered desirable. Under such 
circumstances, divorce and dissolution of marriage are 
allowed under Islamic law. 
(2) In Hindu law, totally,modes of divorce and grounds 
o- divorce and causes are from Preliminary Acts, causes. 
Amendment, ordinance and judicial reles, not from 
dharmashastra, that for divorce. 
But In Islam, modes of divorce, grounds of divorce 
and causes are from Religious view, that for divorce but 
some causes are modifications in Muslim Lav;. 
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(3) In Hindu Law, no iddat (menstrual period) is 
nentioned But in Islam iddat must have to be observed and 
necessary. This Iddat s the period for which a woman must 
wait before marrying again whether, in the event of 
divorce or death. 
(4) In Hindu Law, no dower system, but in Islam the 
dower system is necessary. ("Dower, under the Muhammadan 
Law, is a sum of money or other property promised by the 
husband to be paid or delivered to the wife in 
consideration of marriage, and even where o dower is 
expressly fixed or mentioned at the marriage ceremony, the 
law confers the right of dower upon the wife as a 
necessary effect of marriage. To use the language of the 
Hedaya,'the payment of dower is enjoined by the law merely 
as a taken of respect for its object (the woman), 
wherefore the mentio of it is not absolutely essential to 
the validity of a marriage; and, for the same reason, a 
marriage is also valid although a man were to engage in 
the contract on the special condition that there should be 
no dower. 
(5) In Hindu Law, there is no oral system of divorce 
or pronouncement of divorce, , but in Islam it is oral 
divorce recogniserl as valid as stated in the Holy Qur'an 
and Hadith. 
(6) In Hindu Law, only ther is one way or system for 
divorce, that only petition. But in Islam three are many 
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ways for divorce. 
(7) In Hindu Law and Act time to time changed by 
judicial committee with social change and demand of people 
or Hindu comunity. And the Muslim main law I is 
unchangable can change but the opinions of Muslim Jurists 
can be changed. 
Holy 
(8) After divorce a Muslim woman (Qur'an and Hadid) 
is entitled to maintenance from her husband during the 
(2) period of iddat. But also for the time, if any, that 
elapsed after the expiry of the period of iddat? and her 
(3) 
receiving notice of talaq. Adoptions Act 1955 (1) 
Subject to the provsions of this section a Hindu wife, 
whether married before or after the pronulagation of this Act 
shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband with the 
selond marriage or her life time of she doesnot marry. 
(9) A Muslim widow is not entitled to mainternance out 
of the estate of her late husband in addition to what she 
(44) IS entitled to by inheritance or under his will. 
A Hindu wife, whether married before or after the 
commencement of this Act, (Adoptions Act) shall be 
entitled to be maintained often the death of her husband 
by her father-in-law. 
(1<)) Ahsann talaq, in the case of Ahsa talaq, tl:^ ee 
pronouncements have to be made in three different tuhrs or 
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(10) Ahsan talaq, in the case of Ahsan talaq, three 
month pronouncements have to be made in three different 
tuhrs or in the case of a non mensturing, woman at 
interval of month. 
Hedaya brands it as the most laudable divorce, 
where husband repudiates his wife by a single 
pronouncement in a period of during which he has not had 
intercourse with her, and then leaves her to observance of 
IDPAT. The divorce remain revocable during the IDDAT, and 
the parties relain the right of inheritance. According to 
the Hedaya this method divorce is the most approved 
because the companions of the Prophet approved of it, and 
secondly, because it remains within the power of husband 
to revokes the divorce during IDDAT, which is three 
mentrfal periods or till delivery. 
Such form of divorce is in Islam but the Hindu law 
has no conception of such form of divorce, so this point 
may, noted be as a dissimilerity between Islam and Hindu 
Law. 
(11) Hasan,-In talaq, Hasan, th husband successivily 
pronounces divorce three times during concecutive periods 
of purity ( tuhrs ). It is therefore "a divorce upon a 
divorce" when the first and second pronouncements are 
revoked and followed by a third, laonly the talaq becomes 
irrevocable. It is also essential that no intercourse 
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should have taken place during that particular period of 
purety in which the pronouncement has been made. 
Where the wife is not subject to menstrual courses 
an internal of 30 days is required between each successive 
repudiation. Talaq Hasan to put an end to a barbarous 
pre-Islamic practice to divorce a wife and take back 
several times in order to ill treat her. Through this 
method of talaq the husband has been given to chancees of 
divorcing and then taking the wife back but the third time 
he does so, th talaq becomes irrevocable. Tn this way, the 
process of divorcing and repediating cannot be continued 
indefinitely. 
This divorcing is in Islam but the Hindu Law has 
no conception of such wonderfull divorce. 
(12) Triple divorce:- Hedaya defines it as a divorce 
where the husband repudiables his wife by three divorces 
in one sentences or where he repeats the sentence, 
saparately, three within tuhr such a divorce is lawful, 
although sinful, in Hanafi law; but in Shia law it is not 
permissible. Such divorce is lawful in Islam but in sinful 
and it is not peromissible Shia law inspite of this; such 
form of as be mentioned divorce is not in Hindu law. 
(13) Ila (vow of continence):- Ila is when a person 
swears that he will not have sexual intercourse with his 
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The Hanafi jurists argue that since the husband 
acted unjustly towards his wife, it is equitable that on 
the expiration of four months he should be deprived of the 
benefit of marriage. 
This system of divorce is not in Hindu law but the Islam 
has recognized such form of divorce. 
(14) Zihar (injurious comparison):- Zihar signifies a 
husband's comparison of his wife with his mother or any 
female relation with in the prohibatd degrees. In Zihar 
the usual (phrase is "Thou art to me as the back of my 
mother." 
This mode of talaq is very rare is India, Pakistan, 
Shri Lanka, and .Bangladesh. 
As above mentioned this is a very rare form of 
divorce is found in above mentioned countries So it is the 
one form of divorce in Islam Law but in Hindu law there is 
no conception of such divorce in any siluation. This is 
disscreter to mode of divorce in Hindu law. 
(15) Talaq-i-tafweez (delegated divorce):- A mustion 
husband has got the power pronouncing a talaq in respect 
his wife. He is also entitled to delegate the power of his 
wife or any other person to effect a talaq, with his wife. 
As to difference in case of an agent to pronounce a talaq 
and the power pronounce it. The delegation of power is 
technically called "Tafweez" Tafweez means the making 
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another person owner of act which apertains to the person 
making the Tafweez. It is deligation by the husband of 
power of talaq to the wife desering her to give the 
effictive sentence. 
Such mode of divorce is not in Hindu law, but 
Islam is reognize this form of divorce by Qur'an and 
Hadith. 
Point of Similareties in the following above fieds, in the 
both Religious;-
In Hindu law, liberty to parties to marry again 
When six months often the date of an order of a High Court 
confirming the decree for a dissolution of mariage made by 
District Judge have expired. 
In Islam, A Muslim wife is entitled to marry again 
other party after iddat from dissolution by mutual 
contract. 
(2) A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled 
to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage. 
A woman married under Hindu Law shall be entitled 
to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage. 
(3) Hindu law accepted any mutual contract for 
dissolution of marriage. 
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Muslim law too accepted any mutual contract for 
dissolution of marriage. 
By Mutual Consent;- Khula - (rede„iption ) - If the mutual 
relationship between the husband and wife is not suitable 
the wife, if she so desires, may seek a Khula divorce, 
e.g. by relinguishing her claim to the doweer. It, 
however, entitely depends upon the husband to accept the 
consideration of dower and to grant the divorce. A husband 
may similarly propa a Khula divorce; the wife may accept 
or refuse it. If she accepts, it means that she has 
relinguished the right to get dower from her husband. 
Khula may be for any consideration - dower, mooney, 
property etc. 
Such system of divorce is, Hindu ana Muslim but in 
In Hindu, with defferent condition. 
Mubaraat. (mutual freeing):- Where there is a aversion to 
the marriage on the part of both the parties who are 
desirous of dissolving it, it is called mubaraat. A 
dissolution of marriage at the desire of the wife alone 
for consideration is called Khula. Thd Sunni law places 
mubarrat under the head of Khula. Khula may be effected by 
use of the word mubaraat, so that it comes under the 
definition of Khula. There is however some difference 
in effects in the use of dower. 
Such system of divorce exists in both Hindu and 
Muslim Law. 
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BY JUDICIAL PROCESS 
Lictn (mutual imprecation);- When the husband makes a 
charge accusing his wife of adultery (which term includes 
all cases of unlawful sexual connection whether incest, 
fornication, whoredom or adultery) the procedure for the 
settlement of the accusation by sweuring and imprecating 
(7 
upon them the curse of Allah is technically called li'an. 
They are testiconfirmed by oaths. In this perfouse Holy 
Qur'an said. "And those who accuse honourable women but 
bring not four witesses, scourge them (with) eighty 
stripes and vever (afterward) accept their testimony. They 
(9 )^ indeed are evil-doers". 
"As for those who accuse their wives but have no 
witnesses except themselves; let the testimony of one of 
them be four testimonies (swearing) by Allah that he is of 
those who speak the truth; and yet a fifth, ivoking the 
curse of Allah on and it shall avert the punishment from 
her if she bear witness before Allah four times that thing 
he saith is indeed false; and a fifth (time) that the 
wrath of Allah be upon her if be speaketh truth". 
The wife is entitled to suit for a divorce on the 
ground that her husband has falsely charged her with 
adaltery. At the hearing of the suit, the husband had two 
alternatives: (i) he may retract (withdraw) the charge 
before the end of the trial, in which case the wife could 
not get a divorce, or (ii) to persist in his attitude. 
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whereby he will be required to accuse his wife on oath. 
This is followed by oaths of innocency made by wife. After 
these "mutual imprecations", the Court dissolves the 
(11) ' marriage. 
Such mode of divorce is in Hindu Law by Judicial 
Act and Goverment Oridinance but in Islam is recognized 
this form of divorce by Holy Qur'an and Hadith. 
Faskh (Judicial annulment);- Faskh means annulment. It 
refers to power of Qadi (in India, Law Court in Pakistan, 
under the Muslim family Laws Ordinance) 1961, the Chairman 
of the Union Council to annul a marriage on the 
application of the wife. The Law of Faskh is founded Holy 
Qur'an and Hadith "If a woman be prejudiced by a marriage, 
let it be broken off", (Bukhari). In India, such judicial 
annulments are governed by section 2 of the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
This form of divorce is in both the Hindu Law and 
Muslim religion. 
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RECAPIUTULATION 
In the first chapter of this academic venture 
dealing with Hindu divorce according to the leading Hindu 
source Books-Vedaas Shastra-Manu Shastra-Yajnvalkya etc 
and various at Acts, (Hindu Court Bill) and various schols 
we have observed that the Hindu divorce or dissolution of 
marriage has not remained a can divorce or a 
Dharmashastric or shastric divorce but has be come to be a 
judicial contract and has also become a civil contract, 
though it has semblance of the both. It has a semblance of 
a contract or a civil contract as consent is of some most 
importance necessary. In this chapter, I have also 
mentioned the various forms of the Hindu Marriage and 
divorce. In this chapter, I have also discussed the nature 
of Hindu marriage and divorce and i s form and capacity of 
the parties entering into divorce literally means the 
theory of the "sapurate" in law this term means "divorce". 
In Dr. H.S. Gour's Hindu la\\? of marriage and divorce has 
been difined to be "Separation' or 'dissolution' of a 
marriage means divorce, but not every such separation or 
dissolution can properly be so designated. So while the 
term "divorce" has sometimes been broadly dified or 
applied to include both decrees of nullity and decrees of 
dissolution of marriage." In Modern Hindu Law by 
prof.Paras Diwan, it is defied as: 
"Once it came to be established that marriage is a 
civil contract, it is a ogical next step to recognize that 
it is also a dissoluble union. In the second part of this 
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chapter I have discussed the divorce according to the 
Qur'an/Hadith/Leading School of Juris Prudence. The latest 
acts -pre-post Independent India. 
In Islam divorce, when not absolutly necessary, is 
strongly disapproved of and discouraged. The Prophet 
(peace be on him) has said, "of all the permitted things 
divorce is the most abominable with Allah." 
(Sunan,Abu Dau'ud). Even when a man is not satisfied with 
his wife, the Qur'an enjoins forbearance. It says, "And 
retain them (the wives) kindly. Then if you hate them, it 
may be that you dislike a thing while Allah has put 
abundant good in it." (Qur'an, IV.19). 
Muslim Jurists have held different views regarding 
divorce in Islam. According to some, divorce is prohibited 
but is permissible in case of necessity. It is stated in 
al-Radd al-Muktar, dealing with Hanafi Law, that no doubt 
it (divorce) is forbidden, but it becomes mubah 
(permitted) for certain outside reasons. Also in this 
chapter I have discussed to give instances of our own 
times. We may quote some important changes introduced in 
the Muslim law of divorce by the issolution of Muslim 
marriages act of 1939. The Bill was introduced in the 
central Legislative Assembly by the late Muhammad Ahmad 
Kazmi, a member of the Working Committee of the Jam-iyyat 
al-Ulama-i Hid, because it was considered necessary to 
bring about certain important modification in the then 
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prevalent provision of Muslim Law. 
In the second chapter I have discussed the grounds 
of divorce under Hindu law. Before 1937 divorce was 
impossible without proof of adultery; this was prejudicial 
to public morality, as a person who wished to bring an end 
to his marriage had either to commit adultery or perjury; 
the law was an incitement to immorality. The develpment of 
the English law of divorce has been dealt with in brief 
outline in chapter 1st, as the Hindu marriage act, 1955, 
The Hindu marriage and divorce ordinance, 1960(Kenya) and 
the Hindu marriage and divorce ordinance, 1961(Uganda) 
have borrowed the provisions for divorce largely from the 
English Matrimonial Courses Acts, 1937-1950 (as amended 
and consolidated by the (English) matrimonial couses act, 
1965). The above legislation brought revolutionary changes 
in the Hindu matrimonial law by introducing divorce and 
making marriage a civil contract, which can be terminated 
on prescribed grounds. As we see in chapter (1st), a Hindu 
castric marriage was purely of a sacramental nature and 
did not admit divorce, so there is Indian case law to 
which courts can look for Precedents in applying the 
modern Hindu law of divorce, which is still in process of 
devolompment. The question is how far the Hindu courts can 
resort to English Precedents? The following observations 
of Gajesedragadkar, J. (as he then was) can be of some 
help in this respect. "When we are dealing with the 
problems of constrving a constitutional provision which is 
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not too clear or lucid you feel inclined to inquire how 
other Judicial minds have responded to the challenge 
presented by similiar provisions in other sister 
constitutions. 
Since the Hindu marriage act 1955 is based largely 
on the English matrimonial causes act, 1950 there is a 
great tendency to rely upon English decisions. However, 
there are differences between the two acts and great care 
has to be taken while acting upon the English law and 
practice of divorce; for instance, English decisions 
ordering medical examination of an alleged lunatic can 
nave no sppxlcdtlxm xft ~5' "cjae^  aiislTig under the Hindu 
marriage act, 1955, because, under the matrimonial causes 
rules in England, specific provision has been made for 
examination by medical inspectors. There is no such 
provision in India. There are other important 
considerations. There are differences in the social 
conditions between Hindu and English society and in the 
language of the English and Hindu acts. Hindu law is quite 
different from English law in the following respects. 
Suffering from a virulent form of leprosy for a period of 
a least one year, and suffering from a veneral disease in 
a communicable form for a period of not less than three 
years are grounds for judicial separation, but there is no 
such provision in English law, though the communication of 
veneral disease may amount to cruelty. Coasing to be a 
Hindu by conversion to another religion and renunciation 
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of the world by entering a religious order are grounds for 
divorce peculiar to Hindu law, which I have defined and 
discussed in this chapter. 
In the second part of the second chapter of this 
work I have also discussed the grounds of divorce under 
Islam or Muslim law. The guiding principle in the matter 
of the husband's duty towards his wife is provided by the 
verse of the Qur'an where in it is laid down, "To keep 
them (the wives) with kindness or separate (from them) 
with humanity," in Surah al-Nisa, IV:34. It is stated at 
another palce, in Surah al-Bagarah,ll:231, "And They (the 
wives) have rights similar to those against them in a just 
manner." The Prophet (peace be on him) said in his sermon 
at the last plgrimage, "0, my people, you have certain 
rights over your wives and so have your wives over you': 
At another time he s ressed this matter when he told a 
person "thy body has a right over the and the soul has a 
right over thee and thy wife has a right over thee." 
As stated, one of the important objects of marriage is a 
happy companionship of the parties and with this end in 
view the husband has to perform certain marrital 
obligations. But the failure to perform marital 
obligations by a husband does not necessarily constitute a 
cause for the dissolution of marriage. In some cases it 
may amount to a moral offence only, but in the case of the 
breach of some important obligations the wife gets a right 
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to the dissolution of her marriage. 
In India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, a wife can also 
get her marriage dissolved under the provisions of Act 
viii of 1939, if the husband fails to perform his marital 
obligations. 
In chapter III I have discussed the modes of 
divorce/dissolution of marriage under Hindu Religion or 
Hindu Law and in the secnd part of this chapter I have 
discussed and defined the modes of divorce/dissolution of 
marriage under Islam or Muslim law. 
In fourth Chapter I have discussed the effected 
divorce under Hinduism and Hindu Law and also I have 
discussed the effected divorce under Islam or Muslim Law. 
In Chapter fifth I have metioned the present Hindu 
and Muslim Laws on divorce and the concerned Acts, (causes 
of the Independant India) 
In Chapter sixth I have discussed points of 
similarities and dissimilarities (in the both religious) 
in the fields of 
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